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INTRODUCTION
CIENTIFIC evidence has always posed special problems for the
law,1 and in recent years these problems have become increasingly
difficult.2 Because an expert can be found to support almost any posi-
1. The use of scientific evidence dates from as far back as the fourteenth century.
See Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv.
L. Rev. 40, 42-43 (1901). Nonetheless, the law has yet to develop a satisfactory way to
take advantage of the special knowledge offered by science while assuring the validity and
reliability of the opinions offered by expert witnesses.
As Professor Korn has observed,
[m]uch has been written about the patent weaknesses of a system which pro-
vides for the presentation of [specialized] information by party-selected and
compensated expert witnesses to an otherwise untutored and unassisted lay tri-
bunal. Attention has also been directed to impediments imposed by the formal
trial process and rules of evidence, especially those governing expert testimony.
Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1080, 1080-81 (1966)
(footnotes omitted); see also Elliott & Spillman, Medical Testimony in Personal Injury
Cases, 2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 466, 466 (1935) (quoting commencement address to
1915 Harvard Medical School class in which speaker described expert medical witnesses
at trial as coming from "two hostile camps, and prepared to attempt, under solemn oath,
to uphold opinions diametrically opposed, yet supposedly derived from a single series of
facts and observations"); Ford & Holmes, The Professional Medical Advocate, 17 Sw. LU.
551, 552 (1963) ("Some courts and writers are of the opinion that (expert medical testi-
mony] is the most unsatisfactory and unreliable part of judicial administration."); Smith,
Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 23 B.U.L. Rev. 143, 146 (1943) (as
long ago as 1909, 60% of cases in Suffolk County Superior Court, Massachusetts, in-
volved expert testimony); Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity,
25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 675, 675 (1984) (one of the most serious problems with scientific
evidence "has been the inability of lay factfinders to understand complex scientific and
technical evidence").
Courts and lawyers often just wash their hands of science. In Smith v. W. Horace
Williams Co., 84 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1956), for example, the court noted that it had
"[n]ever... been confronted with a more formidable record of contradictory medical
testimony." l at 225. It then simply deferred to the lower court, declaring that a
"study of this tremendous record leaves us almost hopelessly confused." Id at 227.
2. As one writer has recently noted:
In the past twenty years courts have confronted an increasing variety of contro-
versies over the safety of new technologies, the liability for harm caused by
technological hazards, and the validity or sufficiency of regulatory policies for
controlling science and technology. Despite the emergence of these technically
complex disputes, there has been remarkably little institutional or procedural
reform to ensure a smoother legal passage for such cases.
Jasanoff, Science and the Courts Advice for a Troubled Marriage, 2 Nat. Resources &
Env't 3, 3 (Fall 1986); see also M. Saks & R. Van Duizend, The Use of Scientific Evidence
in Litigation 3 (1983) ("[P]ractitioners and policymakers have had to cope with the
problems engendered by [scientific and technological information] in largely unsystematic
ways."). The bitterly contested testimony by scientific experts that regularly surfaces in
toxic tort litigation involving disease or injury allegedly caused by exposure to chemicals
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tion,3 most commentators agree on the need for judicial review and con-
trol,4 but there is no consensus on how to achieve these objectives. 5 This
or radiation, or by the use of pharmaceuticals or other products, causes particular
problems. See infra note 29.
3. See Ford & Holmes, supra note 1, at 553 (discussing problem of professional testi-
fiers); Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring
Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 43, 45 ("Today practicing
lawyers can locate quickly and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly anything the
lawyers desire."); Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Man-
agement in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 333 (1985) ("The scientific community is
large and heterogeneous, and a Ph.D. can be found to swear to almost any 'expert' propo-
sition, no matter how false or foolish."); Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 473, 482 (1986) ("An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost
any factual theory, no matter how frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid
summary judgment and force the matter to trial.. . . Juries and judges can be, and
sometimes are, misled by the expert-for-hire."); see, e.g., Ladner v. Higgins, Inc., 71 So.
2d 242, 244 (La. Ct. App. 1954) (witness acknowledged that his opinion depended on
which side had retained him).
4. The National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, a joint entity of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, re-
cently concluded an extensive review of the rules governing scientific evidence. The
group reached a general consensus that some special screening of scientific evidence is
necessary, but reached no agreement on exactly what rule should be used. See Rules for
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 81 (1987) (symposium report); see
also Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 Utah L. Rev.
313, 325 (1963-64) (advocating reasonable reliability test); Giannelli, The Admissibility of
Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L.
Rev. 1197, 1245-50 (1980) (advocating a reliability test that shifts the burden of proving
reliability to the party offering scientific testimony into evidence); Graham, supra note 3,
at 90 (advocating common law barriers to admissibility, including the Frye standard, the
requirement of disclosure of the basis for an expert's opinion, the reasonable certainty
test, and the prohibition of opinions on ultimate issues to ensure trustworthiness); Lipton,
The Results of Scientific Techniques as Evidence in Federal Courts: Evolution of the Frye
v. United States Standard in the Period 1969-1977, 8 Envtl. L. 769, 769-70 (1978) (com-
paring traditional general acceptance approach with modem approach, which focuses on
accuracy); McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67
Iowa L. Rev. 879, 911-12 (1982) (advocating eleven-factor balancing test focusing on
accuracy and reliability); Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative
to the Frye Rule, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 545, 573-74 (1984) (emphasizing focus on
reliability, citing the eleven-factor test proposed by Judge McCormick); Note, People v.
Murtishaw: Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital
Cases, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 1069, 1089 (1982) (advocating general acceptance test); Note,
Expert Testimony Based on Novel Scientific Techniques: Admissibility Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 774, 777, 790 (1980) (advocating general ac-
ceptance test as best guarantee of an available pool of experts and of scientific validity);
Case Comment, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence:
State v. Williams, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 757, 768-69 (1979) (advocating flexible reliability test).
5. See supra note 4. Three reports published in Federal Rules Decisions since 1983
provide an excellent summary of current legal scholarship on scientific evidence. The
first report, Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983), is
concerned primarily with the Frye test of general acceptance and alternatives to it. See
id.; see also infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, and infra Part II. The second
report, Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599 (1983),
discusses the relationship between science and the rules of legal procedure. The third
report, Rulesfor Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987), contains four
proposals for a model rule on admissibility of scientific evidence. One of these proposals
is essentially procedural. See id. at 102-07. A second proposal advocates a reliability test,
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Article argues that solving the problems surrounding the use and inter-
pretation of scientific evidence requires a unified, coherent approach to
deciding admissibility that covers all areas of science and all kinds of
cases. In order to develop such an approach, this Article proposes a the-
oretical framework based on distinguishing two aspects of relevancy: (1)
the validity of the reasoning leading to a conclusion, and (2) the reliabil-
ity of the conclusion.
Validity and reliability, though intertwined, are very different con-
cepts. One normally speaks of "valid" rather than "reliable" reasons or
theories, and of "reliable" rather than "valid" instruments or machines.
Results, conclusions, or techniques may be either valid or reliable. Be-
hind these simple examples of everyday usage lie largely overlooked con-
ceptual distinctions and relationships that are fundamental to a coherent
legal theory of scientific evidence.
As used in this Article, reliability means that a successful outcome, or
a correct answer, is sufficiently probable for a given situation.6 A base-
ball player who gets a hit forty percent of the time is an extremely relia-
ble batter,7 but a lie detection device that correctly indicates falsehood
ninety percent of the time may not be reliable enough for use at trial.' In
contrast to reliability, validity means that which results from sound and
cogent reasoning.' An invalid conclusion cannot be reliable, yet valid
reasoning does not necessarily lead to reliable conclusions."o Reliability
is the ultimate legal concern,1" but when it hinges on controversial and
see id at 84-88; a third, a relevancy test, determined in accordance with a Rule 403
balancing process, see id at 89-91; and a fourth, a validity test. See id at 92-101. These
proposals are presented as alternate modifications to Rule 702. Thus, all three of the
nonprocedural proposals miss the point that reliability and validity simply are two as-
pects of relevancy. See infra Part I.B. None of the proposals provides any guidance on
how to determine validity.
6. According to the dictionary, the term reliable "describes what can be counted on
or trusted in to do as expected or to be truthful." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1917 (1961).
7. Indeed, Tommy Henrich, an outfielder with the New York Yankees from 1937
until 1950, was known as Old Reliable, even though his lifetime batting average was .282.
He batted over .300 only three times in eleven Major League seasons. See J. Reichler,
The Baseball Encyclopedia 959 (5th ed. 1982).
8. See e.g., People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 371, 72 N.W.2d 269, 282 (1955) (refus-
ing to admit lie detector test results because "[tihere is still a percentage of error in the
results, estimated at being from less than 10% to 25% by various authorities").
9. The dictionary defines the term "valid" as "well grounded or justifiable [and]
applicable to the matter at hand." As an example of how the word is used, the dictionary
describes a valid argument or principle as one which is "supported either by objective
truth or a generally accepted standard or authority." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 2529-30 (1961).
10. It is possible for incorrect reasoning to produce a correct answer by chance, but
there is no way for a court or a jury to know when a lucky guess has been made. If a
method is based on incorrect premises, but still provides accurate predictions, it may be a
valid predictor. For some purposes, it would thus meet the validity portion of the stan-
dard proposed by this Article.
11. See Saltzburg, Frye and Alternatives, 99 F.R.D. 208, 212 (1983).
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contested reasoning, the validity of that reasoning must be addressed. 2
Distinguishing between validity and reliability is important because it
permits the separation of scientific questions from legal questions. For
example, when an expert concludes that there exists a five percent
probability that a plaintiff's disease was caused by a product made by a
defendant, there is the scientific question whether or not the expert is
correct, and the legal question whether this probability level warrants
presenting the conclusion to the jury. 3 This Article views the scientific
question as a matter of validity, with the answer depending on accepted
scientific practice and the soundness and cogency of the entire pattern of
reasoning leading to the expert's conclusion. 14 In contrast, the legal
question relates to how much reliability the law requires, with the answer
depending on legal standards.1 5
Part I of this Article establishes valid reasoning and reliable conclu-
sions as the two focal points for the legal analysis of scientific evidence,
and demonstrates how the legal concept of relevancy embraces both va-
lidity and reliability. Courts, however, usually ignore the validity aspect
of relevancy, even though the Federal Rules of Evidence are flexible
enough to permit them to address it. 6 This Article therefore proposes a
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. There is also the legal question of how a given level of probability translates into
liability. Under most legal theories, for example, a causal relationship between the de-
fendant's culpable conduct and the plaintiff's injury must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. That is, it must be shown that, more likely than not, the relationship
exists. See Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 Fordham
L. Rev. 732, 749-50 (1984).
14. See infra Part I.C. (discussing the modem view of how science validates theories);
Part II.D.4 (discussing how scientists reason by interweaving theory and observation).
15. See infra notes 52-70, 176-81 and accompanying text.
16. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain no explicit requirement that the reasoning
that underlies a scientific opinion conform to any standard. Rule 702 deals with the
qualifications of an expert, see Fed. R. Evid. 702, and Rules 703 and 705 deal with the
factual basis for an expert's conclusion, see Fed. R. Evid. 703 & 705, but no rule directly
addresses the reasoning that must connect the basis to the conclusion. Some courts have
used Rule 702 or Rule 703 to exercise control in this area, though very few decisions
explicitly consider the fundamental question whether the connective reasoning is valid.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (1st Cir. 1987)
(rejecting extrapolation of animal test results to humans, and rejecting an epidemiologic
analysis that had never been refereed or published); Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F.
Supp. 1087, 1090 (D. Md. 1986) ("The foundation for the [expert] testimony about [rela-
tionship between the Cu-7 IUD and disease] was virtually nonexistent; it was not backed
by sound scientific evidence that was related specifically to the Cu-7 or IUD's which were
comparable to the Cu-7."), aff'd mem., Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1987); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (discussed infra notes 482-96), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987);
Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694
(1988) (discussed infra notes 501-05).
Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein observed that "[t]he very flexibility of the current rules
regulating expert testimony requires judges to exercise more control in some cases."
Weinstein, supra note 3, at 473. Professor Imwinkelried advocates the use of Federal
Rules of Evidence 901, 611, and 403 to reach the validity of theories or techniques. See
Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts
[Vol. 56600
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clarification of Rule 702"7 that would explicitly require consideration of
both scientific validity and the legal significance of reliability in deciding
whether to admit scientific evidence. 8 In order to provide guidance on
how the law can evaluate the validity of scientific reasoning, Part I also
discusses the way in which science itself determines validity. Contrary to
longstanding misperceptions, science does not generate exact knowledge
with logical certainty. Instead, it relies on the give and take of criticism,
testing, experimentation, and review to determine what is valid. 9 Wide-
spread consensus and acceptance, therefore, is the central test that scien-
tists use to decide the validity of theories and reasoning in any given
context,2' which is a test that the law can adopt and use successfully.
Part II uses the proposed validity-reliability analysis to resolve a long-
standing debate about whether scientific evidence should be subject to the
same rule of relevancy as any other evidence2 or to the test of Frye v.
United States,' which is still followed in most jurisdictions.' Under
Frye, courts admit "expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 577, 606-
16 (1984) [hereinafter Imwinkelried I]. See generally Fed. R. Evid. 901, 611 & 403.
Other commentators discuss how active control of scientific evidence fits within the Fed-
eral Rules. Professor Graham, for example, analyzes the way courts have applied the
Rules. He does not advocate any changes in the Rules themselves, but he does suggest
that they be interpreted in light of common law requirements, such as general acceptance,
which were developed to ensure trustworthiness. See Graham, supra note 3, at 89-90; see
also Rothstein & Crew, When Should the Judge Keep Expert Testimony From the Jury?, 1
Inside Litigation 19, 26 (Apr. 1987) (noting that strict scrutiny of scientific evidence
"seems to be an accelerating modem movement and is the direction of the future").
17. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
18. Sufficiency and admissibility are two distinct issues. Evidence can be admissible
but not sufficient to sustain a party's burden of proof on a particular issue. See Martin,
The Uncertain Rule of Certainty: An Analysis and Proposal for a Federal Evidence Rule,
20 Wayne L. Rev. 781, 797-802 (1974); Musslewhite, Medical Causation Testimony in
Texas. Possibility Versus Probability, 23 Sw. L.J. 622, 622 (1969); Note, Causation in
Disease" Quantum of Proof Required to Reach the Jury, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 793, 796-98
(1959).
Scientific evidence can be controlled using either an admissibility or a sufficiency test.
The distinction is not one of great concern for the purposes of this Article. The difference
is more a question of whether the evidence is central enough to the litigation to warrant
judgment against the offering party if it is deficient. In terms of this Article's two-step
approach, admissibility is more closely tied to the validity of reasoning, while sufficiency
is more closely related to the question of whether testimony is reliable enough to warrant
presentation to the trier of fact. Sufficiency is also related to the question whether a
conclusion is reliable enough to satisfy substantive legal requirements, such as the pre-
ponderance of the evidence test.
19. See infra Part I.C.3.
20. See id'
21. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
22. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
23. See Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical
Evaluation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1769, 1769 (1986). But see Rossi, Modern Evidence and the
Expert Witness, 12 Litigation 18, 20 (Fall 1985) (noting that "[w]ithin the last decade,
courts in more than 15 jurisdictions have rejected Frye"). Both courts and commentators
have attacked Frye. For example, in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.
1985), the court observed:
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scientific principle or discovery, [only if] the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made [is] sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." 24 Although based on accept-
ance, Frye does not indicate whether it is the conclusions that result from
reasoning or the reasoning itself that must be accepted. Frye makes ac-
ceptance the exclusive test for admissibility, whereas this Article's pro-
posed mode of analysis looks to acceptance only as the best indication of
the validity of the reasoning supporting a particular scientific opinion.25
Part II further argues that when reasoning is not at issue, acceptance
should have no bearing on legal disputes about the reliability of scientific
conclusions. 2
6
Part III illustrates how the proposed approach would greatly improve
the evaluation of medical testimony, to which the test of "reasonable
medical certainty" 27 is now usually applied. Use of the traditional stan-
dard generally means that courts do no more than consider the qualifica-
tions of an expert, the factual basis for his or her conclusion, and the
degree of confidence expressed in his or her opinion.2" As a result, courts
scrutinize neither the validity of the expert's reasoning nor the reliability
of his or her conclusions. In recent years, the traditional test has been
stretched to the breaking point by the kind of medical controversies that
regularly surface in toxic tort litigation.29 When experts clash in this
In sum, the Frye test suffers from serious flaws. The test has proved to be too
malleable to provide the method for orderly and uniform decision-making envi-
sioned by some of its proponents. Moreover, in its pristine form the general
acceptance standard reflects a conservative approach to the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence that is at odds with the spirit, if not the precise language, of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Id. at 1237; see also Symposium on Science and Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 188
(1983) (noting the "intractable ambiguity" of Frye's general acceptance test); Giannelli,
Frye v. United States, Background Paper Prepared for the National Conference of Lawyers
and Scientists, 99 F.R.D. 189, 191-93 (1983) (summarizing criticisms of the Frye test).
But see Graham, supra note 3, at 55 (advocating the continued use of Frye).
24. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
25. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 161-85 and accompanying text.
27. See Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U.L. Rev. 521, 527 (1986) (traditional standard for admitting a medical
opinion "requires the expert to be qualified, to have used respected [though not necessar-
ily scientific] methodology in arriving at his opinion, and to express confidence in his
opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty"); see also infra note 371.
28. See infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
29. This Article loosely defines toxic tort cases as those in which plaintiffs seek com-
pensation for harm allegedly caused by exposure to a substance that increases the risk of
contracting a serious disease, but generally involve a period of latency or incubation prior
to the onset of the disease. Exposure to radiation and the use of pharmaceutical drugs or
products fall within this loose rubric. Many kinds of injuries are involved, but most toxic
tort cases involve cancer and the issue of carcinogenesis. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra
note 13, at 739-49. An excellent discussion of the variety of cases that fall within the
toxic tort category is provided in Feinberg, The Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis: Conceptual
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous. L. Rev. 155 (1987).
On the problems toxic tort cases create for the law, see Nesson, supra note 27, at 528
n.24 (noting that the "ill-defined standard" of "reasonable certainty" now used for medi-
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context, courts relying on the traditional medical certainty test have
often been unable or unwilling to differentiate between opinions based on
science and those based on mere speculation by individual scientists.3"
The analytical framework proposed in this Article calls upon courts to
evaluate scientific reasoning, which raises the question of how nonexperts
can judge the way in which scientists reach their conclusions. Both
courts and lawyers generally have shunned this kind of review as dis-
tasteful and beyond their abilities.31 Part IV addresses this concern by
cal evidence can lead to "striking inconsistencies" in the way courts respond to medical
experts' conclusions); see also Institute for Health Policy Analysis, Georgetown Univer-
sity Medical Center, Conference Panel Report, Causation and Financial Compensation
41 (1986) (observing that many judges permit expert testimony that many scientists
would consider unsupported by data and logically or methodologically unsound); Riley,
Toxic Shock Syndrome" Proving Causation Before Science Has, 6 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 15,
15 (1982) (noting disagreement among competent experts); Rosenberg, The Causal Con-
nection in Mass Exposure Caser A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L
Rev. 849, 855-59 (1984) (discussing problem of proving causation); Weinstein, supra note
3, at 473 (questioning whether we ask too much of expert witnesses, especially in toxic
tort and psychiatric cases); cf. Nesson, supra note 27, at 529 (suggesting that opinions
about disease causation that are not scientifically supported should still be admissible and
sufficient).
Typical recent toxic tort cases include Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d
741 (11th Cir.) (birth defects allegedly caused by contraceptive foam), reh'g denied en
banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.) (lung disease allegedly caused by exposure to her-
bicide), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., Inc., 646 F.
Supp. 856 (D. Mass. 1986) (Bendectin case), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Marder
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Md. 1986) (infection and other injuries
allegedly caused by IUD), aff'd mem., Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655
(4th Cir. 1987); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (F-D.N.Y.
1985) (health problems allegedly caused by Agent Orange), aff'd on other grounds, 818
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); and Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984)
(cancer allegedly caused by low-level radiation exposure), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694
(1988).
30 See infra Part III.B.
31. Professor Graham has observed that "[ain underlying problem is that lawyers do
not understand science, including the fundamentals of the scientific method and the tech-
niques by which scientific evidence is generated. Unfortunately, many of the lawyers who
might benefit most by overcoming that deficiency exhibit a reluctance to try." Sympo-
sium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 232 (1983) (remarks during
plenary session).
Joseph Nicol has observed that a very important consideration in dealing with scien-
tific evidence
is the inability of the defense bar to handle scientific matters. The sad truth is
that those attorneys simply are incapable by education, and all too often by
inclination, to become sufficiently familiar with scientific evidence to discharge
their responsibilities toward the administration of justice. The scientific illiter-
acy of nearly all lawyers is a disgrace to their profession. The fault lies equally
with the individual lawyers and with the legal profession, including law schools
and bar associations.
Id at 221.
In an article calling for a more detailed evaluation of the weight of scientific evidence,
Professor Imwinkelried has written that "[flor their part, in this new era of scientific
evidence attorneys must not only be familiar with the legal standards governing the ad-
missibility of scientific proof; attorneys must also familiarize themselves with the data
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examining cases that establish that courts do have the ability to deal with
science. These cases show that when expert witnesses are forced to make
their reasoning explicit, courts can evaluate it against accepted scientific
practice.32
Part IV also considers the way in which application of the proposed
unified theory would actually affect the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Finally, it reviews the procedural options available to courts for
controlling testimony based on invalid reasoning. These options range
from pretrial in limine exclusion to posttrial judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, but this Part argues that the pretrial procedures generally are
preferable because they permit more thorough and efficient review.33
This Article concludes that the problems surrounding scientific evidence
can be resolved by separating scientific concerns from legal ones and by
excluding scientific conclusions based more on a particular scientist's
personal biases than on sound scientific reasoning.
34
bases and interpretive standards that facilitate evaluating the weight of scientific evi-
dence." Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 261, 289-90 (1981)
[hereinafter Imwinkelried II].
The call for a more scientifically informed legal profession is not new. See Cavers,
Introduction to Science and the Law Symposium, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1325, 1334 (1965)
("the law may seem condemned to a chronic catching-up process"); Loevinger, Law and
Science as Rival Systems, 8 Jurimetrics J. 63, 70 (Dec. 1966) (noting traditional hostility
of legal profession to study of science or its methods); cf Goldberg, The Reluctant Em-
brace: Law and Science in America, 75 Geo. L.J. 1341, 1350 (1987) ("It would be a
mistake to believe, however, that these differences between law and science prevent mem-
bers of these professions from understanding each other. There is no reason why lawyers
and scientists cannot comprehend the different nature of the other's work and appreciate
when it is being done well.").
Professor Goldberg views the primary difference between law and science as being
rooted in the fact that science focuses on progress while the law focuses on process. See id.
at 1345-46. While this may be true, it should not be forgotten that scientists work to-
wards their goal of progress through the scientific process. It is the premise of this Arti-
cle that when scientists testify as expert witnesses, they should base their testimony on
this scientific process.
32. See infra Part IV.B. As Professor Ladd once put it,
[i]n most cases... scientific problem[s] [are] not so far beyond the reach of the
ordinary person that the reasons and theory back of an opinion serve no pur-
pose in creating an intelligent understanding. Quite to the contrary, qualified
experts may be used to throw a surer light upon a case by refinement of the
average juryman's knowledge.
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 429 (1952).
33. See infra Part IV.D.
34. On the problem of personal biases of scientists, see infra note 214. These biases
may manifest themselves in the willingness of witnesses to tailor testimony to their cli-
ent's needs, see supra note 3, or to give opinions about ultimate issues clearly beyond their
expertise. For example, in Commonwealth v. Hart, 348 Pa. Super. 117, 501 A.2d 675
(1985), a doctor testified that, based on the nature of the wounds on a child's corpse, the
child had been murdered. See id. at 121, 501 A.2d at 677.
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I. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON DISTINGUISHING THE
VALIDITY OF REASONING FROM THE RELIABILITY OF
CONCLUSIONS
A. Reasoning and Conclusions as the Focal Points for the Legal
Analysis of Scientific Evidence
The law's contact with science almost always comes through expert
witness testimony. An expert testifies about his or her conclusions, which
are based on facts generally relied upon in the expert's field35 and on the
facts in evidence. Reasoning connects the facts to the conclusions.36 A
legal analysis centered on reasoning and conclusions therefore addresses
the most fundamental concerns about the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Most commentators, however, have focused their analyses on dis-
crete scientific techniques,37 devices,3 principles,39 or theories." This
diffuse approach masks the basic conceptual issues at the core of all evi-
dentiary disputes about science.4'
35. Fed. I Evid. 703.
36. See McCoid, Opinion Evidence and Expert Witnesses, 2 UCLA L. Rev. 356, 356
(1955) (experts allowed to give opinions because they are capable of drawing inferences
from proved facts).
37. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1198 & nn. 1-6 (giving as examples neutron
activation analysis, sound spectrometry, psycholinguistics, atomic absorption, remote
electromagnetic sensing, and bitemark comparisons); Imwinkelried I, supra note 16, at
577 (referring to theories underlying scientific techniques); Imwinkelried I1, supra note
31, at 262 (referring to forensic techniques); Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 Jurimetrics J.
254, 255 (1984) (focusing on validity of principle underlying a technique, on validity of
technique applying the principle, and on proper application of the technique); Moenssens,
supra note 4, at 545 (referring to Frye as an obstacle to evidence based on novel scientific
techniques).
38. See, e.g., Boyce, supra note 4, at 315-23 (referring to various devices).
39. See, e.g., id. at 313; Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1198; Lacey, supra note 37, at 255.
40. See e.g., Boyce, supra note 4, at 313 ("Enforcement agencies, both public and
private, have been applying new devices and theories of a scientific nature in an effort to
stem the rising crime rate."); Imwinkelried I, supra note 16, at 579-82 (discussing impor-
tance of determining validity of underlying scientific theory).
41. Professor Imwinkelried has noted that the "typical text [on scientific evidence] is
a catalogue of scientific techniques.... These texts do not even attempt to synthesize the
voluminous material and do not offer the attorney an overall approach to evaluating the
probative weight of the myriad techniques mentioned in the texts." Imwinkelried II,
supra note 31, at 273. For a recent example, see J. Tarantino, Strategic Use of Scientific
Evidence (1988), which, after a brief introduction, launches into discussions of specific
techniques ranging from fingerprinting to thermography. The introductory chapter dis-
cusses both reliability and validity, but neither clearly defines these terms nor articulates
their relationship within an analytical framework. See ict at 3-20.
Disputes about reliability, which is the law's ultimate concern, may involve the ques-
tion of how well a device or a technique works, or questions about the validity of a
principle or a theory, but addressing these questions comes down to the available empiri-
cal evidence and the expert's reasoning about that evidence. Even for a relatively simple
device such as a radar speed detector, the legal determination of reliability depends on
reasoned, expert conclusions about the "construction, the operation and the purpose of
[the instrument in question], its margin of error if properly functioning, and the ways and
means of testing its accuracy." State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210, 213, 100 A.2d 778, 779
(Super. Ct. 1953). See generally Annotation, Proof, By Radar or Other Mechanical or
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Disputes about techniques or devices usually involve questions about
the accuracy of what they measure or determine, 2 or about the interpre-
tation of measurements or results. 43 Whether it is a question of measure-
ment or interpretation, however, the issue comes down to reasoning and
conclusions. What reasons lead to the conclusion that a breath analyzer
consistently measures the alcohol content of a person's breath, and what
reasons lead to the conclusion that such a measurement provides an accu-
rate and consistent enough indication of blood alcohol level upon which
to base a conviction for drunk driving?" Likewise, what reasons underlie
the technique of HLA blood type matching, and how reliable are the
conclusions it provides about paternity?45
Evidentiary issues related to scientific principles and theories also are
best analyzed within a framework that examines the reasoning connect-
ing facts to conclusions and separately examines the conclusions them-
selves. Both principles and theories result from reasoning, and can be
viewed as general propositions or conclusions upon which further rea-
soning is based.46 In addition, the word "theory" may have a less univer-
sal meaning. When a scientist refers to a theory, he or she may mean
nothing more than an explanation for a specific event, such as why a
rocket exploded.47 In either the general or the specific sense, however,
the evaluation of theories reduces to an evaluation of reasoning. Indeed,
in the specific sense, an expert's theory is his or her reasoning.
Past commentary on scientific devices, techniques, principles, or theo-
ries48 therefore indirectly reflects concerns about the same basic concep-
Electronic Devices, of Violation of Speed Regulations, 47 A.L.R. 3d 822 (1973). Resolving
legal issues related to more complex and controversial areas of science surely requires no
less attention to the reasoning behind an expert's conclusions, or to the legal significance
of those conclusions.
Professor Graham has outlined six factors that govern the reliability of evidence de-
rived from a scientific principle: "(1) the validity of the underlying scientific principle, (2)
the validity of the technique or process that applies the principle, (3) the condition of any
instrumentation used in the process, (4) adherence to proper procedures, (5) the qualifica-
tions of the person who performs the test, and (6) the qualifications of the person who
interprets the results." Graham, supra note 3, at 52 (citing E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli,
F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal Evidence 83-90 (1979)). This list certainly touches
upon the kind of relationship that must exist between principle and application, but it
overlooks the fact that the reasoning connecting factual evidence to expert conclusions is
the more fundamental concern. The validity of a scientific principle depends on the rea-
soning behind it, as does the validity of any application of such a principle.
42. For example, does a radar speed detector accurately measure speed, or does a
blood test accurately determine blood alcohol level? Similar questions can be raised
about almost any measuring or analytical technique.
43. For example, does a given blood alcohol level imply inebriation, or do
nondestructive metallurgical test results imply that steel is of a given tensile strength?
44. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 717 S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).
45. See generally Ellman & Kaye, Probabilities and Proof- Can HLA and Blood
Group Testing Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1131 (1979).
46. An accepted theory, like the theory of relativity, or electromagnetic theory, can
be viewed as "pre-packaged" reasoning.
47. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 37-40.
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tual issues that this Article addresses directly. With the validity of
reasoning and the reliability of conclusions as the focal points for analy-
sis, a single, unified approach for all evidentiary applications of science
becomes possible. Furthermore, this approach accords with the tradi-
tional law of evidence.49
B. The Reliability and Validity Aspects of Relevancy
The law of evidence incorporates both validity and reliability into the
conceptual touchstone of relevancy. Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to make the existence of a fact at issue more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. 0 Whether a relationship exists
between a piece of evidence and a fact at issue "depends upon principles
evolved by experience or science, applied logically to the situation at
hand."5 " Relevancy thus encompasses questions about both the validity
of the reasoning that links evidentiary facts to conclusions and the relia-
bility of those conclusions. This Article's proposed analytical framework
addresses the same issues.
In deciding issues about scientific evidence, however, courts generally
have fixed on the reliability of conclusions. The validity of the reasoning
leading to conclusions usually is ignored, often because the issue of valid-
ity is not raised. United States v. Williams5" provides an excellent exam-
ple of the conceptual predominance of reliability, and demonstrates how
reliability connotes probability of correctness. One of the issues in Wil-
liams involved the identity of a telephone caller whose voice had been
recorded during a call he had made to an undercover officer about a
proposed heroin sale.53 The trial court allowed the government to intro-
duce testimony about a voice spectrograph (or voiceprint) comparison'
to help establish that the defendant had been the caller.5 After his con-
viction, the defendant appealed, arguing that evidence based on the tech-
nique should have been excluded.56
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to admit the disputed evidence, noting that
the admissibility of scientific evidence, like any other evidence, should be
determined by weighing probativeness, materiality and reliability against
49. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
50. See Fed. R. Evid. 401.
51. Fed. R. Evid. 401, notes of advisory committee on Proposed Rules.
52. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
53. See id at 1195-96.
54. Voice spectrograph, or voiceprint analysis, presumes that everyone's voice is dif-
ferent, and that a graphical representation of the voice produced by an electrical device
known as a sound spectrograph is unique for any individual. See Annotation, Admissibil-
ity and Weight of Voiceprint Evidence, 97 A.L.R. 3d 294, 298 (1980); Spectrogram Voice
Identification, 19 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 423 (1967); see also Note, The Voiceprint Di-
lemma.: Should Voices Be Seen and Not Heard?, 35 Md. L. Rev. 267, 271 (1975).
55. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1978), cerL denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
56. See id
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any tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury.57 The circuit
court's main concern was the reliability of voiceprint identification and
its possible tendency to mislead.58 In deciding the question of reliability,
several indicia were considered, including a low error rate, the mainte-
nance of standards, the care with which the technique had been em-
ployed, similarity to other tests, and "fail-safe" characteristics.5 9 The
court's concentration on these five factors, and its holding in favor of
admissibility show that its decision turned upon a finding that the tech-
nique was, for legal purposes, likely enough to provide a correct identifi-
cation," and that the jury would not perceive a higher degree of
reliability than in fact existed.6'
Williams also illustrates how judicial concentration on reliability often
reflects the failure of lawyers to question the reasoning of experts. Be-
cause the reasoning underlying the voice spectrograph comparison ap-
parently was not contested, the court had to consider only whether a less
than certain identification was probative enough to outweigh its potential
for confusing or biasing the jury. Had the court considered the validity
of the reasoning, it might have decided differently, 62 but on the evidence
of the case, the decision related to the legal significance of a scientifically
uncontested fact-namely the probability that the voice on the tape was
that of the defendant. Indeed, the opinion explicitly notes that "courts
cannot ... surrender to scientists the responsibility for determining the
reliability of ... evidence. "63
Evidence based on the science of epidemiology,' often at issue in toxic
tort cases,65 further illustrates how the distinction between the validity of
57. See id. at 1198.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1198-99.
60. Williams was a case in which the Frye test was rejected, see id. at 1198, freeing the
court to focus on reliability. Courts that apply Frye generally are less prone to admit
voiceprint evidence than courts that have rejected Frye, but their analysis also tends to
focus primarily on reliability issues. See, eg., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explicitly distinguishing reliability from acceptance, but in ap-
plying acceptance test, focusing on probable success rate and problems in determining
error rate).
61. For a discussion of the issue of weighing the probative value of proferred evidence
against its prejudicial effect, see United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.)
("Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes
its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific
evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be at-
tacked by cross-examination and refutation."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); see also
Fed. R. Evid. 403.
62. See infra notes 270-82 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979).
64. "Epidemiology is concerned with the patterns of disease occurrence in human
populations and the factors that influence these patterns." A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld,
Foundations of Epidemiology 3 (2d ed. 1980).
65. A substantial body of legal literature on this topic has developed in recent years.
See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 13; Dore, A Commentary on the Use ofEpidemiological
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reasoning and the reliability of conclusions parallels a separation of legal
and scientific issues. Epidemiologists study the patterns of disease occur-
rence in human population groups, and, from these patterns, infer rela-
tionships between diseases and factors suspected of causing them.66 In
the case of infectious diseases, a microorganism or virus responsible for
all cases of a disease usually can be identified with great assurance.67 For
latent diseases like cancer, however, causal factors cannot be identified
with similar precision and certainty, either in general or in specific
cases. 68 This imprecise causal attribution has generated considerable
legal debate, 69 but epidemiologic reasoning is rarely attacked. Legal
choices about epidemiology usually do not involve scientific questions
Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 429 (1983); Hall &
Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 Harv. Envl. L Rev.
441 (1983); Jacob, Of Causation in Science and Law: Consequences of the Erosion of
Safeguards, 40 Bus. Law. 1229 (1985); McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substancex
The Problem of Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 Clev. St. L. Rev. 29 (1984);
Novick, Use of Epidemiological Studies to Prove Legal Causation: Aspirin and Reye's
Syndrome, A Case in Point, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 536 (1987); see also In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing In re Swine Flu
Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo. 1981), aff'd sub nom.
Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that when the
exact organic cause of a disease cannot be scientifically isolated, epidemiologic data be-
comes highly persuasive), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
66. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 750-51.
67. See S. Epstein, The Politics of Cancer 38-39 (1978).
68. See id at 39.
69. A relatively recent student Note captures the flavor of this debate. See Note,
Causation in Toxic Torts Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evi-
dence, 96 Yale L.J. 376 (1986). The student author raises interesting philosophical ques-
tions about the use of probability estimates to resolve the issue of causation. The author
distinguishes between "fact probability" and "belief probability," pointing out that just
because statistical evidence establishes a certain level of probability for a population, it
does not necessarily follow that one must conclude that this was the probability of causa-
tion in an individual case. Id at 386-92. The Note asserts that it is inappropriate to
apply population based probability estimates directly to the probability of causation in
any individual case. See id. at 382-84.
The question that the Note raises relates to a choice that must be made between alter-
native philosophical concepts of what the Note terms "fact probability": the population
frequency concept, and the chance or wagering concept. See id at 383-84. Under the
frequency view, the rate of occurrence of a disease in a population cannot be used as the
basis for estimating the probability that an individual member of the population con-
tracted the disease as a result of exposure to a suspected factor. Under the second view,
however, the population frequency rate provides the best information to use if one were
making a rational wager on whether or not an individual contracted the disease because
of exposure. See I. Hacking, The Logic of Statistical Inference 1-12 (1965); see also Kaye,
The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1979)
(pointing out that "skepticism about the application of probability theory to legal
factfinding rests on fundamental misconceptions about the philosophical debate over the
meaning of probability, the character of rational decisionmaking, and the values of the
legal system").
For a more detailed discussion of "belief probability," see generally L. J. Cohen, The
Probable and the Provable (1977). This is reviewed in Schum, A Review of a Case Against
Blaise Pascal and His Heirs, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 446 (1979). See also Cohen, On Analyzing
the Standards of Forensic Evidence." A Reply to Schoeman, 54 Phil. of Sci. 92 (1987);
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about the validity of epidemiologic methods, but rather what to do with
the probabilistic scientific answers that the methods provide.
If all scientific evidence derived from noncontroversial, well-accepted
reasoning, a pure reliability rule would suffice, and there would be no
question about the validity aspect of relevancy. For controversial science
that involves new theories or applications, however, reliability often de-
pends on disputed reasoning. Ignoring validity under these circum-
stances makes it impossible for a court to determine if an opinion is based
on science or merely reflects the personal views of an individual scientist.
Jones v. State,7 a recent Texas case, shows how the validity of the
reasoning underlying a conclusion, instead of the conclusion itself, can
become the principal concern. In Jones, a nurse allegedly had killed one
of her patients by injection with succinylcholine, a poison very difficult to
detect.7" To establish that this chemical had been the cause of death,
tissue samples were sent to a research institute in Sweden, where scien-
tists used special methods to extract the small quantities of poison in the
samples.73 A technique known as gas chromatography mass spectrome-
try74 was then used to identify the drug.7 5 When the defendant chal-
Schoeman, Cohen on Inductive Probability and the Law of Evidence, 54 Phil. of Sci. 76
(1987).
For other views on the appropriate use of epidemiologic evidence, see Black &
Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 764-66 (advocates combining epidemiologic principles with
the legal burden of proof); Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules
for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 881, 899-902 (1982) (advocating proportional
recovery and reversal of burden of proof); Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev.
1219, 1243-51 (1987) (advocating a scheme in which defendant pays total damages based
on population analysis, but money is distributed only to plaintiffs "most likely" injured
by defendant's conduct); Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the
DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713, 755 (1982) (advocating apportionment scheme); Note,
Establishing Causation in Chemical Exposure Cases: The Precursor Symptoms Theory, 35
Rutgers L. Rev. 163, 191 (1982) (advocating use of epidemiologic evidence that a chemi-
cal causes precursor symptoms); Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to
Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 575, 614 (1983) (advocating a probabilistic approach to causation and the
use of rebuttable presumptions); Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensa-
tion, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 Yale L.J. 840, 855-59 (1981) (advocating
scheme based on determining what exposure levels double risk); cf Huber, supra note 3,
at 278 (arguing that courts are ill-equipped to deal with "public risks").
70. Cf Sulesky v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 426, 430-31 (S.D.W. Va. 1982) (court
declined to consider epidemiologic evidence in Swine Flu case, relying instead on testi-
mony of treating and evaluating physicians).
71. 716 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
72. See id. at 144.
73. See id. at 145.
74. Gas chromatography is a method for the separation and analysis of complex mix-
tures of volatile organic and inorganic compounds. It is based on the fact that different
components move at different rates through a column containing a solvent liquid or solid.
See 6 McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology 61-64 (5th ed. 1982). After
separation of the mixture with gas chromatography, each component can be analyzed
further with a mass spectrometer, which determines molecular structure based on the
fragmentation of ions formed when the molecules are ionized. See 8 McGraw-Hill Ency-
clopedia of Science and Technology 234-41 (5th ed. 1982).
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lenged this procedure, the state's expert explained that he had confidence
in it primarily because the principles upon which it was based were well-
established.76 The reliability of his findings, therefore, derived almost
solely from the validity of the reasoning behind those principles and the
expert's reasoning from them." As the Jones decision illustrates, how-
ever, it is difficult to pinpoint the validity issue when applying the tradi-
tional general acceptance analysis. 8
To accommodate cases such as Jones, this Article proposes a clarifica-
tion of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to require explicitly
that testimony be based on valid scientific reasoning and that it be relia-
ble enough to satisfy threshold legal requirements for admissibility. As
modified, Rule 702 would read:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise. When the witness offers testimony based on scientific
knowledge, such testimony shall be admitted only if the court deter-
mines that the opinion:
1) is based on scientifically valid reasoning; and
2) is sufficiently reliable that its probative value outweighs the dan-
gers specified in Rule 403. 79
The two steps of the proposed clarification of Rule 702 constitute in-
dependent requirements, 0 one essentially based on scientific considera-
75. See Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 145.
76. See id. at 148-50.
77. Id. at 148. For a case that involved a fact pattern similar to that in Jones, see
Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (expert combined new
and old tests and procedures to develop method for detecting traces of succinylcholine
chloride in exhumed body), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 927 (1970).
78. The Jones court noted that while scientific and legal periodicals sometimes are
used to establish general acceptence, this inquiry does not lead to a consideration of valid-
ity. See Jones, 716 S.W.2d at 147.
79. Currently, Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702.
80. Other commentators have discussed the use of a reliability standard, or a validity
standard, but none has presented validity and reliability as two complementary aspects of
relevancy. Professor Giannefli views reliability as the principal test and sees the validity
of the underlying principle and of the technique applying the principle as issues subsidi-
ary to reliability, see Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1200-01, an approach somewhat similar
to that taken in this Article. He is not very clear, however, about the meaning of validity.
He notes in a footnote that although courts use validity and reliability interchangeably,
the terms have distinct meanings in scientific jargon. "Validity" refers to the
ability of a test procedure to measure what it is supposed to measure-its accu-
racy. "Reliability" refers to whether the same results are obtained in each in-
stance in which the test is performed-its consistency. Validity includes
reliability, but the converse is not necessarily true.
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tions, the other on legal considerations."' Nonetheless, validity and
reliability are closely related. Invalid reasoning cannot lead to reliable
Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1201 n.20.
This definition of validity, however, is quite confusing, for it seems to reverse the rela-
tive roles of validity and reliability that Professor Giannelli sets out in the main text.
What is more, equating validity with accuracy is simply at variance with the normal
usage of the word "validity." Professor Giannelli himself does not really use validity in
this way. In discussing voice spectrograph comparisons, he notes that "[i]f the theory of
voice uniqueness is not valid, voiceprint evidence is not reliable." Id. at 1202. If "accu-
rate" were substituted for "valid" in this sentence, it would not make sense, because one
does not properly refer to a theory as accurate. Still later in his article, Professor Gian-
nelli maintains that the reliability of a technique can be established through empirical
validation, which indicates still another meaning for validity. See id. at 1213. For a very
different view of the relationship between accuracy, reliability, and validity, see Epstein,
The Risks ofRisk/Utility, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 469, 470 (1987) ("Validity and reliability stand
in inverse relation to each other. Validity seeks to identify the ultimate thing to be mea-
sured, while reliability seeks to insure that the measurements undertaken are done accu-
rately.").
A 1974 article on psychiatric evidence also distinguishes reliability from validity. See
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 Cal. L. Rev. 693 (1974). Like Professor Giannelli, Ennis and Litwack
define validity in terms of accuracy. See id. at 697. They take reliability to mean "the
probability or frequency of agreement when two or more independent observers answer
the same question." Id. Once again, equating validity with accuracy simply does not
accord with the usual usage of the word "validity." Nonetheless, Ennis and Litwack
make a distinction not unlike the distiction made in this Article. If they were to reverse
their usage of reliability and validity, their formulation would approximate this Article's
formulation, except that they do not tie the two concepts together as complementary
aspects of relevancy. See also Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An
Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 Yale L.J. 694, 694 (1961) (validity of a technique relates to
whether it actually tests what it claims to test).
Perhaps the most revealing indication of how the law has failed to grasp the interrela-
tionship between reliability, validity, and relevancy is provided by a symposium that ap-
peared recently in Federal Rules Decisions. See Rules for Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987) (symposium report). This report contains four proposals
for a model rule on admissibility of scientific evidence. One of these, advanced by Profes-
sor Giannelli, is more procedural than evidentiary. He proposes that expert testimony be
inadmissible "unless the proponent gives the adverse party sufficient advance written no-
tice of intent to use such evidence." Id. at 102. The other three proposals, however, each
go off in different substantive directions. Professor Berger focuses on relevancy, see id. at
89, Professor Starrs focuses on validity, see id. at 92, and Professor Lederer focuses on
reliability. See id. at 84. The clarification to Rule 702 proposed in this Article, see supra
text accompanying note 79, essentially combines the proposals of Professors Lederer,
Berger and Starrs. This merging of their ideas is possible because all three proposals fit
within the analytical framework advocated herein.
81. On how scientific factual issues can be separated from policy or legal issues, see
Martin, The Proposed "Science Court" 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1058, 1078 (1977). While agree-
ing with Professor Martin's premise, this Article does not agree that a separate science
court is required. See also Harter & Schlenker, In Quest ofAgreement: Non-Adversarial
Processes for Making Scientific Judgments Concerning Public Health, Monograph No.
102, Institute for Health Policy Analysis, Georgetown University Medical Center, at 6
(1988) (noting that "[t]he clarity of the science will do nothing to resolve the difficult
political decision as to whether [a given level] of risk is acceptable"); Steinbock, Richman
& Ray, Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 261, 281-82 (1988)
(arguing that experts should not be allowed to testify about the legal question of proxi-
mate cause, and that such testimony should be excluded under Rule 702).
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results,82 which, in some cases, means that the legal inquiry need go no
further than the first step. In other cases, validity may be established by
reference to a history of success in applying a theory or method. For
example, the fact that virtually all bridges succeed in carrying the loads
for which they were designed provides persuasive evidence for the valid-
ity of the principles of structural engineering and the reasoning of struc-
tural engineers.
Reliability, in other words, can be a very good indicator of validity,
and when it is, the legal analysis of the two concepts may collapse into
one step. Indeed, to the extent that courts rely on a history of success in
reaching decisions about the admissibility of scientific evidence, they
merely incorporate the traditional view of the scientific method into the
law.83 If, as once thought, all science proceeded in this fashion, there
would be no need to distinguish validity from reliability, but in actual
scientific practice, decisions about validity are not based purely on
confirmation.
C. Acceptance as the Scientific and Legal Basis
for Determining Validity
Unfortunately, the traditional view of the scientific method implies an
exactness and certainty that simply cannot exist. Over the last twenty-
five years, philosophers of science have abandoned tradition for a more
realistic account of the scientific enterprise,84 but the law persists in the
82. This point has been made by Professor Imwinkelried, who has advocated judicial
screening of techniques and theories to establish their validity as a predicate to admissi-
bility. See Imwinkelried I, supra note 16, at 581. He views theories in the sense of broad,
general propositions, however, and validity in terms of accuracy. See id. at 600-01. He
assumes an essentially positivist version of the scientific method, see id. at 101, which
does not accurately reflect actual scientific practice. See infra Part I.C. 1 (in-depth discus-
sion of Logical Positivism).
83. See infra Part I.C.
84. To understand what makes science scientific, one must turn to the philosophy of
science. Scientists themselves generally have been remarkably uninterested in what war-
rants their work as scientific. See, e.g., T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
47 (2d ed. 1970) ("Though many scientists talk easily and well about the particular indi-
vidual hypotheses that underlie a concrete piece of current research, they are little better
than laymen at characterizing the established bases of their field, its legitimate problems
and methods."); MacLure, Popperian Refutation in Epidemiology, 121 Am. J. Epidem.
343, 343 (1985) ("Practically minded epidemiologists may tend to believe that philosophy
of science is irrelevant, abstract and dull."); McMullin, Alternative Approaches to the Phi-
losophy of Science, in Scientific Knowledge 6 (J. Kourany ed. 1987) ("[W]hen contempo-
rary scientists set out to give an account of the nature of the scientific method, they can
sometimes be as remote from scientific practice as were Aristotle or Descartes."); Ziman,
What is Science?, in Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science 35, 38 (E.D.
Klemke, R. Hollinger, & A.D. Kline eds. 1980) (the "Rule of Order" that most scientists
would state is not always obeyed in practice).
Philosophers, on the other hand, have long had an interest in science as the quintessen-
tial example of epistemic (knowledge-generating) activity. See S. Toulmin, Foresight and
Understanding 13-14 (1961) ("[C]ertain general questions about science remain which,
though not immediately urgent for the working scientist, are nonetheless worth asking.
In dealing with these questions.., the scientist must co-operate with the historian and
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old view.85 Understanding this misperception, and its implications for
the law,86 requires a brief review of how the philosophy of science has
with the philosopher."); Suppe, Afterword to The Structure of Scientific Theories 716 (F.
Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977) ("Over much of the history of philosophy a central aim of episte-
mology has been to vindicate the epistemic claims of then contemporary science; such
were principal motives of ... the Positivists for developing [their view of science].").
85. See Lansing, The Motherless Calf, Aborted Cow Theory of Cause, 15 Env. Law 1, 9
(1984) (advancing a proposal that would counter "the harshness of plaintiff's having to
prove a true scientific cause-in-fact"); Nesson, supra note 27, at 523 (adopting the posi-
tion that "the legal standards of proof must be more liberal than scientific standards
because courts must seek justice as well as ultimate, unassailable, scientific truth"); Com-
ment, Scientific Evidence - Admissibility Fryed to a Crisp, 21 S. Texas L.J. 62 (1981)
(viewing scientific method as providing complete objectivity); Note, Of Reliable Science:
Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the Courts, 7 Va. J. of Nat. Res.
L. 27, 30-31 (1987) (outlining five-step "method" that reflects Logical Positivist view); cf
Brennan & Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other
Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. Health Politics, Policy & Law 33, 35 (1985)
(noting that most discussions of the relationship between legal and scientific causation
usually center on "platitudes about lawyers and scientists thinking differently"); Danner
& Sagall, Medicolegal Causation: A Source of Professional Misunderstanding, 3 Am. J.
Law & Med. 303, 303 (1977) (arguing that judges and attorneys view causation quite
differently than do members of the medical community); Goldberg, supra note 31, at
1342-43 (noting that most lawyers think of science in terms of "progress", a very positiv-
ist view, but pointing out that there "are more than a few objections to this formula-
tion"); Large & Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy Depends on the
Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof With Legal Proof, 11
Envtl. L. 555 (1981) (essentially contrasting the Logical Positivist view of science with
the law). In their article, Danner and Sagall focus on the difference between what physi-
cians usually do and what they are asked in court. This, however, begs the question of
how a physician can answer the questions posed by the law in a scientifically appropriate
way. The article distinguishes scientific proof from the legal standard of "more likely
than not." Danner & Sagall, supra, at 307. The real question is how one proves scientifi-
cally that something, more likely than not, is true.
86. This misperception of science has been noted by others. See Brennan & Carter,
supra note 85. Brennan and Carter see judges as continuing to view science as requiring
mechanistic explanation, see id. at 35, 53, despite the fact that neither Mechanistic Mate-
rialism nor Logical Positivism is now recognized as an accurate picture of how science
actually is conducted. See id. at 38-39. In this regard, they agree with the view advo-
cated in this Article, but they do not examine how science determines validity in the
absence of Positivist confirmation. Also, they assume that courts have proven totally
incapable of dealing with probabilistic population-based evidence. See id. at 54. In fact,
this is not the case.
As early as 1919, the New York Court of Appeals upheld, without any difficulty, a
plaintiff's verdict based on population-based evidence. In Stubbs v. City of Rochester,
226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137 (1919), the defendant city inadvertently had contaminated a
portion of its water supply system. See id. at 518-19, 124 N.E. at 137. Though there was
a typhoid outbreak in all parts of the city, the incidence rate in the contaminated part was
much higher than elsewhere. See id. at 525, 124 N.E. at 140. Based on this probabilistic,
population-based type of evidence, the plaintiff, who lived in the contaminated area and
had contracted typhoid, successfully claimed against the city. See id. at 527, 124 N.E. at
139-40. For a discussion of other precedents favoring the use of epidemiologic evidence,
see Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 769-76. But see Johnston v. United States, 597
F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984) (rejecting probabilistic evidence), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 694 (1988).
The real point Brennan and Carter seem to be making is that courts should accept the
non-probabilistic, qualitative opinions often offered by plaintiffs in toxic tort cases. They
start out arguing for probability, see Brennan & Carter, supra note 85, at 34-35, but in
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developed since the turn of the century. The current philosophical view
of science further demonstrates how the law can evaluate the validity of
scientific reasoning without detailed or specific knowledge of science.
Stripping science to its philosophical core reveals that validity derives,
not from applying pure logic to purely objective facts, but from the give
and take process of testing, experimentation, criticism, and review.
1. The Traditional View of Science
The misconceptions about the scientific method that permeate legal
thinking reflect a once deeply entrenched philosophical tradition known
as Logical Positivism.87 The philosophers who developed this tradition
sought to sustain a vision of science as the source of absolute truth. Until
the early 1900's, most scientists thought in terms of a purely objective
world-independent of those who perceive it and governed by mechani-
cal laws that allow precise descriptions and predictions.8" They believed
that if a person knew the positions and velocities of all particles in the
universe at a given instant, he or she could predict all future events and
perfectly reconstruct all past occurrences.8 9 At the heart of their belief
effect advocate "trans-science." See Note, Trans-Science in Torts, 96 Yale LJ. 428 (1986)
(discussed infra notes 506-08 and accompanying text).
87. See generally The Legacy of Logical Positivism (P. Achinstein & S. Barker eds.
1969); Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in The
Structure of Scientific Theories 3, 6-62 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977). The name for this
philosophy derives from the fact that it represents a combination of the rigorous mathe-
matical logic of Bertrand Russell and the Positivist or Empirical philosophy of Ernst
Mach. See Toulmin, The Structure of Scientific Theories, in The Structure of Scientific
Theories 600, 600 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977).
The Logical Positivist picture of science is best explained in terms of an example of a
theory formulated in accordance with it. Consider the theory that relative density deter-
mines whether or not a solid object will float in a liquid, an example taken from C.
Hempel, The Theoretician's Dilemma, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other
Essays in the Philosophy of Science 180-82 (1965). Observations of the floating proper-
ties of various objects placed in a liquid, such as water, reveal general patterns such as the
fact that wood floats and iron does not. This does not account, however, for the observa-
tion that a properly made hollow iron sphere also floats. Dealing with such an anomaly
forces the development of a theory, which might be described as follows. First, a theoret-
ical term, density, is defined as the quotient of two observation terms, weight and volume.
With this theoretical term, a theoretical statement, or postulate can be formulated,
namely that if the density of a solid body is less than the density of a liquid, the body will
float on the liquid. From this it can be inferred, or predicted, for any specific combina-
tion of solid and liquid whether or not the body will float. Test procedures for specific
combinations are given by correspondence to rules similar to the rules that define the
theoretical terms. See id. More complex theories would involve several interrelated theo-
retical statements, but the basic idea remains the same. See Feigl, The Origin and Spirit
of Logical Positivism, in The Legacy of Logical Positivism 3, 15-16 (P. Achinstein & S.
Barker eds. 1969) (explaining how Logical Positivists axiomatized theories).
88. See Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding ofScientfic Theories, in The
Structure of Scientific Theories 3, 8 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977).
89. See Salmon, Why Ask "Why?'7 An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation, in
Scientific Knowledge-Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Science 51, 51 (J. Kourany ed.
1987). An excellent description of the world view of 18th and 19th century scientists is
provided in D. Bohm, Causality and Change in Modern Physics 36 (1957):
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was the assumption that all phenomena could be explained in terms of a
few fundamental and absolute laws. This mechanistic and self-contained
view foreclosed concern about reasoning or the nature of abstract theo-
retical constructs. 90
Around the turn of the twentieth century, however, advances in physi-
ology and psychology and the advent of the quantum and relativity theo-
ries in physics destroyed simple, mechanistic certainty. 91 Quantum
theory tells us that certainty is a physical impossibility, relativity that
time is not absolute, and psychology that preconceptions color suppos-
edly objective accounts of the natural world. The Logical Positivists
strove to rescue this situation by divorcing theories from the world of
empirical observation and examining only their logical structure.92 The-
ories explained observational phenomena, 93 but supposedly existed apart
The very precision of Newton's laws [of motion] led.., to new problems of a
philosophical order. For, as these laws were found to be verified in wider and
wider domains, the idea tended to grow that they have a universal validity.
Laplace, during the eighteenth century, was one of the first scientists to draw
the full logical consequences of such an assumption. Laplace supposed that the
entire universe consisted of nothing but bodies undergoing motions through
space, motions which obeyed Newton's laws. While the forces acting between
these bodies were not yet completely and accurately known in all cases, he also
supposed that eventually these forces could be known with the aid of suitable
experiments. This meant that once the positions and velocities of all the bodies
were given at any instant of time, the future behaviour of everything in the
whole universe would be determined for all time.
Id. (emphasis in original).
90. Mechanistic Materialists believed that:
The scientific method yields immediate and objective knowledge ... and is ca-
pable of doing so by empirical investigation without any recourse to philosophi-
cal speculation. Thus there is no place for a priori elements in natural science or
in empirical knowledge. Observation of the world is immediate in the sense that
no a priori or conceptual mediation is involved in obtaining observational
knowledge; observation in accordance with the procedures of natural science is
sufficient to yield knowledge of the world's mechanistic nature.
Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in The Structure
of Scientific Theories 3, 8 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977).
91. See id. (noting that "work... on the physiology of the senses indicated that an
adequate philosophy must make provision for the activity of the thinking subject in the
growth of scientific knowledge") (citation omitted). For a nontechnical account of how
relativity and quantum mechanics made it clear that events cannot be known with com-
plete precision, see J. Gribbin, In Search of Schrodinger's Cat (1984).
92. A very readable account of the Logical Positivist view by one of the founders of
Logical Positivism is provided in Feigl, The Origin and Spirit of Logical Positivism, in The
Legacy of Logical Positivism 3 (P. Achinstein & S. Barker eds. 1969); see also supra note
87.
93. As Logical Positivism developed, its adherents came to view a theory's explana-
tory power as a prerequisite to its validity. Three forms of explanation were recognized:
deductive-nomological (D-N); deductive-statistical (D-S); and inductive-statistical (I-S).
See C. Hempel, supra note 87, at 335-47, 376-93. The density comparison theory de-
scribed in note 87, supra, illustrates D-N explanation. A conclusion about any solid-
liquid combination could be rigorously deduced from the theory, and the predicted result
(floating or sinking) would be expected with law-like certainty. Prediction of the result of
tossing a coin illustrates D-S explanation. One can deduce that a given result will occur
with a given probability based upon knowledge about what a coin is like. One need not
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from them.94
By requiring all theories to conform to a single, logical pattern,'- the
Positivists focused on only one of several ways in which scientists and
nonscientists use the word "theory." Sometimes theory refers to a broad
field of established knowledge, like the theory of electricity, sometimes to
a mere conjecture or hypothesis. For scientists and for purposes of this
Article, however, a theory is best understood as an intellectual frame-
work or device that allows one to describe and understand natural phe-
nomena.9 6 In this sense, theories incorporate the patterns of reasoning
that tie every valid scientific conclusion to empirical evidence and to rec-
ognized principles.
The Positivists, however, made the reasoning leading to a theory irrel-
evant in determining the theory's validity. Once put into the standard
format, a theory's validity depended only on whether consequences de-
duced from it could be observed.97 Known as the hypothetico-deductive
collect data beforehand to make this prediction. Predicting disease rates, on the other
hand, requires that data be determined in order to calculate probability. This illustrates
I-S explanation. It should be noted that even the Logical Positivist view did not require
that science always lead to absolute and certain explanations, though the infusion of
probability was an afterthought forced upon the philosophy. See Brennan & Carter,
supra note 85, at 38. It should also be noted that Positivists did not distinguish between
explanation and prediction. See Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Sci-
entific Theories, in The Structure of Scientific Theories 3, 28 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977).
94. Logical Positivists sometimes offered a metaphorical picture according to which a
theory's system of postulates hovers over the plane of empirical reality, acquiring mean-
ing only through correspondence rules that tether it to empirical observations. See Feigi,
The "Orthodox" View of Theories" Remarks in Defense as Well as Critique, in IV Minne-
sota Studies in the Philosophy of Science-Analyses of Theories and Methods of Physics
and Psychology 3, 5-6 (M. Radner & S. Winokur eds. 1970).
95. Logical Positivists recognized that theories initially might not be in the proper
form, but they thought that a valid theory had to be such that it could be "rationally
reconstructed" to make its logical structure and empirical content as clear as possible.
See P. Achinstein, Concepts of Science 68 (1968). This procedure supposedly provided
an understanding of the structure of theories and the logic of scientific explanation, as
well as the method for assessing claims of scientific knowledge. "With the addition of
appropriate information about particular theories and experiments, such rational recon-
structions [were] supposed to enable one to carry through an analysis of the kinds of
claims particular theories make about the world and to evaluate the worth of such
claims." Burian, Scientific Realism and Incommensurability: Some Criticisms of Kuhn
and Feyerabend, in Methodology, Metaphysics and the History of Science 1, 2 (R. Cohen
& M. Wartofsky eds. 1984).
Logical Positivists thought that science develops through a process of accumulation in
which prior facts and theories are never discarded but, instead, are incorporated into later
theories as special cases. See D. Shapere, Reason and the Search for Knowledge 60
(1984). This absolutist version of science offers the appeal of logical certainty, but it has
fallen from favor because many well-recognized developments and advances in science do
not conform to its strict rules. See Doppelt, Relativism and Recent Pragmatic Concep-
tions of Scientific Rationality, in Scientific Explanation and Understanding 107, 107 (N.
Rescher ed. 1983).
96. See Suppe, Afterword to The Structure of Scientific Theories 615, 658 (F. Suppe
ed. 2d ed. 1977).
97. See Feigl, The Origin and Spirit of Logical Positivism, in The Legacy of Logical
Positivism 3, 5 (P. Achinstein & S. Barker eds. 1969) (discussing rejection of metaphysics
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method,98 this version of science implies that a theory, once verified, be-
comes an indelible part of our knowledge, though it eventually may be-
come incorporated into a broader, more inclusive theory.99 At the same
time, however, hypothetico-deduction, if strictly applied, invalidates a
theory entirely if a single prediction proves false. " While such a result
is perhaps appropriate in some cases, neither prong of this rigid and self-
contradictory view could survive as a universal description of either sci-
ence or scientific theories.101
2. Why the Traditional View of Science Is Incorrect
The idealized Logical Positivist recipe for all of science fails because it
entails two unsupportable bright-line distinctions. The first has to do
with the supposed absolute distinction between observation and theory.
According to Logical Positivism, observations can be described in a com-
pletely theory-neutral "observation language."' 02 Logical Positivists
would have it that red is red, no matter what theory of spectroscopy one
subscribes to, but this misses the fact that preconceptions influence all
observations. 103 The second bright line concerns the origin of theories.
by the Logical Positivists and their requirement that meaning derive from observable
consequences of a theory); see also Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of
Scientific Theories, in The Structure of Scientific Theories 3, 11-12 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed.
1977).
98. Salmon, Inquiries Into the Foundations of Science, in Probabilities, Problems, and
Paradoxes 139, 141-42 (S. Luckenbach ed. 1972).
99. See supra note 95.
100. See Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline ofAn Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge,
in IV Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science-Analyses of Theories and Meth-
ods of Physics and Psychology 17 (M. Radner & S. Winokur eds. 1970). Feyerabend, one
of the most radical critics of positivism, shows that a logical consequence of the positivist
view is that a theory must agree completely with experience, see id. at 42, which effec-
tively makes all theories quite useless. Feyerabend bases his argument on a strict inter-
pretation of Logical Positivism. According to him, the slightest change in a theory to
accommodate an observational anomaly means that an entirely new theory has been de-
veloped, and that the old theory is completely invalidated. See id. at 42-43. In practice,
of course, an old theory (like Newtonian mechanics) still may be used for many applica-
tions even after being shown to be invalid for other applications for which a new theory
(for example, Einstein's theory of relativity) is valid.
101. This rigidly structured process does resemble some areas of science, but even as to
these, it fails to account fully for the way scientists reason. For example, the epidemio-
logic method for determining the cause of a disease depends heavily on statistical reason-
ing, but not to the exclusion of other considerations. Even in this rigorously statistical
branch of medicine, the reasoning cannot be reduced to a logical algorithm. Instead, a
number of postulates must be satisfied. See A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, supra note 64,
at 13 (epidemiologists use a two-stage sequence of reasoning that involves "[t]he determi-
nation of a statistical association between a characteristic and a disease," and then the
drawing "of biological inferences from such a pattern of statistical associations"); Black
& Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 750-64 (explaining epidemiologic principles); Evans, Cau-
sation and Disease: The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 Yale J. Biology & Med. 175,
192 (1976) (listing ten criteria).
102. Suppe, The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories, in The
Structure of Scientific Theories 3, 45-49 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977).
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56
1988] UNIFIED THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 619
The reasoning process leading to a theory supposedly had nothing to do
with the validity of that theory. Only confirmation in accordance with
the axiomatic logical format could make the theory valid."o
The complete separation of theory from observation fails because it
does not account for the interaction that necessarily takes place between
the two.10 5 Theories serve as tools for eliminating confusion about the
empirical world, but they shape perception as well." 6 For example, two
observers waiting by a highway at night may have very different theoreti-
cal ideas about what they will see. One might expect a UFO, and the
other an automobile. When two lights appear in the distance, each ob-
server will see something different. Observations, however, also shape
theories. As the UFO/automobile draws closer, the observer who be-
lieves in extraterrestrial visitors will have to reshape his or her thinking
to accommodate the empirical evidence. At some point, he or she will
have to abandon the theory of UFOs, or at least modify it so that it
allows for the fact that cars, as well as flying saucers, move along high-
ways. Based on the evidence, a scientist would conclude that the car
theory is far better supported and far more valid. Science thus proceeds
by weaving observation and theory together, not by viewing them as par-
allel but separate threads.' 0 7
Even if theory and observation were separable, the rigid logic of hy-
pothetico-deductive confirmation suffers from intrinsic limitations.
While hypothetico-deductivism seems quite straightforward, it does not
allow for the fact that the same data can confirm an infinite number of
104. See Nickles, Heuristics and Justification in Scientific Research. Comments on
Shapere, in The Structure of Scientific Theories 571, 575 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed. 1977). Karl
Popper, a well-known early critic of Positivism, rejected the idea that any theory could be
verified through a process of confirmation. See K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Dis-
covery 40-42 (1959). Instead, he took the view that scientific theories had to be in falsifi-
able form, see id., and that if a theory withstood many attempts at falsification, it would
be well "corroborated." Id at 251-81. Like other philosophers of the Positivist period,
however, Popper thought that he could make "explicit the rules of evidential inference
which scientists use implicitly for making choices of theory." Laudan, Two Puzzles About
Science: Reflections On Some Crises in the Philosophy and Sociology of Science, 20 Mi-
nerva 253, 256 (1982).
105. See D. Shapere, supra note 95, at 181 ("In many ways, scientific method is more
like military strategy than it is like the rules of chess: the strategy shapes the course of
the campaign, but is itself responsive to the lay of the land ... and it adjusts to new
situations and new devices."); Achinstein, The Problem of Theoretical Terms, in Readings
in the Philosophy of Science 234 (B. Brody ed. 1970) (noting that the division of expres-
sions used by scientists into theoretial and observational sets depends on the particular
theory in question and on the context of the observation).
106. See Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. Am., Dec. 1974, at 23, 28 (noting
that "a theory can be a powerful tool for clarifying confusion, but it can also lead to
distortion and unreliability if people attempt, perhaps unconsciously, to make fact fit
theory").
107. By the mid 1960's, it was established clearly that no reasonable criteria for com-
plete separation of theoretical from non-theoretical terms could work. Proposed criteria
were all shown to be "tied, in most cases rather specifically, to a particular context of
observation or to a particular theory." Achinstein, The Problem of Theoretical Terms, in
Readings in the Philosophy of Science 234, 247 (B. Brody ed. 1970).
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hypotheses.108 The hypothesis that a dog pulls the sun across the sky
each day is consistent with every sunrise and sunset. In fact, contempo-
rary astronomical observations confirmed the Ptolemaic geocentric the-
ory of the universe 0 9 at least as well as they confirmed the heliocentric
theory1 ° of Copernicus."' Galileo's choice of the Copernican view,
therefore, could not have derived solely from confirmation--other con-
siderations must have come into play."'
In practice, claims that purport to be scientific often are rejected with-
out any resort to hypothetico-deductive testing, and often are accepted as
at least worthy of further development despite hypothetico-deductive dis-
confirmation. 1 3 Astrological predictions, for example, are rejected as
unscientific without empirical tests. A scientist who undertakes such
tests "would, at the very least, be deemed by the scientific community to
be eccentric and exhibiting questionable judgment." 1 4 At the other ex-
treme, physicists continue to pursue and develop theories that predict the
existence of esoteric particles despite repeated failures to find them.115
Logical Positivism fails as the basis for judging both astrology and mod-
em particle theory because it does not describe or explain how scientists
108. As explained in R. Pirsig's best-selling book:
If the purpose of scientific method is to select from among a multitude of hy-
potheses, and if the number of hypotheses grows faster than experimental
method can handle, then it is clear that all hypotheses can never be tested. If all
hypotheses cannot be tested, then the results of any experiment are inconclusive
and the entire scientific method falls short of its goal of establishing proven
knowledge.
R. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance 115 (1974); see also Salmon, In-
quiries Into the Foundations of Science, in Probabilities, Problems, and Paradoxes 139,
142-43 (S. Luckenback ed. 1972).
109. The geocentric theory assumes the earth is the center of the solar system, and
indeed, of the universe. See McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms
676 (3d ed. 1984).
110. The heliocentric theory maintains that the sun is the center of the solar system.
See id. at 737.
111. See T. Kuhn, supra note 84, at 75-76.
112. See Drake, Ptolemy, Galileo, and Scientific Method, 9 Stud. in Hist. & Phil. of Sci.
99, 99 (1978). Galileo wrote about a method not very different from hypothetico-deducti-
vism, see id. at 103, but he persisted in trying to justify Copernicus' view despite a lack of
evidence. The fact that the heliocentric view allowed for a mechanical explanation of
tidal action apparently was a factor. See id. at 115.
113. See Laudan, A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress, in Scientific Revo-
lutions 144, 144 (I. Hacking ed. 1981). Indeed, for some sciences, rigorous, prospective
hypothetico-deductive testing is virtually impossible. Geologists, for example, cannot do
experiments to confirm directly that processes of long duration occurred in accordance
with their theories.
114. Weyant, Protoscience, Pseudoscience, Metaphors and Animal Magnetism, in Sci-
ence, Pseudo-Science and Society 77, 80 (1980).
115. J. Gribbin, supra note 91, at 270 (discussing "supergravity" theory, which pre-
cisely predicts the existence of 162 different kinds of particles, some of which have never
been detected, and noting that the "problems are immense, but theories like supergravity
are at least consistent, finite, and not in need of renormalization. There is a feeling in the
wind that physicists are on the right track.") (emphasis added).
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actually do their work. As a result, it cannot provide universal criteria
for evaluating claims of knowledge supposedly based on science.
The failure to account for all of science does not mean that Positivism
is completely unrelated to scientific practice. As already noted, epidemi-
ology closely resembles the Positivist view of science.'" 6 Nor does the
failure mean that universal criteria cannot be formulated. Some philoso-
phers, however, have taken the extreme position that there can be no
criteria for judging science and that all judgment is subjective and rela-
tive. 1 7 Paul Feyerabend, perhaps the most extreme of these "Relativ-
ists,"' 8 has taken the position that anarchy is the best foundation for
both epistemology 9 and the philosophy of science." He maintains
that if one looks at the history of science, the only rule is that "anything
goes,"12 though he freely admits that this eliminates any rational basis
for distinguishing even witchcraft from science." According to another
version of Relativism, science normally does proceed within the confines
of accepted "paradigms," but when a new paradigm (such as Einstein's
theory of relativity) replaces an old one (such as Newtonian mechanics),
criteria change as well.23
3. The Legal Implications of the Current View of Science
To what, then, should science, and the law, turn if Logical Positivism
is dead and if Relativism provides no independent universal standard for
deciding whether a scientific claim or theory is valid? In the actual prac-
tice of science, "hypotheses are [in fact] confronted with the test of expe-
116. See supra note 101.
117. See, eg., T. Kuhn, supra note 84, at 4 (noting that when different schools of
science compete, the distinction between them is not based on any failure of method, but
on "incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing science in it"); Feyer-
abend, Problems of Empiricism, in 2 Beyond the Edge of Certainty 145, 146 (R. Colodny
ed. 1965) ("Thinkers who accept different views concerning the nature of experience and
the way in which theories are to be related to experience have proceeded in different ways
and thereby given rise to different kinds of scientific knowledge.") (footnotes omitted).
118. The term "relativism" derives from the fact that taking a subjective view of sci-
ence means that the validity of a theory is relative to the viewpoint of the person deter-
mining validity. Relativists take an historical view of science and argue that "every
particular standard of scientific rationality is violated by some major historical transition
in scientific life." Doppelt, Relativism and Recent Pragmatic Conceptions of Scientific
Rationality, in Scientific Explanation and Understanding 107, 107 (N. Rescher ed. 1983).
119. Epistemology is "the study of the method and grounds of knowledge esp[ecially]
with reference to its limits and validity." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
of the English Language Unabridged 765 (1961).
120. See Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge,
in IV Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science-Analyses of Theories and Meth-
ods of Physics and Psychology 17, 17 (M. Radner & S. Winokur eds. 1970).
121. Id. at 26.
122. See id. at 23 n.27.
123. T. Kuhn, supra note 84, at 5-7 (pointing out that "normal science" is based on the
assumption that the scientific community knows what the world is like, but that a new
theory can imply a change in the rules governing the prior practice of normal science).
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rience and subjected to comparative evaluation." 124 To this extent the
Logical Positivists are right; but the Relativists also are right when they
point out that the criteria used for evaluation are neither universal nor
changeless over time."' When the Relativists argue, however, that a sci-
entist who objects to the rejection of a theory can arbitrarily articulate
new criteria to achieve acceptance, they go too far. While there is no
universal algorithm2 6 for verifying scientific validity, this does not mean
that no basis exists for judging theories and claims to scientific
knowledge.
a. The Scientific Commitment to Objectivity: Acceptance
as Evidence of Validity
Since the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, science has
always been rooted in a commitment to objectivity, even if the evidence
used is not purely objective, and to justification in terms of reasons and
evidence.2 7 The goal for scientists is "to obtain systematic knowledge
that provides understanding of the world we live in."'128 Scientists evalu-
ate their ideas against criteria that involve testability, objectivity, impar-
tiality, and a belief in a deep and obvious connection between evidence
and reason. 2 9 Guidelines for the practice of science, however, are not
fixed; they evolve along with scientific knowledge.'
30
124. I. Scheffier, Science and Subjectivity 10 (1967).
125. See Laudan, A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress, in Scientific Revo-
lutions 144, 144 (I. Hacking ed. 1981).
126. An algorithm is "[a] set of well-defined rules for the solution of a problem in a
finite number of steps." McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 50
(3d ed. 1984).
127. See Suppe, Afterword to The Structure of Scientific Theories 650 (F. Suppe ed. 2d
ed. 1977). Professor Suppe observes:
[F]ar more of science is concerned with reasoning, argument, and marshaling
evidence than with manipulating nature in the laboratory. In short, a central
and characteristic activity of science is the use of reason in the suggestion and
development of hypotheses and theories and in evaluating the knowledge claims
made by those who advance such hypotheses and theories.
Id. (emphasis in original).
128. Id.
129. See I. Scheffier, supra note 124, at 1; Siegel, What is the Question Concerning the
Rationality of Science?, 52 Phil. of Sci. 517, 528-32 (1985).
130. See M. Harris, Cultural Materialism 26 (1979) ("The task of specifying precisely
what kinds of guidelines ought to be followed falls to the practitioners."); D. Shapere,
supra note 95, at 214 ("What is counted as 'evidential' and 'observational' in science is
not something given once and for all, but evolves along with scientific knowledge.");
Toulmin, The Evolutionary Development of Natural Science, 55 Am. Scientist 456, 460 &
462 (1967) (noting that those who carry on an intellectual tradition determine if it is
scientific, and that the intellectual situation within a given branch of science determines
which general types of hypotheses are taken seriously).
Modern physicists, for example, have developed criteria for deciding when they have
observed a subatomic particle and what kind of particle they have observed. See Achin-
stein, The Problem of Theoretical Terms, in Readings in the Philosophy of Science 234,
236 (B. Brody ed. 1970). Scientists of Isaac Newton's era neither required, nor could
have conceived of, such criteria.
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The key to rationality and consistency lies in the process by which sci-
ence maintains its commitment to objectivity. Typically, as scientists
work with a theory and develop it in detail, the theory tends to become
more and more accepted as valid, and confidence grows in its application.
Validity is not an all-or-nothing proposition, as Logical Positivism would
have it, but rather a matter of degree. Observation and experimentation
are used to find shortcomings, to determine how to make improvements,
and "to discover how to eliminate known artificialities, distortions, over-
simplifications, and errors in the descriptions, explanations, and predic-
tions of reality that the theory affords."'' Only after a theory has
survived a period of this kind of testing, review and refinement can it be
used without significant questions,3 2 and even then, it remains open to
renewed doubt.133 One philosopher has written that this process not
only reflects the scientific method, but that "it is the scientific
method." 13
4
The question of scientific validity, therefore, hinges on acceptance, a5
and the answer depends on the purpose for which a theory is advanced
and on the extent to which it has been tested. Acceptance may imply no
more than a commitment to do research. Indeed, scientists often use a
theory for some purposes while general acceptance remains quite tenta-
tive.' 36 When invalidity has serious consequences, however, acceptance
requires more complete validation. This higher standard has developed
because the history of science contains countless examples of wel-rea-
soned hypotheses that proved to be wrong. For example, early successes
with vaccines led Robert Koch, one of the nineteenth century founders of
modern bacteriology, to reason that a vaccine could be developed against
any disease once the causative bacterium was isolated. He proceeded to
produce a vaccine for tuberculosis, which the German government
quickly started to use. Unfortunately, the reasoning was invalid, and
vaccination actually caused dormant cases to become active. 3 '
131. Suppe, Afterword to The Structure of Scientific Theories 706 (F. Suppe ed. 2d ed.
1977).
132. See Ziman, What is Science, in Introductory Readings In the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 35, 40 (E.D. Klemke, R. Hollinger & A.D. Kline eds. 1980); see generally Merton,
Behavior Patterns of Scientists, 38 Am. Scholar 197, 198 (1969) (noting the competition
among scientists to be first in declaring a new discovery).
133. See K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 47 (2d ed. 1968) ("there can be
no ultimate statements in science") (emphasis omitted).
134. Ziman, supra note 132, at 40 (emphasis in original); see id at 35-40.
135. See D. Shapere, supra note 95, at xxiii (science aims to determine a range of possi-
ble solutions and to establish criteria for what counts as an acceptable solution).
136. See van Fraassen, Glymour on Evidence and Explanation, in X Minnesota Studies
in the Philosophy of Science-Testing Scientific Theories 165, 168 (J. Earman ed. 1983).
137. For an interesting modem account of this event, see RL Dubos & J. Dubos, The
White Plague 100-10 (1987). For a contemporary account, see K. Wezel, Robert Koch
30-53 (1912) (in German).
Koch gained fame in 1870 by isolating the bacterium that causes anthrax, following it
through its life cycle, and producing anthrax by injecting bacteria into laboratory ani-
mals. He went on to develop laboratory techniques still used in bacteriological laborato-
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Beyond experimental testing, acceptance of a theory also depends on
the theory's level of development and sophistication.138 At the primitive
stage of development when a theory consists of little more than observed
patterns of regularity, traditional inductive confirmation is more central
to scientific reasoning than it is for more refined theories. For example,
there exists at present no overarching concept of carcinogenesis; 39 there-
fore, confirmation of an hypothesis about a relationship between expo-
sure to a chemical and cancer must depend heavily on observed
correlations and the methods of epidemiology. 140 For a comprehensive
theory such as the general theory of relativity, however, much less evi-
dence is required. Only six or seven direct tests of the basic tenets of the
theory have been attempted,14 1 yet it has gained almost universal
ries around the world. On March 24, 1882, he electrified the scientific world by
announcing that he had discovered the organism responsible for tuberculosis. In 1890, he
again stunned the world by announcing that he had isolated a substance that could pro-
tect against tuberculosis, and even cure the disease. An English doctor by the name of A.
Conan Doyle (of Sherlock Holmes fame) carefully reviewed Koch's work and "concluded
his analysis by expressing much doubt as to the usefulness of tuberculin [the substance
Koch had isolated] in therapy." Dubos & Dubos, supra, at 106. Unfortunately, "Doyle's
anticipations were amply confirmed by subsequent events. It soon became obvious that
tuberculin killed many more patients than it helped, and the treatment fell in [sic] dis-
credit almost everywhere." Id.
Precisely because of such occurrences, federal law requires scientific clinical evaluation
of most drugs before they are marketed. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For an interesting history of legislation in this
area, see 39 Fed. Reg. 33229, 33231-32 (Sept. 16, 1974).
138. See Suppe, Afterword to The Structure of Scientific Theories 724 (F. Suppe ed. 2d
ed. 1977).
139. Carcinogenesis is "the origin or production of cancer." Stedman's Medical Dic-
tionary 223 (24th ed. 1982).
140. See Peto, The Preventability of Cancer, in Cancer Risks and Prevention 1, 13 (M.
Vessey & M. Gray eds. 1985). As Peto points out:
[T]here may be many qualitatively different ways of turning normal cells into
cancer cells, with the ones that matter being those that underlie the common
cancers; and, there is no guarantee whatever that the mechanisms of cancerous
change that are currently being investigated in the laboratory do not differ so
greatly from those that importantly affect people as to make the related labora-
tory findings of no direct human relevance. To underline these difficulties, labo-
ratory studies have thus far failed to identify reliably which are the important
carcinogens and co-carcinogens in tobacco smoke, and have consistently failed
to reproduce in animals the carcinogenic effects of alcohol in humans.
Id. The author goes on to contrast the mechanistic laboratory-based approach with the
epidemiologically based "black box" strategy that "tries to identify as many correlates, or
inverse correlates, of human cancer risk as possible, without understanding exactly how
cancer arises." Id. He further observes:
Not all correlates point to true causes, of course. Indeed, most of them do not.
But, having identified many correlates or inverse correlates, it is reasonable to
hope that further investigation of them ... will lead to identification of a few
truly causative or truly protective factors with respect to which humans already
differ.
Id. Finally, Peto points out that the epidemiology approach has yielded by far the most
important findings to date. See id. at 14.
141. See Suppe, Afterword to The Structure of Scientific Theories 724 (F. Suppe ed. 2d
ed. 1977).
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acceptance.
b. Publication as Evidence of Acceptance
Because acceptance is predicated on a process of refinement and criti-
cal review, communication among scientists is a necessity; hence the im-
portance of publication to scientific inquiry. "The audience to which
scientific publications are addressed is not passive; by its cheering or boo-
ing, its bouquets or brickbats, it actively controls the substance of the
communications that it receives." 4 ' Publication does not by itself confer
validity, but it does serve as an evidentiary threshold of validity. If a
theory is not accepted anywhere in the literature of science, strong
doubts must arise.
Reference to the literature also raises ancillary questions about the rel-
ative quality of journals, and about the scientific fields in which publica-
tions typically appear on particular issues. The question of quality
relates to the amount of critical review that precedes publication, and can
be resolved fairly easily by emphasizing the importance of the peer re-
view system. The level of scrutiny involved in peer review varies widely
from journal to journal, but individual journals develop reputations for
the degree to which they are strict or lax. 43 Although not perfect, peer
review generally serves at least as an initial screening process.'"
c. Selecting the Relevant Field of Science
Resolving the evidentiary question of whether a journal publication
adequately covers the scientific claims at issue requires a more detailed
examination of the way in which science is conducted within investiga-
tive fields such as biology, biochemistry, or oncology.'45 Fields develop
and grow as scientists organize their work around central problems in an
effort to fill gaps in their knowledge and understanding of the world.' 46
Because acceptance of a theory or scientific claim depends on the beliefs
142. Ziman, supra note 132, at 41; see also Lakatos, History of Science and its Rational
Reconstructions, in Scientific Revolutions 107, 119 (I. Hacking ed. 1981) (discussing the
way in which science progresses, and noting that "[t]he scores of the rival sides... must
be recorded and publicly displayed at all times") (emphasis omitted).
143. See Note, supra note 85, at 34 n.26.
144. See Cole, Rubin & Cole, Peer Review and the Support of Science, 237 Sci. Am. 34,
34 (Oct. 1977) (concludes that "the NSF peer-review system [used to distribute grant
money] is in general an equitable arrangement that distributes the limited funds available
for basic research primarily on the basis of the perceived quality of the applicant's propo-
sal.... Tjhe NSF does not discriminate systematically against noneminent scientists in
ways that some critics have charged."); Merton & Zuckerman, Institutionalized Patterns
of Evaluation in Science, in The Sociology of Science 460, 461 (W. Storer ed. 1973)
("Although the referee [peer review] system has its inefficiencies, practicing scientists see
it even in its current form as crucial for the effective development of science."); Note,
supra note 85, at 27-28 ("For years, the scientific community has validated experimental
results through a process known as peer review.").
145. See Darden & Maull, Interfield Theories, 44 Phil. of Sci. 43, 43-44 (1977).
146. See id at 44 (other identifying features of a field include "facts related to [the
central] problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to how
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of scientists within a particular scientific field, using acceptance as evi-
dence of validity works only if there is a way to address problems related
to the choice of which field is applicable to the legal issue at hand.
If a dispute about a scientific claim reduces to the issue of which field
is appropriate, how is the choice made? For example, must the law
choose between toxicology and pharmacology as the relevant field when
deciding if a drug has caused illness or death? In other instances, the
issue may be whether there is any appropriate field, or whether the valid-
ity of a conclusion that derives from the accepted practices and principles
of several fields can readily be determined. Finally, what prevents im-
proper self-validation by a group that attempts to create its own field
with its own publications?147
These questions do not pose insurmountable problems because of the
extent to which scientific fields overlap and interact. Logical Positivists,
in keeping with their commitment to logical structure, actually saw sci-
ence as a hierarchy of disciplines that eventually would reduce to basic,
universal principles,'48 a position that has gone the way of their view of
theories. A less rigid version of scientific unity, however, has survived.
Broad fields such as physics, astronomy, or biology include subfields or
specialities like high energy physics or solid state physics, and even sub-
subfields in which relatively few scientists work.149 Specialists, however,
seek wider recognition. They will endeavor, for example, to place papers
in journals covering broader, more inclusive fields. This results in wider
publication and recognition for the individual scientists150 and in peer
review and criticism from outside the subspecialty. This process pro-
vides a way to avoid self-validation by a small group. As one writer has
put it, a scientist cannot create his own niche. 15'
Another indication of how well a field fits into science is citation of its
publications by neighboring fields.' 52 Often, one branch of science, as a
part of its own development, will generate "important conceptual, theo-
retical and problem-solving links with other branches."'5 3 Scientists
the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and, sometimes ... concepts, laws,
and theories") (footnotes omitted).
147. The current debate about creation science exemplifies this problem. See infra
Part IV.A.2.
148. See Oppenheim & Putnam, Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, in II Min-
nesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science--Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body
Problem 3, 27-28 (H. Feigl, M. Scriven & G. Maxwell eds. 1958).
149. See T. Kuhn, supra note 84, at 177; D. Shapere, supra note 95, at 320-21.
150. See Doreian, A Measure of Standing of Journals in Stratified Networks, 8
Scientometrics 341, 342 (1985) (pointing out that citations leave a pattern of ties between
journal articles and between journals; also citing examples of journal networks).
151. See Lugg, Theory Choice and Resistance to Change, 47 Phil. of Sci. 227, 239
(1980).
152. See Weinberg, Criteria for Scientific Choice, in Science Observed 134, 136 (F. Je-
vons ed. 1973) ("Relevance to neighboring fields of science is... a valid measure of the
scientific merit of a field of basic science.").
153. Maul, Unifying Science Without Reduction, 8 Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 143, 143
(1977); see also Crane, Invisible Colleges 99-101 (1972) (pointing out how scientific com-
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often work in several specialty fields,'54 and they freely look to other
fields for information. If a theory from one field leads to a different con-
clusion than a theory from a second field, scientists in both become aware
of the conflict. Both theories are then cast in doubt, and the area of
divergence becomes a problem for investigation in both fields.
4. The Need for an Acceptance Test Based Upon
a Correct View of Science
When a dispute about the admissibility of scientific evidence hinges on
the validity of an expert's reasoning, an acceptance test based on the cur-
rent, realistic view of science provides the only way to reach a rational
and consistent decision. A court should determine which scientific fields
are relevant to the dispute and then turn to the peer-reviewed literature
from those fields for guidance. Experts should be required to make their
reasoning clear and explicit, and to explain how their conclusions derive
from accepted scientific practice. An expert who cannot demonstrate
that his or her reasoning conforms to the standards of science should not
be allowed to testify. A complete legal analysis of scientific evidence also
requires consideration of the reliability of the expert's conclusions, but
because reliability properly involves only legal standards, scientific ac-
ceptance should have no bearing on that issue.
II. RESOLUTION OF THE FRYE VERSus RELEVANCY DEBATE
An acceptance test focused on reasoning and scientific standards dif-
fers from the traditional test of Frye v. United States.'5 5 Where Frye
makes acceptance an exclusive test, this Article's proposed approach uses
it only when the reasoning underlying an expert's conclusions is called
into question. Unlike Frye, this approach clearly establishes what must
be accepted, and it provides a minimal evidentiary threshold by reference
to publications.
Distinguishing the validity of reasoning from the reliability of conclu-
sions also permits the resolution of the debate that has dominated legal
thinking about scientific evidence for some sixty years. 156 Two polar po-
sitions have defined the contours of this debate: the general acceptance
test of Frye'. 7 and the pure relevancy test advocated by Professor Mc-
munities interact and how all research areas must rely to some extent on other fields of
science).
154. See T. Kuhn, supra note 84, at 178 (noting that individual scientists generally will
belong to several communities "either simultaneously or in succession").
155. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
156. Although Frye was decided 65 years ago, courts still frequently cite it, and legal
commentators still focus on it, as evidenced by the fact that the 1983 Symposium on
Science and the Rules of Evidence published in Federal Rules Decisions essentially in-
volved a debate about Frye and its alternatives. See Symposium on Science and the Rules
of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983). For an excellent summary of the case law and com-
mentary on Frye, see generally Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
157. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. For the text of the Frye test, see infra note 171.
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Cormick and others, according to which scientific evidence is treated no
differently than other evidence.' 58 When the latter test is used, the focus
is usually on the reliability aspect of relevance. This Article's proposal
encompasses both poles, as well as the multifactor balancing approaches
that one finds nestled in between.' 59 These balancing approaches essen-
tially are refined versions of the relevancy test, but they reflect the way in
which Frye is often actually used.'"
Within the analytical framework proposed in Part I, the extreme posi-
tions of the debate become complementary rather than antagonistic. The
relevancy standard, especially its multifactor variants, easily equates with
the legal considerations portion of the proposed analytical framework;
and Frye's general acceptance test, when confined to the question of va-
lidity, fits neatly within the scientific portion. Unfortunately, the ambi-
guity of Frye has obscured this basic harmony. The cases since Frye
reveal extreme incoherence and inconsistency in the application of the
general acceptance test. In most of them, the validity of reasoning is not
at issue, and the Frye test merely masks legal decisions about reliabil-
ity. 6 ' The standards advanced in place of Frye further cloud the matter,
either by ignoring acceptance completely or by demoting it to one of
several undifferentiated items on a list of factors to be weighed and bal-
anced.' 62 Because no analytical structure relates the items to one an-
other, the significance of acceptance as evidence of validity is lost.
Despite this generally murky picture, some courts have distinguished
acceptance from reliability,'63 and several have recognized that accept-
ance properly relates to the validity of an underlying theory or its appli-
cation.'" A few decisions outline an approach very close to the one
advocated here, 165 but their significance has not been widely recognized.
158. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 203, at 608 (3d ed. 1984) ("Any rele-
vant conclusions supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there
are distinct reasons for exclusion."); D. Louisell & C. Mueller, 1 Federal Evidence § 105,
at 826 (1977) ("The Frye approach as such should be abandoned, and the term 'general
scientific acceptance' absorbed into the judicial notice concept, under which the relevance
of scientific proof can be established without taking time to lay an elaborate scientific
foundation through testimony describing the principles involved.").
159. See, e.g., 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, 702(03), at 702-18
to 702-21. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part II.B.3.
160. At least one court has acknowledged this relationship. In State v. Free, 493 So.
2d 781 (La. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 83 (1987), the court used a balancing
test to determine that voice spectograph identification evidence was inadmissible. See 493
So. 2d at 787. The court explicitly posed the question, however, whether in reality, it just
was applying another version of the general acceptance test. See id. at 787 n.9. It noted
that the Fifth Circuit had applied a balancing test, and reached the result that the value
of hypnosis in refreshing a witness's memory had not been "clearly established," and that
"[t]his language sounds close to the general acceptance standard." Id.
161. See infra Part II.A.
162. See infra Part II.B.3.
163. See infra note 268.
164. See infra note 267.
165. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 706-07, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (Sup.
Ct. 1978); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1233-35 (Utah 1980).
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The need for wider recognition becomes particularly apparent in cases
involving forensic psychology and psychiatry, 166 one of the few medical
areas to which Frye or its alternatives has been applied. The importance
of the scientific reasoning in these cases varies greatly, but, as a group,
they highlight the need for this Article's proposed mode of analysis and
for at least a rudimentary understanding of the philisophical foundations
of science.
A. Frye's Legacy: The Wrong Half of the Right Approach
Few decisions have dominated an area of the law or caused as much
confusion as Frye v. United States.'67 Decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1923, the case
marked the first judicial recognition of the need for special rules for sci-
entific evidence. "68 The appellant in Frye had been convicted of a murder
he claimed he had not committed. 69 To bolster his defense, he had
sought to introduce evidence that he had passed a systolic blood pressure
deception test, 170 a precursor of the modern polygraph lie detector. The
trial court rejected this evidence, and in affrming that decision, the D.C.
Circuit articulated its now famous "general acceptance" rule.1 '
Frye's general acceptance test quite clearly was meant to apply to sci-
entilic principles, which is not inconsistent with the validity portion of
this Article's proposal. The ambiguous reference to "the thing from
which the deduction is made"1 72 has, however, led many courts to con-
166. See infra Part II.D.
167. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
168. See E. Cleary, supra note 158, § 203, at 605. It should be noted that many issues
related to scientific evidence have been decided without any special rule, both before and
after Frye. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 400-504, 391 A.2d 364, 377-428 (1978)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (discussing cases not employing the Frye test).
169. For an interesting historical account of Frye, see Starts, "A Still-Life Watercolor":
Frye v. United States, 27 J. of Forensic Sciences 684 (1982). Professor Starts points out
that the two-page Frye opinion provides very little insight into the facts of the case. See
id. at 685. He has, however, done considerable research beyond the opinion. James Al-
phonso Frye was accused of murdering a doctor. See id. at 687-88. At first he confessed,
but later he recanted. See id at 688. At trial he attempted a weak alibi, but was con-
victed. See id at 689. He served eighteen years, and after his release he married a wo-
man who, in 1981, told Professor Starrs that Frye had caused her nothing but
unremitting trouble. See id. at 692. Devotees of scientific evidence have long felt the
same way.
170. See 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
171. See id. at 1014. The test, as articulated by the court, reads as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experi-
mental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the





centrate on devices or techniques,173 rather than on theories or reason-
ing-a problem greatly compounded by the fact that reasoning was not
really at issue in Frye. The theory that emotions correlate with involun-
tary physiological manifestations was accepted for some purposes at the
time of Frye,174 as was the idea that lying might trigger emotions.
1 75
Though the court did not cite a single legal or scientific reference in sup-
port of its holding, a substantial body of literature about the systolic
blood pressure test in fact was available.' 76 Under some circumstances
the test had proven useful, and based on acceptance, it surely represented
a valid, scientific application of a valid, scientific theory.
177
The Frye court's real concern must have been whether the specific con-
clusion about Mr. Frye was, as a legal matter, reliable and understanda-
ble enough to warrant presentation to the jury, yet it blurred this crucial
point by turning a legal decision about a scientific conclusion into a deci-
sion about whether the conclusion was scientific.178 Lie detector deci-
173. See, for example, State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 53-55, 622 P.2d 986, 991-92
(1981), discussed infra notes 194-98, in which focus on the electrophoresis technique,
which is recognized and accepted for some purposes, led the court to overlook the way in
which the technique was being used in the case before it. In Medley v. United States, 155
F.2d 857, 859-60 (D.C. Cir. 1946), discussed infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text,
the same problem arose relative to the spectroscopic technique of metallurgical analysis.
As examples of cases in which the court focused on a device, see City of Seattle v. Peter-
son, 39 Wash. App. 524, 527, 693 P.2d 757, 758 (1985) (regarding Doppler radar speed
detector, the court noted the "issue here is not the reliability of a scientific principle...
but whether the particular machine employing the principle is so designed and con-
structed that the results produced by proper operation are reliable"); see also People v.
Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 566, 147 N.E.2d 728, 730, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337-38 (1958) ("We
think the time has come when we may recognize the general reliability of the radar speed-
meter... and that it will no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case
as to the nature, function or scientific principles underlying it .... "); People v. Tilley, 120
Misc. 2d 1040, 1047, 466 N.Y.S.2d 983, 987 (Erie County Ct. 1983) (following review of
theory behind breathalyzer and discussion of questions related to a particular type of
instrument, court held that "[i]t is not necessary that the perfection of the machine be
proven beyond all doubt. Reasonable proof of its accuracy has been established."). But
see People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 275, 38 N.W.2d 322, 324 (1949) (excluding "drunk-
ometer" test results).
174. See Comment, The Use of Psychological Tests to Determine the Credibility of Wit-
nesses, 33 Yale L.J. 771, 773 n.13 (1924) ("it is possible to influence expressive measure-
ments somewhat by emotional control") (citing Burtt, The Inspiration-Expiration Ratio
During Truth and Falsehood, 4 J. of Experimental Psychology 1, 23 (1921)).
175. See Starrs, supra note 169, at 686 (" 'few of us would doubt, or need any evidence
other than experience, that conscious lying produces in the ordinary man emotional dis-
turbances' ") (quoting McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 Calif. L.
Rev. 484, 484 (1927)).
176. See Annotation, Physiological or Psychological Deception Test, 34 A.L.R. 147
(1925). In commenting on Frye, this annotation notes that among other publications
available at the time were a 1922 article in American Bar Association Reports, a 1921
article in the Journal of Experimental Psychology, a 1917 article in the Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, and two 1921 articles in the Journal of Criminal Law. See id. at 147-
48; see also Case Note, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1138 (1924).
177. But see Skolnick, supra note 80, at 699 (pointing out problems of verifying accu-
racy of lie detection).
178. At least one commentator previously has noted that courts essentially are making
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sions since Frye, despite going into far more detail about the specific
techniques involved, by and large have perpetuated this misuse of general
acceptance.
In People v. Davis,17 9 for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan
acknowledged "the proven value of the polygraph in the fields of crime
detection and criminal interrogation,"" 0 but it was troubled by the possi-
bility of erroneous results, "estimated at being from less than 10 percent
to 25 percent by various authorities."'' Neither the validity of reason-
ing nor acceptance was at issue. The evidence before the court estab-
lished the underlying principle that a definite relationship exists between
willful lying and an elevation of blood pressure, changes in respiration,
and variations in the electrical resistance of the skin.'82 The evidence
also made it clear that applying this principle by recording these reac-
tions on the polygraph was an accepted way to determine truthfulness. 83
The court's real concern was the "tremendous weight which such tests
would necessarily carry in the minds of a jury... . " , Nonetheless,
citing Frye and related cases, it purported to ground its opinion on
acceptance.
185
policy judgments in their decisions about lie detectors. See Trautman, Logical or Legal
Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 385, 395-97 (1952). It should be noted
that at least one court has in fact found lie detector results to be sufficiently reliable for
legal purposes. See United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (FD. Mich. 1972)
(holding that defendant in pejury case could introduce polygraph evidence provided that
defendant submit to additional polygraph tests administered by court-appointed expert).
One very significant result of fixing on the wrong issue is that it causes courts to ignore
totally the constitutional question of whether the evidence presented by a defendant in a
criminal case has to reach the same level of reliability as evidence offered by the prosecu-
tion. See Giannelli, supra note 23, at 196-98. The recent Supreme Court decision in
Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), indicates that this is a genuine concern. The
appellant in Rock was convicted of manslaughter for shooting her husband. See id. at
2705. To refresh her memory as to the precise details of the shooting, she had undergone
hypnosis. See id. Because of serious questions about the scientific validity of refreshing
memory in this fashion, a number of states, including Arkansas, have held that the testi-
mony of any witness who has undergone hypnosis is inadmissible. See infra Part II.D. 1.
In Rock, however, this rule conflicted with the constitutional right of a criminal defend-
ant to testify on his or her own behalf. The Supreme Court held that under these
circumstances,
[a] State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to
per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case. Wholesale inadmis-
sibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to tes-
tify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all
posthypnosis recollections.
107 S. CL at 2714.
179. 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955).
180. Id at 371, 72 N.W.2d at 282.
181. Id
182. See id at 369, 72 N.W.2d at 280-81.
183. See id, 72 N.W.2d at 281.
184. Id at 372, 72 N.W.2d at 282.
185. See id at 371-72, 72 N.W.2d at 281-82. For other decisions that employ a similar
analysis, see State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 629-30, 185 P.2d 147, 151-52 (1947) (device
has utility, but questions related to accuracy, reliability and ease of interpretation exist);
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A number of undesirable results stem from the Davis kind of analysis,
which forces the use of acceptance as an ultimate test, rather than as
evidence of validity, and which confuses validity with reliability. In ad-
dition to using Frye to mask legal decisions about reliability with a simple
label, courts sometimes combine acceptance and reliability into a version
of Frye that requires evidence to be "accepted as reliable." This fused
version in effect cedes to scientists the decision about what constitutes
sufficient reliability for legal purposes. When Frye is used to decide ques-
tions related to the validity of reasoning, the acceptance test works bet-
ter, but the analysis still often falls short by failing to include any
consideration of reliability.
1. Acceptance as a Label
At least one court has explicitly acknowledged the problem of using
Frye to decide reliability issues. The issue in United States v. Franks,86
as in United States v. Williams,187 was the admissibility of the voiceprint
method for comparing a suspect's voice with an incriminating record-
ing. 188 The court in Franks held that there was no evidence to rebut "the
government's claim that voiceprint analysis is sufficiently accurate to be
admissible."18' 9 Apparently realizing, however, that accuracy does not
necessarily imply general acceptance, the court simply declared that "[i]f
a scientific process is reliable, or sufficiently accurate, courts may also
deem it 'generally accepted.' "90 It is at this point that acceptance be-
comes a mere label rather than a mode of analysis.
2. Reliability and Validity Both Ignored Because of the Acceptance
Test: The Problem of Self-validation
When the acceptance rule is applied in a rigidly legalistic way, it often
State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 221-22, 52 N.W.2d 458, 465 (1952) (lie detector ac-
knowledged to be useful, but inadmissible for three reasons: probable impact on jurors;
not of sufficient scientific and psychiatric accuracy; and difficulties in interpreting results);
State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 491-93, 171 A.2d 124, 129 (1961) (citing Frye, but
really basing rejection on the margin of error intrinsic to the test; court also bothered by
need for the well-trained expert to interpret results); Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495,
501-04 (Okla.) (citing Frye, but really basing decision on reliability and accuracy, court
found medical consensus on physiologic manifestation of emotion, but that polygraph,
even when properly interpreted, does not work for about 10% of population), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951).
186. 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
187. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). For a further
discussion of Williams and voiceprint analysis, see supra notes 52-63 and accompanying
text.
188. See Franks, 511 F.2d at 30 (taped conversations with government informants).
189. Id. at 33.
190. Id. at 33 n.12; see also United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir.
1983) (finding reliability one of the most important factors to consider in determining
acceptance) (citing United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975)). But
see United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (distinguishing reliabil-
ity from general acceptance).
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becomes a simplistic requirement for scientific precedent, and both valid-
ity and reliability may fade into the background. This wooden reliance
on precedent can lead to an acceptance test that ignores the purpose or
application for which a method or device has been accepted. In Medley
v. United States,19 for example, the prosecution introduced evidence
based on spectroscopic metallurgical analysis to connect bits of metal
found on a file belonging to the defendant with filed-down bullets that
had killed a murder victim.1 92 Although this technique was generally
accepted in scientific research and for certain industrial uses, the opinion
gives no indication that it had any track record for the forensic applica-
tion at issue. Nonetheless, the court in Medley held that testimony based
in part on this analysis was admissible.'
In some cases, such an uncritical approach to acceptance allows a
group that advocates a technique or method to self-validate it simply by
declaring acceptance. For example, in State v. Washington,'94 results of
a "multi-system" blood-typing test used only by crime labs were used to
link the defendant to a rape-murder. 95 The murderer apparently had
cut himself during the commission of his crime, and the state claimed
that the dried drops of blood found at the crime scene matched the de-
fendant's blood.196 Though based on methods widely used and accepted
for analysis of fresh blood in clinical, research, and genetic laboratories,
and in paternity testing clinics, the validity of the state's forensic exten-
sion of these methods to a single sample of dried blood raised a number
of unanswered questions.' 97 Kansas' highest court, however, upheld the
191. 155 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 328 U.S. 873 (1946).
192. See id. at 860.
193. See id.; see also People v. Haggart, 142 Mich. App. 330, 370 N.W.2d 345 (1985).
In Haggart, the court held admissible testimony regarding the analysis of blood using a
technique known as serological electrophoresis, even though the technique admittedly
had virtually no track record for such a use. See 142 Mich. App. at 343-45, 370 N.W.2d
at 352-53. For the court, it sufficed that electrophoresis was accepted in the scientific
community for other applications. See i& at 344, 370 N.W.2d at 353. Haggart's uncriti-
cal acceptance of electrophoresis soon was reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court in
People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 505, 391 N.W.2d 270, 286 (1986), a case involving a
form of electrophoresis known as the multi-system test. For a more detailed discussion of
the problems surrounding the forensic use of multi-system electophoresis, see Black,
Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239 Sci. 1508, 1509
(1988); infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
Another case properly distinguishing acceptance for one use from acceptance for an-
other is United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (acceptance of radar
system for determining location of aircraft did not mean acceptance of system for deter-
mining kind of airplane that had been located).
On the general problem of admitting evidence based on acceptance for the wrong pur-
pose, see Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend
Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92, 96 (1987).
194. 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981).
195. See id. at 49, 55, 622 P.2d at 988-89, 992.
196. See id.
197. See Grunbaum, Physiological Stain Evidence.: Guidelines to Assure Quality Analy-
sis, 1 Calif. Defender 20, 21 (1985); see also Black, supra note 193, at 1508-09; Jonakait,
Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 Emory LJ. 833, 852-54 (1982).
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evidentiary use of the forensic blood test results without considering
these questions, having been particularly impressed with the fact that the
test was used "in over 100 criminal laboratories ... and ... the FBI
research laboratory." '198 The court did not even mention the analytical
theory underlying the multi-system test, much less consider how the
multi-system differed from other applications. 99
The Supreme Court of Kansas unfortunately overlooked the fact that
use does not necessarily imply either valid reasoning or reliable results.2"o
Unlike hospitals that test undeteriorated, uncontaminated blood using
established techniques designed to assure safe transfusions, crime labs
have no way of knowing if they are right or wrong in finding a match
based on deteriorated, contaminated blood samples examined with a
technique developed by police scientists.20 1 In the hospital, patients
would die if the blood test did not work, but complaints from innocent
defendants cannot be distinguished from the protestations of the guilty.
For this reason, acceptance of the forensic blood test by criminologists
without controlled testing amounts to nothing more than self-validation,
198. 229 Kan. at 55, 622 P.2d at 992. For other examples of this problem of self-
validation, see People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 253-54
(1958) (nalline test for narcotics accepted by those who apply it); Robinson v. State, 47
Md. App. 558, 573-76, 425 A.2d 211, 219-21 (1981) (electrophoretic testing of blood)
(discussed infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text).
199. See Black, supra note 193, at 1508-09.
200. See Jonakait, supra note 197, at 849.
201. See infra note 202. To some extent, even the developers of the multi-system test
have acknowledged the need for more data to establish its validity and reliability. In
1986 they published an article that drew criticism from three FBI scientists who, though
supporters of the technique, felt that the authors, Wraxall and Stolorow, had done "little
to strike at the heart of the criticisms confronting its use. The paper did not support their
scientific claims nor the reliability and validity of the ... method." Murch, Kearney &
Budowle, Discussion of "The Simultaneous Separation of the Enzymes Glyoxalase I, Es-
terase D, and Phosphoglucomutase," 32 J. of Forensic Sci. 1498, 1499 (1987). Wraxall
and Stolorow responded that release of FBI data on the technique was long overdue. See
id. at 1500.
Other forms of electrophoretic analysis in fact may be more valid than the multi-sys-
tem, which itself eventually may gain wider and more general acceptance. See generally
Budlowle & Murch, Electrophoresis Reliability II-Historical Use in the FBI Laboratory,
Validity, and Scientific Scrutiny, Crime Laboratory Digest (in press) (arguing that the
multi-system has been validated); Note, The Admissibility of Electrophoretic Methods of
Genetic Marker Bloodstain Typing Under the Frye Standard, 11 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 773
(1986) (advocating multi-system as well as other techniques); cf People v. Reilly, 242
Cal. Rptr. 496, 511-13 (Cal. App. 1987) (holding electrophoretic testing of dried blood to
be generally accepted; multi-system test was not at issue). The entire debate may be
mooted as still better techniques such as "DNA Fingerprinting" are developed. See
Lewis, DNA Fingerprints: Witness for the Prosecution, Discover, June 1988, at 44; Moss,
DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A.J. 66 (May 1988) (discussing matching based on
very specific tests of genetic structure). It is interesting that George Sensabaugh, a pro-
fessor at the University of California at Berkeley's School of Public Health, and a leading
proponent of DNA matching, has called for additional study. According to Moss, Prof.
Sensabaugh "says the forensic science community is concerned because the research vali-
dating DNA typing has come primarily from ... private sector companies. That re-
search should be published quickly for critical evaluation by other scientists, he says." 74
A.B.A.J. at 69.
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a conclusion reached by the Michigan Supreme Court in a case decided
five years after Washington.2"'
The reasoning in Washington also raises fundamental questions that
relate to the use of any "matching" evidence.2" 3 These problems are par-
ticularly well illustrated by the evidentiary use of neutron activation
analysis ("NAA").2° NAA can detect "with great sensitivity the pres-
ence and concentrations of most chemical elements in materials, without,
in most cases, destroying the sample analyzed."2 "5 As a valid analytical
technique, NAA passes the acceptance test with relative ease,2 °6 but this
202. See People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270 (1986). The court in
Young noted that no comprehensive control test had been run with the specific technique
at issue, which had been developed by police scientists for police work. See id. at 491-92,
391 N.W.2d at 279-80. There were also questions about how the deterioration of blood
affects the test results, see id at 487-90, 391 N.W.2d at 277-79, and about the effect of
crime scene contamination of blood samples. See id at 495-99, 391 N.W.2d at 281-83.
Thus, testimony from prosecution witnesses about the reliability of the test amounted to
"the type of self-verification considered inconclusive in the scientific community." Id at
476, 391 N.W.2d at 272. The court also was aware of the need to consider the views of
nonforensic scientists who use electrophoresis, the blood testing technique at issue, see id.
at 474-76, 391 N.W.2d. at 271-72, and was sensitive to the fact that "[t]he only prosecu-
tion witness having substantial experience with electrophoresis of evidentiary bloodstains
relied on his own unpublished observations and an unpublished reliability study." Id. at
475, 391 N.W.2d at 272. The court noted that forensic uses of electrophoresis to analyze
blood stains had not been "subjected to the scrutiny of the scientific ommunity .... The
scientific tradition expects independent verification of new procedures. When other
scientists analyze and repeat the tests, they counteract the dangers of biased reporting."
Idt at 499, 391 N.W.2d at 283.
203. In addition to obscuring the question of precisely how the disputed test could
determine a match in blood types, the decision in Washington fails to recognize the logi-
cal flaws in concluding, even from a perfect match, that the defendant had been at the
scene of the murder. The state's expert testified that the defendant's blood type was
found in less than one percent of the black population. See State v. Washington, 229
Kan. 47, 49, 622 P.2d 986, 989 (1981). This would be relevant, however, only if it were
known that the murderer was black, and that blacks comprised only a very small percent-
age of the population in the area where the murder occurred. If there were even a thou-
sand blacks in the area, there would be about ten suspects, based on the blood-typing.
204. The NAA technique is very well described in a 1971 Comment:
The detection of elements by activation analysis is possible because most ele-
ments can be made artificially radioactive. The resulting radioactive products
can be identified by observation of the ways in which they undergo radioactive
decay. Radioactive decay is a fairly complicated process during which the nu-
clei of most radioactive atoms (these nuclei are often referred to as ra-
dionuclides) emit a pulse of high-energy electromagnetic radiation called a
gamma-ray which has an energy characteristic of the emitting nucleus. The
activation analyst usually tries to count the number of gamma-rays of each en-
ergy which are emitted from a sample of activated material. He also observes
the half-life of each emitting radionuclide. These measurements tell him what
kind of radionuclide produced the gamma-rays, and from the number of
gamma-rays of each energy he deduces the number of radioactive nuclei of that
particular type which are present in the activated sample. From this informa-
tion he can determine the preactivation elemental composition of the sample.
Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 Cal. L Rev. 997, 999-
1000 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
205. Idt at 997 (footnote omitted).
206. See id at 998.
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does not validate conclusions based on the results of NAA testing.
The biggest problem with NAA evidence, as with the kind of blood
matching performed in Washington, is the way in which experts misinter-
pret the results. The fact that paint found on the body of a hit-and-run
victim exactly matches the paint on a suspect's car does not necessarily
implicate the car. If the same kind of paint were used on a large number
of cars, the match could not establish a reliable connection. Courts,
however, often overlook this important gap in an expert's reasoning. In
People v. Collins,"°7 for example, NAA was used to determine if hairs
found on a murder victim's clothing matched hairs found on the floor of
the basement room where the murder allegedly occurred.0 8 The prose-
cution's witness claimed that there was "a distinct and high level of
probability" that the samples he examined had come from a common
source, 20 9 and the court admitted this testimony over objections about
the way the tests had been done.210 Neither the court nor, apparently,
the defense, considered the question of how unique the hairs were.211
This basic logical flaw arises with regard to a number of matching tech-
niques. It requires that courts probe the validity of the reasoning that
leads to the conclusion that an identification has been made, rather than
confining themselves to consideration of the analytical technique used to
make the comparison.21 2
3. Letting the Scientists Decide: The "Acceptance
of Reliability" Test
A number of courts have adjusted to the fact that Frye does not work
very well for reliability issues by reformulating the general acceptance
test to require "a showing that [a] technique has been generally accepted
207. 43 Mich. App. 259, 204 N.W.2d 290 (1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866 (1974).
208. See id. at 264, 204 N.W.2d at 293.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 265, 204 N.W.2d at 293.
211. See 43 Mich. App. 259, 204 N.W.2d 290 (1972) (passim), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
866 (1974).
212. A number of commentators have discussed this problem. See generally Ellman &
Kaye, supra note 45; Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1226; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971); Comment, supra note
204, at 1014-20. The most frequently cited case on this point is People v. Collins, 68 Cal.
2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968), which involved a purse snatching commit-
ted by a black man with a mustache and beard, and a blond woman, who drove away
from the crime scene together in a yellow car. See id. at 320-21, 438 P.2d at 34, 66 Cal.
Rptr. at 498. The state introduced expert testimony from a statistician who testified that
there was only a I in 12 million chance that this particular combination of factors could
occur. See id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 36-37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01. The California Supreme
Court held that this testimony was inadmissible because there existed no foundational
evidence about the data upon which the probability estimate was based, see id. at 327, 438
P.2d at 37, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502, and because even given the assumption that the combi-
nation of factors was as rare as the witness had concluded, there would still be a 40
percent probability that two or more couples would fit the description of the couple that
had committed the crime. See id. at 331, 438 P.2d at 40, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
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as reliable in the scientific community in which it developed."2 3 This
maneuver fixes on the right issue in most cases, but may do so at the
expense of turning legal decisions over to scientists,2" 4 a problem that
becomes especially severe when acceptance is established on the basis of
recognition within a single, limited field. In Robinson v. State,2" 5 another
blood typing case, the court held that evidence of a match between blood
on the defendant's clothing and the blood of an assault victim was admis-
sible because the technique used was accepted as reliable in the field of
forensic chemistry. 216 Given the testimony at trial, the court's decision
in effect allowed the police department to decide whether the prosecu-
tor's evidence was reliable enough for legal purposes. 2 7
The aura of unfairness that surrounds Robinson is made all the more
unsettling by the fact that the court did not consider the purposes for
which other crime labs had accepted the test. Nor does the court's deci-
sion give the slightest hint about how frequently the test might produce
an incorrect result. None of these holes in the legal analysis would have
occurred had the court followed the approach proposed in this Article.
4. Acceptance Properly Used
Though often misused, Frye has worked well in cases involving issues
directly related to the validity of reasoning. United States v. Brown 218
illustrates this better side of general acceptance. The defendant in Brown
213. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 34, 641 P.2d 775, 784, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 252
(emphasis added), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); see State v. Washington, 229 Kan.
47, 55, 622 P.2d 986, 992 (1981); Robinson v. State, 47 Md. App. 558, 575-76, 425 A.2d
211, 220-21 (1981).
214. A good discussion of this problem is found in Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and
Science. An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 527 (1978):
A scientist. as a scientist, might be able to state the quantitative probability that
precisely defined behavior such as suicide was going to occur. If a scientist says
"harm is likely," however, he is behaving as an ordinary layperson, assigning
his own private, unscientific meaning to the terms 'harm' and 'likely.' This
determination, however, is not part of the scientist's proper role in the court-
room. Rather, the judge or jury should consider the empirical data and then
decide the social, moral, and legal question of whether the legal standard is met.
Id. at 591 (emphasis in original). Also see Markey, Jurisprudence or "Juriscience'?, 25
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 525, 529-30 (1984):
When questions arising from scientific or technical activities are presented to
the courts under the artificial regime of bipartisan adversarial litigation, value
questions may seem indistinguishable from questions of scientific fact. Failure
to make the distinction, however, would allow moral, philosophical, and polit-
ical decisions to be based solely on the outcome of a purely technical debate
between scientific experts. This result has already occurred in a variety of
instances.
Id. at 529-30; see also Steinbock, Richman & Ray, supra note 81.
215. 47 Md. App. 558, 425 A.2d 211 (1981).
216. See id at 574-76, 425 A.2d at 220-21.
217. The state's witness was a forensic chemist employed by the county police depart-
ment, see id at 573, 425 A.2d at 219, and her testimony gave no indication of acceptance
in any other area of science. See id at 574-76, 425 A.2d at 220-21.
218. 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
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was accused of firebombing a Planned Parenthood Clinic.2 19 Part of the
evidence against him consisted of three hairs on a broken bottle found at
the site of the bombing.22° To link him to the bottle, and thus to the
crime, the government presented testimony about ion microprobic analy-
ses that they had done on the three suspect hairs and on hair samples
from the defendant. 2
2 1
The Brown court applied a four-part test, which determined admissi-
bility based on the qualifications of the expert, the appropriateness of the
subject of the testimony, conformity to a generally accepted explanatory
theory, and probative value balanced against prejudicial effect.222 For
the ion microprobe testimony, the validity of the underlying theory was
the central issue, and the court held that it had not been adequately es-
tablished.223 The experts had no demonstrable objective procedure for
reaching their opinion. Neither of them claimed to be an expert on
human hair, and their expertise went no further than having performed
experiments on 130 hair samples. 22 4 "Both concede[d] that their test re-
sults [had] not been duplicated elsewhere and neither was able to cite any
authority in the field [of mass spectrometry] in support of their posi-
tions." '225 There were no standards with which to test the accuracy of
the measurements, and, most troubling to the court, the witnesses had
made no attempt "to match the test samples against a statistically valid
test group." 2
26
The legal analysis in Brown avoids the problem of turning reliability
decisions over to experts. It also avoids the self-validation problem illus-
trated by State v. Washington 227 and the labeling problem illustrated by
United States v. Franks.228 It still falls short of the proposed framework,
however, because the four-factor test does not address adequately the dis-
tinction between reliability and validity. The court groped in this direc-
tion, but, by not jettisoning the baggage of Frye, failed to take the
necessary final step.
B. Alternatives to Frye: The Other Wrong Half
The confusion of acceptance with reliability, compounded by the fact
that the latter is the crucial issue in most forensic science cases, has led a
number of commentators to attack Frye on a variety of grounds, 229 and
219. See id. at 544-45.
220. See id. at 554.
221. See id. at 554-56.
222. See id. at 556.
223. See id. at 557.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 558; see also United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973)
(articulating the standard used in Brown).
227. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
229. See Boyce, supra note 4, at 325-27 (suggesting the replacement of Frye with a
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some courts have begun to pay heed. They generally purport to employ
the kind of relevancy analysis advocated by Professor McCormick," °
and their focus usually shifts to the reliability aspect of relevance, some-
times in the context of a multiple factor test. For cases involving only
reliability, such as United States v. Williams,'-" this trend can represent a
great improvement. Sometimes, however, courts simply exchange the
Frye acceptance label for a reliability label, or they reverse the Frye prob-
lem and squeeze validity issues through a reliability hoop.
1. Reliability as a New Label
Like any other standard, reliability does little good when used only as
a conclusory label. This problem is illustrated by State v. Kersting, 1 2 an
Oregon case in which the state's intermediate appellate court explicitly
rejected Frye for a "reasonable reliability" test. a3 The evidence at issue
consisted of the microscopic comparison of the defendant's hair with
hairs found on the clothing and clutched in the hand of a murder vic-
tiM.2 4 The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence on the
ground that the method used was not "generally accepted as reliable."2"
After a lengthy discussion of what it perceived to be wrong with Frye
and right with its new test, the Kersting court concluded, without any
discussion of the technique, that the hair comparison method, in fact,
was reasonably reliable. 36 Like the court in People v. Collins,23' which
also admitted identification evidence based on testing of hair samples, the
Kersting court completely failed to consider the fact that even a perfect
match does not necessarily provide a specific identification.238 Other
than the fact that the method at issue in Collins (NAA) may have deter-
mined the composition of the hair more accurately than the method in
Kersting, the two cases are nearly identical, except that one court used
Frye as its label and the other used reliability.239
"reasonable reliability" test); Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1246-47 (advocating adjusting
the burden of proof to accommodate the concerns Frye intended to address); Im-
winkelried II, supra note 31, at 272-73 (advocating approach based more on the weight of
the evidence than on admissibility); McCormick, supra note 4, at 911-12 (advocating
multi-factor balancing test); Moenssens, supra note 4, at 548-55 (discussing problems
with Frye).
230. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
232. 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981), aff'd, 292 Or. 350, 638 P.2d 1145 (1982).
233. See id. at 470-71, 623 P.2d at 1101.
234. See id. at 465, 623 P.2d at 1098.
235. I&
236. See id. at 471, 623 P.2d at 1101-02.
237. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
239. Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court, which had not directly ruled on the scientific
evidence issue in Kersting, see 292 Or. 350, 352, 638 P.2d 1145, 1146 (1982), aff'g State v.
Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981), subsequently required a more thorough
analysis. See State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 416-18, 687 P.2d 751, 759-60 (1984) (en banc).
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2. Forcing a Reliability Analysis of Validity Issues: Throwing Away
Acceptance When It Is Needed
Because the distinction between validity and reliability has never been
fully appreciated, some courts inappropriately have discarded accept-
ance. For example, in Whalen v. State,2" the defendant in a rape-murder
case appealed his conviction, claiming that the semen test used to estab-
lish that the victim had been raped by the defendant was not generally
accepted.241' The court found that the record contained no evidence of
acceptance yet affirmed the conviction because the expert witness had
described how the test was performed, how it worked, and how it would
be affected by the presence of certain chemicals.242 According to the
court, this "fulfilled the hallmarks of admissibility, relevance and reliabil-
ity.' ' 243 It is difficult on these facts, however, to see how the court could
reach a conclusion about reliability without considering the validity of
the expert's explanation, and even more difficult to see how it could de-
termine validity without looking at evidence of acceptance. 2 "
Whalen is unusual in the way it highlights the misuse of reliability to
decide an issue of validity. Because reliability subsumes validity, its mis-
application tends not to create the obvious distortions that accompany
the misuse of acceptance. A court that speaks in terms of reliability may
be referring to the reasoning that supports a conclusion. In United States
v. Fosher,245 for example, expert testimony about the problems surround-
ing eyewitness identification was rejected for want of reliability, even
though the court explicitly recognized that the expert's "mode of scien-
tific analysis" was at issue.2 46 This is precisely the sort of question that
demands the acceptance test proposed in this Article,247 but stating the
decision in terms of reliability made no difference because without valid-
ity, there is no reliability.
The flaw in both Whalen and Fosher is their failure to allow for scien-
tific concerns in reaching a decision about admissibility. Analytically,
this failure mirrors the problem of using the acceptance test to determine
reliability. Where forcing a Frye analysis in a reliability case often results
in leaving legal decisions to scientists, forcing the use of reliability in a
validity case often leaves too much of the decision about scientific merit
240. 434 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982).
241. See id. at 1354.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. In some ways, the Whalen case represents another manifestation of the labeling
problem. Because the court saw that the testimony could not satisfy Frye, it latched onto
reliability as a way of sustaining the conviction. Whalen, however, differs from Kersting
and Collins. In those cases, the label covered a failure even to consider what the issue
was, while in Whalen, the court applied the reliability test to a situation that clearly
called for an evaluation of validity.
245. 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
246. Id. at 383.
247. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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to judges and juries ignorant of the views of the scientific community.
Watson v. State,2' still another hair matching case, illustrates how this
occurs. Without any consideration of the details of the underlying the-
ory or of the reliabilty or accuracy of the technique, the Watson court
used the relevancy test and held that whatever problems there might be
could be cured by cross-examination.249 "If... the witness is qualified as
an expert, the testimony may be believed by the jury despite scientific
evidence to the contrary. ' 250
The Watson standard allows laymen to credit testimony that flies in
the face of science. All that is required is a qualified expert willing to
testify. The effect is the same as the self-validation seen in some Frye
cases,251 there being no difference between not probing scientific validity
at all and allowing an expert to decide on his own what is accepted. Re-
calling Paul Feyerabend's acknowledgement regarding the use of subjec-
tive criteria for evaluating theories and reasoning,25 2 one wonders how
the court in Watson or State v. Washington 25 3 would react to a qualified
physician who chooses to base his conclusions on the principles of a
witch doctor, but who maintains that such principles are generally ac-
cepted. These two decisions indicate that neither court would limit this
kind of testimony, though one doubts that either would adhere to its
prior holding if actually confronted with such facts. 2
3. Multiple Factor Forms of the Relevancy Test
While the reliability test is, in practice, the principal alternative to
Frye, it developed as a consequence of applying the traditional relevancy
standard to scientific evidence.2 5 A number of those who advocate using
248. 64 Wis. 2d 264, 219 N.W.2d 398 (1974).
249. See id. at 272-74, 219 N.W.2d at 403.
250. Id. at 274, 219 N.W.2d at 403 (emphasis added); see also Boldt v. Jostens, Inc.,
261 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Minn. 1977) (stating that the "truth of the [scientific] opinion need
not be capable of demonstration").
251. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
254. One legal commentator, however, has maintained that treating and diagnosing
physicians should be allowed to testify that an exposure to a chemical caused a plaintiff's
disease, even if it is conceded that there is no accepted scientific evidence that the chemi-
cal can cause the disease at all. See Nesson, supra note 27, at 530-31. This position
makes explicit the consequences of abandoning any effort at judicial control of the valid-
ity of reasoning. According to Professor Nesson, a treating or diagnosing physician al-
ways should be allowed to testify about causation unless a large number of controlled
studies show that no conceivable causal connection can exist. See id. This proposal, of
course, completely reverses the usual burden of proof.
255. See Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1232-45. As discussed in note 80, supra, Professor
Giannelli sees reliability as the principle factor to consider in evaluating scientific evi-
dence. He would deviate from the standard relevancy analysis only in making it explicit
that the burden of proving reliability rests with the party seeking to introduce expert
scientific testimony. See id. at 1245-49. He points out that in weighing probative value
against prejudice, the probative value depends on the reliability of the technique or device
at issue. See id. at 1247 n.379; see also Boyce, supra note 4, at 327 (advocating a reason-
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one basic rule in this manner nonetheless recognize that such an ap-
proach can result in the inadequate kind of analysis seen in Kersting,25 6
and so they have proposed various lists of factors to guide the determina-
tion of the relevancy and probative value of scientific evidence. 2"5
Professors Weinstein and Berger, for example, have outlined seven
factors:
(1) The technique's general acceptance in the field;
(2) The expert's qualifications and stature;
(3) The use which has been made of the technique;
(4) The potential rate of error;
(5) The existence of specialized literature;
(6) The novelty of the invention; and
(7) The extent to which the technique relies on the subjective inter-
pretation of the expert.258
able reliability test); Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 115
F.R.D. 84, 84-85 (1987) (proposing amendment to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to require that scientific evidence be reliable); McCormick, supra note 4, at 904
(suggesting new standards based on concerns about accuracy and reliability); Moenssens,
supra note 4, at 564-65 (suggesting a new procedure rather than a new rule for dealing
with scientific evidence, and noting that "[t]he new procedure must emphasize reliability
of the technique rather than its general acceptance"); Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 216
(noting that "[a] foundation is needed that establishes sufficent reliability for a test to
remove fears that later developments will suggest that an inaccurate and unjust result was
reached at trial because the test was used"); cf Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured
and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 115 F.R.D. 92, 98-99
(1987) (proposing amendment to Rule 702 to require that scientific evidence be scientifi-
cally valid and noting that "[r]eliability has often been stated to be the linchpin without
which scientific evidence would send the law reeling," and that "the difference between
accuracy, validity, and reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no
more than a hen's kick").
256. See supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
257. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
258. J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence 1 702[03], at 702-18 to 702-19
(1987). Other commentators also have formulated lists of factors to be considered in
evaluating scientific evidence. For example, Professor McCormick advocates an eleven-
factor list including:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the existence and mainte-
nance of standards governing its use, (3) presence of safeguards in the charac-
teristics of the technique, (4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results
are admissible, (5) the extent to which the technique has been accepted by scien-
tists in the field involved, (6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced,
(7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its
results explained, (8) the extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the
court and jury, (9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the tech-
nique, (10) the probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the
case, and (11) the care with which the technique was employed in the case.
McCormick, supra note 4, at 911-12 (footnotes omitted). In 1983, the National Confer-
ence of Lawyers and Scientists proposed consideration of, among other factors:
(1) The reputation of the expert within the scientific community, (2) The
strengths of opposing views and the standing of the persons who express them,
(3) Whether the expert is prepared to discuss uncertainties in the techniques
used to prepare the evidence and in the conclusions, and (4) Whether both sides
to the controversy have reasonably comparable access to scientific authorities.
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These seven factors capture much of the substantive flavor of this Arti-
cle's proposal, but they are skewed heavily toward techniques, rather
than reasoning and conclusions. In addition, the Weinstein-Berger list
provides no analytical framework indicating how the factors relate to
each other or to the question of admissibility or sufficiency. Despite
these shortcomings, the list represents an improvement, as illustrated by
the Oregon Supreme Court's use of it in State v. Brown," 9 to modify
State v. Kersting.2" Brown involved a defendant who had taken several
lie detector tests and wanted to introduce the results into evidence at
trial.26 The request was denied, and the defendant was convicted. 62 On
appeal, the court held that neither the general acceptance of Frye nor the
reasonable reliability of Kersting provided a comprehensive standard.263
Instead, it applied the Weinstein-Berger guidelines.2  Use of these
guidelines, however, still resulted in exclusion of the polygraph results
when probative value was weighed against prejudicial effect. 26  The fact
that general acceptance, reliability-relevance, and checklist-relevance all
tend to the same outcome for polygraph evidence should not come as any
26
surprise. 66 Courts have shown a remarkable ability to manipulate Frye
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 231 (1983) (statement
by Margaret Berger).
259. 297 Or. 404, 416-17, 687 P.2d 751, 759 (1984) (en banc). Similarly, in State v.
Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981), the court considered
a variety of factors in determining that blood stain analysis evidence was reliable enough
to permit admissibility and held that the determination of admissibility of scientific evi-
dence necessarily must be made on an ad hoc basis, and that it would be impossible to
establish rules applicable in every case. See Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 85.
260. 50 Or. App. 461, 623 P.2d 1095 (1981), aff'd on other grounds, 292 Or. 350, 638
P.2d 1145 (1982) (en banc). See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
261. See 297 Or. at 407, 687 P.2d at 753.
262. See id
263. See id at 438, 687 P.2d at 772.
264. See id at 416-17, 687 P.2d at 759.
265. See id at 439, 445, 687 P.2d at 773, 776-77. This, of course, is the almost univer-
sal decision in polygraph cases, no matter what test is used. See Annotation, Physiologi-
cal or Psychological Truth and Deception Tests, 23 A.L.R. 2d 1306, 1308 (1952 & Supps.
1982 & 1987) ("It would appear, at least in the absence of stipulation, that the courts
almost uniformly reject the results of lie detector tests when offered in evidence for the
purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime.").
266. See State v. Free, 493 So. 2d 781, 787 n.9 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (the court ques-
tioned whether, in applying a balancing test, it was in reality simply applying the general
acceptance standard in a more explicit fashion), cert denied, 499 So. 2d 83 (1987). A
number of commentators have made the same point. See, for example, Saltzburg, supra
note 11, in which the author points out that
[c]ontentions that Frye should be replaced with a relevance analysis are calls for
unnecessary reforms. Frye... is consistent with the approach that common
law courts have traditionally taken toward all evidence, an approach that is
carried forward in modem evidence codifications such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence.... [I]t is not very helpful to debate the question whether Frye or a
relevance approach to scientific evidence is preferable.
Id at 209. The two approaches are essentially the same, despite the frequency with
which they are assumed to differ. The more significant question is how much success a
scientific claim must have before courts will rely on it.
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to reach desired results, and lists such as the seven-factor checklist do
little more than collect the various approaches. The result has been a
similar skein of analytical problems for both the general acceptance test
and the reliability test. Both often become labels, and both often lead to
having decisions about admissibility made by the wrong people and in
the wrong way.
C. Acceptance and Reliability Combined: Two Wrong Halves Make
One Right Whole
A number of courts have recognized that acceptance relates to the the-
ory or principle underlying an expert's conclusion, 267 and a number have
differentiated reliability from acceptance.268 Only a handful of deci-
sions,269 however, approximate the kind of analysis proposed in this Arti-
cle, and none explicitly takes the view of validity and reliability
267. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973) (admissi-
bility to be determined by reference to four criteria: "1. qualified expert; 2. proper subject;
3. conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and 4. probative value compared
to prejudicial effect") (emphasis added); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th
Cir. 1977) (citing Amaral); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977)
(same); see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (Frye's
general acceptance test guards against unproven hypotheses, and is therefore one factor
in a balancing test); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir. 1975) (as-
suming that Frye refers to scientific principles); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,
743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (assuming without explanation that Frye refers to the theory from
which a deduction is made); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979)
(stating that Frye's general acceptance test properly focuses on methodology, not subject
matter), later appeal, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. App. 1983); State v. Smith, 50 Ohio App. 2d
183, 193-94, 362 N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (1976) (holding that the law of scientific evidence
requires that testimony be based on a dependable principle that has gained general ac-
ceptance; derived from a proper apparatus and materials; and presented by a qualified
expert; and pointing out the problem of self-validation that can result when the relevant
field is defined too narrowly).
268. Most cases that reject Frye for a relevancy analysis in effect distinguish acceptance
from reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1986)
(test used to match semen not generally accepted, but evidence shows it to be reliable),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1337 (1987); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988-90 (3d Cir.
1985) (footprint comparison admitted based on reliability), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172
(1986); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (court determines
reliability, regardless of the scientific "voting" pattern), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979); Jackson v. Garrison, 495 F. Supp. 9, 11 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (rejecting general ac-
ceptance as test for polygraph because it is at least as reliable as other forms of evidence
that are admissible), rev'd, 677 F.2d 371, 372-73 (4th Cir.) (reversal based on ground that
admissibility of polygraph was properly a state law issue), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1036
(1981); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1981) (evidence of reliability but no
evidence of acceptance), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App.
461, 471, 623 P.2d 1095, 1101-02 (1981) (holding that evidence did not support general
acceptance, but appropriate standard is reasonable reliability), aff'd on other grounds, 292
Or. 350, 638 P.2d 1145 (1982) (en banc); cf United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying Frye but distinguishing reliability from acceptance).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (discussed supra
notes 218-26 and accompanying text); People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 391 N.W.2d 270
(1986) (discussed supra note 193); People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 365
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advocated here. People v. Collins,27° a New York trial court decision,
perhaps comes the closest.
In Collins, the defendants allegedly had made certain phone calls in
furtherance of an extortion scheme, and some of these calls had been
recorded.27 The State obtained voice exemplars and made a pretrial mo-
tion to admit evidence based on a voiceprint comparison.272 In deciding
this motion, the Collins court retained the Frye test, but held that "the
standard which must be applied to the admissibility... of any scientific
test, is the twofold test of reliability and general scientific acceptance."273
The court denied the motion, finding that the technique failed both
prongs of the test.
274
Although the court in Collins did not explicitly connect acceptance to
the validity of the underlying reasoning, its acceptance analysis closely
parallels this Article's proposed validity test. Citing a book about the
(1978) (discussed infra notes 270-82); Phillips ex reL Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
Phillips involved the use of HLA blood test results to establish paternity in an action to
compel child support. The plaintiff mother had introduced the test results at trial, and
the putative father appealed after a verdict against him. The Utah Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that there was insufficient evidence that the HLA test was reliable. See
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1238. The court's true focus, however, was on validity, and it articu-
lated criteria that covered both issues. As the court explained, a sufficent foundation for
admissibility of genetic evidence requires that six elements be addressed:
(1) the correctness of the genetic principles underlying the test for determining
paternity; (2) the accuracy and reliability of the methods utilized in application
of the principles to determine paternity; (3) the effect of variables such as occur
in persons of different nationalities or ethnic origins that would influence the
accuracy of the test; (4) other factors that might tend to invalidate the test or
significantly change the probability of accuracy; (5) establishing that the actual
method employed and the particular test used in a given case were performed in
accordance with proper procedures and with proper materials and equipment;
and (6) the qualifications of the necessary witnesses.
Id. at 1235. The first criterion equates directly with validity at the theoretical level, and
the second looks to the validity of the application. The four remaining criteria all relate
to reliability or to foundational issues outside of the principal focus of this Article.
The real issue in Phillips, as in Collins, concerned the validity of the application. See
id at 1233. The evidence showed that the HLA test had been in use for about 15 years,
but not necessarily for the determination of paternity. See id. at 1236. The plaintiff's
expert apparently had testified about medical uses such as testing for tissue compatibility
for purposes of organ transplantation rather than about its use for determining paternity.
See id
The Phillips court sought to distance itself from the general acceptance test of Frye
with a rule that "[tiests that have passed from the experimental stage may be admissible if
their reliabilty is reasonably demonstrable," even if the test is not generally accepted. Id.
at 1234. This does not really do away with acceptance, however, because passage from
the stage of experiment could not be determined without consideration of acceptance.
270. 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1978). It should be noted that this case has
no connection to the two other Collins cases discussed supra notes 207-12 and accompa-
nying text.
271. See id at 705, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
272. See id
273. Id. at 706, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
274. See id at 720, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
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scientific method, the court found that "[i]t is certainly reasonable to
expect science to withhold judgment on a new theory until it has been
well tested in the crucible of controlled experimentation and study. Such
a procedure would require replication of original experiments, and scru-
tiny of the results in various scientific journals."2 75 The court also ad-
dressed the problem of defining the relevant scientific community,
recognizing "that expertise in disciplines tangential to the one under con-
sideration could have significant bearing on the issue under discus-
sion. '' 276 The court noted that voiceprints were used by experts in
linguistics and acoustic phonetics, and by speech scientists, psychologists
and engineers,277 and that the sound spectrograph had been developed as
a linguistic tool to study language.278 The court clearly recognized that
the technique was accepted, but for purposes different from voice identifi-
cation. There was only one study that supported use for identification,
and it had not been replicated.2 79 Thus, the court held that "[i]n this
case ... it is not surprising that so few qualified scientists accept this
technique, which acceptance would necessarily be predicated on prelimi-
nary and incomplete experimentation."28 0
According to this Article's analytical framework, the Collins decision
could have ended at this point. The issue then would have been viewed
as a question of whether the identification represented a valid application
of the voiceprint technique. The answer, in accordance with the court's
analysis, would have been no, and this would have resolved any possible
question about reliability. The court, however, undertook a separate
evaluation of reliability, which became largely a repetition of the accept-
ance analysis, precisely because the unreliability derived from invalid rea-
soning. The fact that there was "no experimentation to show that two
275. Id. at 709-10, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 369 (citing T. Huxley, The Method of Scientific
Investigation, in Science: Method and Meaning 6 (S. Rappaport & H. Wright eds. 1974)).
Similarly, United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975), held that
[i]n order to prevent deception or mistake and to allow the possibility of effec-
tive response, there must be a demonstrable, objective procedure for reaching
the opinion and qualified persons who can either duplicate the result or criticize
the means by which it was reached, drawing their own conclusions from the
underlying facts.
Id. at 466. In contrast to Collins, however, the court ultimately admitted the voiceprint
testimony. See id. at 466-67.
276. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d at 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 368; see also United States v. Alexan-
der, 526 F.2d 161, 164 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that polygraph technique is based on a
number of concepts and that "[e]xperts in neurology, psychiatry and physiology may
offer needed enlightment upon the basic premises of polygraphy. Polygraphists often lack
extensive training in these specialized sciences."); People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 474,
391 N.W.2d 270, 271 (1986) (noting that nonforensic scientists can evaluate forensic use
of electrophoresis).
277. See Collins, 94 Misc. 2d at 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
278. See id. at 708-09, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
279. See id. at 709, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
280. Id. at 710, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
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different voices will always appear different spectrographically,"'28 and
the fact that there appeared "to be no objective criteria to determine
when there is a sufficient sample"2 2 go to the heart of validity. The
application of objective criteria constitutes the very foundation of
science.
D. Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence: The Need for an
Understanding of the Nature of Scientific Knowledge in
Applying the Validity-Reliability Analysis
The Frye debate has almost completely bypassed disputes about the
admissibility of medical testimony,283 but it has reached some forensic
applications of psychiatry and psychology,28 4 two fields closely related to
medicine.285 The case law that has developed around these applications
merits separate review because it provides a bridge between medical evi-
dence and what traditionally has been regarded as scientific evidence,
and because psychiatry and psychology exemplify the kind of controver-
sial science that most troubles the law.286 The cases illustrate how the
281. IdL at 713, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
282. Id at 714, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 371. The court's conceptual confusion led to the use
of the term "acceptance of reliability," but this had no real bearing on the substance of its
analysis.
283. For example, in People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 236 (1984), the court observed:
We have never applied the Kelly-Frye rule to expert medical testimony, even
when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the
reconstitution of a past state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness,
or even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in the
diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association.
Id at 373, 690 P.2d at 724, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 251; see also Boyce, supra note 4, at 325-27;
Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 969, 1022 (1977). But see Puhl v. Milwaukee
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 353-54, 99 N.W.2d 163, 168-69 (1960) (plaintiff's evidence
rejected because of lack of consensus in the medical field), overruled on other grounds,
Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 142-44, 299
N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (1980).
284. See eg., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (dis-
cussed infra notes 294-303) (rejecting hypnotically enhanced recall testimony, based on
Frye), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291,
203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (discussed infra note 317) (rejecting rape trauma syndrome);
State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982) (discussed infra note 318) (accepting
rape trauma syndrome); cf United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), on
remand, 609 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985) (dis-
cussed infra notes 350-63 and accompanying text) (addressing overall legal approach to
scientific evidence in context of case involving evaluation of studies of eyewitness reliabil-
ity). But see McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma
Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C.L. Rev. 1143, 1182 (1985) (noting that Frye often
is not applied to expert testimony based on the behavioral sciences).
285. See In re Freiburger, 153 Mich. App. 251, 257, 395 N.W.2d 300, 302 (1986) (not-
ing that psychiatry is a branch of medicine).
286. A recent article in the Washington Post Health Supplement discusses at some
length the extensive use of, and extensive problems with, psychiatric evidence. See Spec-
ter, Diagnosis or Verdict? Psychiatrists on the Witness Stand, Washington Post, July 28,
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proposed validity-reliability mode of analysis is flexible enough to fit the
complexity of the reasoning behind an expert's testimony, and they
demonstrate the extent to which even a rudimentary grasp of the nature
of scientific knowledge can facilitate an understanding of scientific issues.
At one extreme, psychological evidence based directly on an overarch-
ing explanatory theory requires a close validity analysis. Hypnotically-
enhanced recall, for example, derives almost exclusively from the appli-
cation of a theory about how the human mind works,287 and the validity
of that theory (and reasoning based upon it) should be the primary focus
of legal inquiry. At the other extreme, testimony about psychological
profiles involves almost no explanation or reasoning. A profile usually
consists of little more than observed patterns of behavior,288 and validity
is a concern only when questions about the method of observation arise.
Studies of the accuracy of eyewitness identification fall in between hyp-
nosis and profiles. These studies begin with tests of how various factors
affect the way one person recalls the appearance of another. Generaliza-
1987, (Health Supplement) at 10, col. 1. The article notes the increasing use of expert
witnesses of all kinds, and points out that none plays a more prominent role than does the
psychiatrist:
For decades, psychiatrists have participated as expert witnesses in American
trials, testifying in a wide range of cases. . . . Legal and medical authorities
agree that the testimony of psychiatrists can often determine the outcome of
even the most public and controversial trials. But they also acknowledge that
the credibility of psychiatrists on the witness stand is frequently in doubt.
Id. For a withering critique of Freudian analysis, see A. Grunbaum, The Foundations of
Psychoanalysis (1984).
The trial of John Hinckley in 1982 highlighted many of the problems with psychiatric
evidence. See Note, Federal and Local Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, 92 Yale
L.J. 292, 292-93 (1982). Largely in response to dissatisfaction with the finding that
Hinckley was legally insane, Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was amended in
1984. This rule generally allows experts to give testimony that embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact, but the 1984 amendment creates an exception
under which
[n]o expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone.
Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).
Psychiatry and psychology have also been the subject of intense criticism from legal
commentators. See, e.g., Almy, Psychiatric Testimony: Controlling the "Ultimate Wiz-
ardry" in Personal Injury Actions, 19 Forum 233, 234 (Winter 1986) (pointing out that
courts have not controlled the use of psychiatry in personal injury cases); Ennis &
Litwack, supra note 80, at 719 (criticizing wide variations in psychiatric judgment and
use of imprecise diagnostic categories); Morse, supra note 214, at 654 (advocating a re-
duced role for mental health professionals in judging the legal status of individuals);
Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 Md. L.
Rev. 539, 543 (1979) ("Although the scientific bases of psychology may be adequate to
sustain its validity as a social science, it is argued that in a legal context the courts should
impose on psychology qua science the same standards for probative value that it demands
of every other scientific process or technique.").
287. See infra Part II.D.I.
288. See McCord, supra note 284, at 1187.
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tions are then derived from the test results. Both the validity of the tests
and the probative value of the resulting pattern relative to a specific case
therefore must be considered.
1. Hypnotically-enhanced Recall
The admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony has been a legal
issue since at least 1904, when a New York appellate court held against a
plaintiff who could not recall being seduced by the defendant until hyp-
nosis "unlocked" her memory. 2 9 Exclusion remained the general rule
until 1968, when the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held in Harding
v. State290 that a complaining witness in an assault case could testify de-
spite the fact that she told a different story after hypnosis. 29 Discussing
neither Frye nor the scientific basis for this use of hypnosis, the court in
Harding simply relied on the statement of a psychologist who testified
that "there was no reason to doubt the accuracy of the witness'
recollections." 29
2
The error of the Maryland decision became apparent as other courts
undertook the scientific review from which it had abstained. 293 In People
v. Shirley,294 the California Supreme Court conducted a particularly
searching analysis. Having considered the psychological literature on
human memory in detail, the Shirley court cited several reasons for ex-
cluding hypnotically-induced recall. 29 5 Hypnosis, it found, is by its very
nature "a process of suggestion," and the hypnotized subject has a "com-
pelling desire to please the hypnotist." 296 There is also usually no way to
verify the refreshed version of the facts, which may seem inordinately
plausible because of the coherence of the testimony and the witness's re-
call of detail.297 Finally, the increased confidence of a hypnotized wit-
289. See Austin v. Barker, 90 A.D. 351, 355, 85 N.Y.S. 465, 467 (1904). The case
involved double hypnosis in that the plaintiff claimed the defendant had hypnotized her
at the time of the seduction to make her forget it. See id.
290. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cerL denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
291. See id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
292. Id. at 246, 246 A.2d at 311.
293. Indeed, in a subsequent case, the Maryland Court of Appeals applied the Frye test
and rejected Harding. See State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 702, 464 A.2d 1028, 1044
(1983). Legal commentary on the problems associated with hypnosis includes: Dia-
mond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68
Calif. L. Rev. 313, 348-49 (1980) (advocating exclusion); Falk, Posthypnotic Testimony-
Witness Competency and the Fulcrum of Procedural Safeguards, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 30,
59-60 (1982) (advocating admissibility if safeguards are used); Comment, Hypnosis in Our
Legal System: The Status of Its Acceptance in the Trial Setting, 16 Akron L Rev. 517,
535-36 (1983) (same); Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67
Va. L. Rev. 1203, 1232-33 (1981) (same); and Note, The Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Mem-
ory: Invaluable Tool or Dangerous Device?, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1059, 1084-85 (1982)
(same).
294. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
295. See id at 62-66, 641 P.2d at 801-04, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 270-72.
296. Id at 63-64, 641 P.2d at 802, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
297. See id at 65-66, 641 P.2d at 803-04, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271-72.
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ness does not relate to increased accuracy or veracity.29 Thus, the court
found the foundational validity of the method wanting,2 99 and testimony
tainted by its use had to be excluded.3"
The general acceptance test of Frye worked well in Shirley because
hypnosis provides a paradigmatic example of the need to distinguish the
validity of the reasoning underlying a method from its reliability. Propo-
nents of hypnotically-aided recall view human memory as something like
a videotape machine that may require some tinkering to get a full play-
back of pictures locked in the subconscious mind,30 1 but there is no way
of knowing what is there before the hypnotically-induced unlocking.
There also is no way to distinguish between facts added or enhanced by
the process of hypnosis and those genuinely uncovered by the process, 30 2
298. See id. at 65, 641 P.2d at 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272.
299. The Court wrote in terms of the unreliability of hypnosis, see id. at 39-40, 641
P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255, but clearly meant invalidity as that term is defined in
this Article.
300. The Shirley court held that even testimony about facts recalled prior to hypnosis
would be barred if they were covered while the witness was hypnotized, although it also
held that prehypnotic testimony taken at a pretrial hearing might be admissible in lieu
thereof. See id. at 70-71, 641 P.2d at 807, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 275. The court found that
testimony given after hypnosis could not help but be colored by the hypnosis, whether or
not recalled beforehand. See id. at 68-69, 641 P.2d at 806, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 274. Other
jurisdictions, while rejecting hypnosis, have admitted such prior facts. See United States
v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 709 F.2d 653
(11th Cir. 1983); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 188, 644 P.2d
1266, 1274 (1982); Merrifield v. State, 272 Ind. 579, 582-83, 400 N.E.2d 146, 149-50
(1980); State v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 1981); People v. Hughes, 59
N.Y.2d 523, 545, 453 N.E.2d 484, 495, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 266 (1983). Still others allow
posthypnotic testimony if the hypnotic session was conducted with certain safeguards.
See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 547, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis.
2d 555, 575, 329 N.W.2d 386, 396, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983). Finally, some
courts simply admit testimony after hypnosis, taking the position that any problems go to
weight, not admissibility. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372, 374-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979). Counting the per se inadmissibility rule of Shirley, this comes to four op-
tions, all of which are discussed quite thoroughly in State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 681-
700, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034-43 (1983); see generally Annotation, Admissibility of Hypnotic
Evidence at Criminal Trial, 92 A.L.R. 3d 442 (1979). Given the problems outlined in
Shirley and Collins, the per se rule seems the most appropriate. But see Rock v. Arkan-
sas, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2714-15 (1987) ("Arkansas' per se rule excluding all posthypnosis
testimony infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his or her own
behalf.").
301. See Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 57, 641 P.2d at 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266; see also
Buckhout, supra note 106, at 23 (pointing out the fallacy of viewing memory as a tape
recorder, and that this version of how memory works "reflects a 19th Century view of
man as perceiver, which asserted a parallel between mechanisms of the physical world
and those of the brain"); Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67
Va. L. Rev. 1203, 1208-09 (1981) (noting that some writers have erroneously concluded
that "all sensory impressions are recorded and stored permanently in the memory, and
that hypnosis facilitates the retrieval of these impressions").
302. See Diamond, supra note 293, at 314 ("[O]nce a potential witness has been hypno-
tized for the purpose of enhancing memory his recollections have been so contaminated
that he is rendered effectively incompetent to testify.").
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nor is there any way directly to determine probability of correctness.3"3
If the theory about memory as a videotape were valid, hypnotically-en-
hanced recall would meet at least the first criterion of the proposed ana-
lytical framework, but based on an absence of scientific acceptance for
any purpose,3" it fails even this test.
When courts in hypnosis cases begin to think in terms of reliability,
they quickly get into trouble. In State v. Armstrong,3 "5 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court strayed from the question of reasoning and looked in-
stead to a "reasonable degree of scientific certainty,"30 6 as evidenced by
the testimony of the hypnotist. Thus misdirected, the court held that,
with safeguards, recall induced by hypnosis could be admissible.3'"
Other courts also have focused on assurances of reliability without con-
sidering foundational validity.30 8
2. Profile or Syndrome Evidence
For over twenty years, courts have struggled with the admissibility of
"profile" or "syndrome" evidence, 3" which is based on the idea that be-
havior sometimes follows predictable patterns in response to certain
stresses or circumstances. 310 Rape trauma syndrome provides an excel-
lent example of profile evidence, and of the problems it has posed for the
law. This syndrome, which develops in certain rape victims, is a type of
posttraumatic stress disorder, meaning that its central feature "is the de-
velopment of characteristic symptoms after a psychologically traumatic
incident... beyond the range of ordinary human experience." 31' The
syndrome is thus little more than a systematized collection of
observations.312
Because of the myths that cloud the average person's understanding of
how rape affects its victims, 31 3 courts generally have admitted testimony
303. See id. ("After hypnosis the subject cannot differentiate between a true recollec-
tion and a fantasy or a suggested detail. Neither can any expert [n]or the trier of fact.").
304. See Buckhout, supra note 106, at 23 (indicating that modem researchers in the
area of eyewitness identification reject the mechanistic videotape version of memory).
305. 110 Wis. 2d 555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
306. Id. at 565, 329 N.W.2d at 391.
307. Id. at 570, 329 N.W.2d at 394.
308. See supra note 300.
309. See Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of
Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 Geo. LJ. 429, 448 (1985).
310. See E. Cleary, supra note 158, § 206, at 634 (profiles are based on studies that
"show a correlation between certain traits or characteristics and certain forms of
behavior").
311. Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Rape
Trauma Syndrome, 42 A.L.R. 4th 879, 883 (1985).
312. See McCord, supra note 284, at 1187 (noting that "[a]ll of behavioral science
consists of studying human reactions, attempting to find patterns in those reactions, giv-
mg names to those patterns, and thereafter examining particular individuals to see if their
symptoms coincide with the symptoms of other people in the past whose symptoms have
given rise to a category of behavior.").
313. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr.
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about rape trauma syndrome when offered to explain post-rape behavior
that otherwise might be thought inconsistent with a victim's story. In
Delia S. v. Torres,314 for example, a psychologist was allowed to testify
that victims often delay reporting attacks.315 The defendant had cited
the plaintiff's delay in reporting the incident as evidence that an alleged
sexual assault had not really taken place.316
The cases split, however, when an expert has gone beyond such general
observations about rape victim behavior and testified that the alleged vic-
tim's conduct evidences facts related to the occurrence of a specific rape,
such as a lack of consent. Some courts have applied the Frye test to
exclude specific comparisons between a victim's behavior and the rape
trauma syndrome pattern,3 17 while at least one court, also applying Frye,
has held such comparisons admissible.3"' Maryland's highest court,
450, 457 (1984); Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma
Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 Minn. L.
Rev. 395, 402-03 (1985).
314. 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1982).
315. See id. at 479, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
316. Torres was a civil action for battery, rather than a criminal action for rape. The
victim's embarrassment and shame had kept her from reporting the attack. See id. at
476, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 790. In addition to testimony about the typical reactions of rape
victims, the court admitted testimony about the typical characteristics of rapists, which
seems a poor decision in view of the imprecision of profiles and the potential prejudicial
effect of such evidence. See id. at 479-80, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
Other courts also have admitted testimony concerning the typical reactions of rape
victims. See Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 175-76, 450 N.E.2d 190, 198
(in civil action for sexual assault, court admitted testimony that it was not remarkable for
a victim to return to the scene of the attack, or to feel safe with her attacker after the
attack had occurred offered to explain victim's return to her attacker after rape when she
discovered she had left purse and keys in his apartment), review denied, 390 Mass. 1102,
453 N.E.2d 1231 (1983); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn. 1984) (involving a
sexually abused child); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 432-35, 657 P.2d 1215, 1217-19
(1983) (involving a minor who gave inconsistent post-rape stories); see also People v.
Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48, 681 P.2d 291, 298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457 (1984) (citing
Torres, Middleton and Terrio, with approval).
317. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251, 681 P.2d at 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460 (find-
ing that rape trauma syndrome had been developed for purposes of treatment, not for
determining if rape took place, court concluded "expert testimony that a complaining
witness suffers from rape trauma syndrome is not admissible to prove that the witness
was raped"); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982) ("Rape trauma syn-
drome is not a fact-finding tool, but a therapeutic tool useful in counseling.... ."); State v.
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (expert's "statements that prosecutrix
suffered from rape trauma syndrome and that she had been raped are not sufficiently
based on a scientific technique, which is either parochially accepted or rationally sound").
318. See, e.g., State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982). Marks
states:
An examination of the literature clearly demonstrates that the so-called 'rape
trauma syndrome' is generally accepted to be a common reaction to sexual as-
sault .... As such, qualified expert psychiatric testimony regarding the exist-
ence of rape trauma syndrome is relevant and admissible in a case such as this
where the defense is consent.
Id. (citations omitted); cf State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 601, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1982)
(allowing psychiatrist to testify about truthfulness of 13-year-old complaining witness;
Frye issue not addressed).
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viewing the issue as medical rather than scientific, also has allowed testi-
mony based on comparison. 31 9 In overruling the state's intermediate ap-
pellate court, which had relied on Frye, the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that general acceptance constituted "an unreasonably high standard
for the admissibility of medical opinion evidence, ' 320 and that "causes of
emotional disturbances are complicated medical questions." '321
In fact, all of the specific comparison cases miss or obscure the real
issue, which is not complex, not medical and not related to acceptance or
validity. The real concern is whether the rape trauma syndrome pattern
is unique enough to be a reliable indicator of consent or occurrence for
legal purposes. There is little doubt that the syndrome reflects the actual
behavior of many rape victims, and little disagreement about the reason-
ing that relates the pattern to a specific case. As one commentator has
put it:
The theory of relevance for rape trauma syndrome evidence on the
issue of consent is simple and straightforward. Women who engage in
consensual intercourse do not experience rape trauma syndrome.
Most women who are forced to engage in nonconsensual intercourse
do experience rape trauma syndrome. Thus, if the complainant is ex-
periencing rape trauma syndrome, it is because she was raped. 3 "
For the commentator, a proponent of admissibility, this elementary
logic means that "[t]he probative value of the evidence seems patently
obvious, '3 23 but his conclusion follows only if the syndrome comprises a
precise enough symptomology to mark the victim clearly. Recognizing
this requirement, another advocate of admissibility refers to the syn-
drome symptoms as "psychological 'bruises.' "324 If she is correct that
the symptoms "are similar but not identical to other posttraumatic stress-
disorder symptoms," and distinguishable from reactions to other life
stress,325 her argument for allowing relatively broad use of rape trauma
syndrome evidence would be well taken. To the extent that courts have
addressed this question, however, they have not found that the symptoms
differentiate precisely enough to provide legally reliable evidence.
In People v. Bledsoe,326 the California Supreme Court pointed out that
"rape trauma syndrome... does not consist of a relatively narrow set of
criteria or symptoms whose presence demonstrates that the client or pa-
tient has been raped; rather,... it is an 'umbrella' concept, reflecting the
319. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986).
320. Id at 98, 517 A.2d at 745.
321. Id. at 101, 517 A.2d at 747 (quoting Johnson v. Zerivitz, 234 Md. 113, 116, 198
A.2d 254, 255 (1964)); see also McCord, supra note 284, at 1194 (arguing that a reason-
able degree of medical certainty should suffice to make testimony about rape trauma
syndrome admissible).
322. McCord, supra note 284, at 1197.
323. Id.
324. See Massaro, supra note 313, at 440.
325. Id. at 447.
326. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984) (en banc).
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broad range of emotional trauma experienced by clients of rape counsel-
ors." 3 27 The Kansas Supreme Court, on the other hand, did not address
the issue at all in holding similar evidence to be admissible,328 and the
Maryland Court of Appeals obscured it by resorting to a discussion of
medical opinion evidence. 329 These mixed precedents, all decided by
courts that recognize Frye, parallel the confusion that has resulted from
using the acceptance test of Frye in other situations where reliability is
the proper focus.
3. Eyewitness Identification
Wrongful convictions resulting from misidentifications have long been
recognized as a serious problem, 330 and a number of commentators have
responded by suggesting that expert psychological testimony about the
inaccuracy and unreliability of eyewitness identification might serve to
reduce jurors' misplaced reliance on it. 331 Psychologists have devised a
number of experiments to test the accuracy of recall and to determine
how various factors affect it. For example, the effect of preconceptions
327. Id. at 250, 681 P.2d at 300-01, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 460; see also State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982); cf State v. Brodniak, 718 P.2d 322 (Mont. 1986).
Brodniak raises the interesting question of whether the victim suffered posttraumatic
stress disorder as a result of rape, or as a result of a physical beating inflicted after con-
sensual intercourse. See Brodniak, 718 P.2d at 325. Though this fact pattern highlights
the imprecision inherent in inferring a lack of consent from the rape trauma syndrome
profile, the Supreme Court of Montana held that expert psychological testimony on the
issue of consent was admissible. See id. at 327.
328. See State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
329. See State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98, 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986).
330. See Note, supra note 283, at 969 ("'The identification of strangers is proverbially
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of
instances in the records of English and American trials.' ") (quoting F. Frankfurter, The
Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927)). Concern about the problem of eyewitness identifi-
cation resulted in the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), that a postindictment lineup was a critical pretrial proceeding at which a defend-
ant had the right to have counsel present: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."
Id. at 228.
331. See Buckhout, supra note 106, at 23; Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors
in Criminal Cases, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934, 959 (1984) (citing a number of prior commen-
tators); Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 15 Jurimetrics J.
188, 190 (1975) ("Since eyewitness testimony carries so much weight, it is important to
find out why disorientation occurs in a witness' memory."); Note, Helping the Jury Eval-
uate Eyewitness Testimony: The Need for Additional Safeguards, 12 Am. J. Crim. L. 189,
192 (1984) ("Although eyewitness misidentification is the single most frequent cause of
wrongful conviction, the American judiciary has traditionally refused to give or allow
juries special guidance on the factors affecting human memory .... ") (footnote omitted);
Note, supra note 283, at 970-71 ("[U]nless some steps are taken to ensure that the unreli-
ability of eyewitness evidence is brought to the attention of the trier of fact, mistaken
identifications will continue to be a major source of wrongful convictions."); cf Levine &
Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1079, 1081-82 (1973) (discussing police practices in obtaining identifications,
pointing out that eyewitness unreliability "only underscores the necessity of improving
the quality of pretrial identification proceedings").
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has been tested by using playing cards on which the spades are red in-
stead of black. When people are shown such cards they tend to see
hearts instead of spades because they do not expect the reversal of the
colors.s32 To test the propensity to fill in specious details, subjects are
shown simple but incomplete geometric shapes. Then they are asked to
draw what they have seen. The longer the delay between viewing and
drawing, the more likely a person is to fill in a complete shape.33
Laboratory experiments with cards and simple shapes are, of course, a
far cry from real life-a "nagging gap" 3 4 that researchers have sought to
close with more realistic and sophisticated experiments. In one of these,
a mock assault was committed on a California campus. The event oc-
curred before one-hundred forty-one unsuspecting witnesses and was
videotaped to check their recollections against reality. The resulting de-
scriptions were quite inaccurate. Without biased prompting, far less than
half of the witnesses could pick out a photograph of the attacker.335
Based on such work, many psychologists have concluded that eyewitness
identification is far less reliable than most people think, and that inform-
ing jurors of its weaknesses would be "a needed contribution to the judi-
cial system. ' 336
The law, however, has not hastened to take up this offer of psychologi-
cal help. Until recently, all appellate courts that had ruled on the ques-
tion had excluded expert testimony about eyewitness reliability, often
without addressing the scientific issues involved.337 In the first major de-
cision on the admissibility of such evidence, United States v. Amaral,338
the court explicitly declined to reach the question whether such testi-
mony "was in accordance with a generally accepted theory explaining
the mechanism of perception. '339 Instead, it rejected expert testimony
about eyewitnesses, holding that cross-examination would reveal any un-
certainty or doubt about the accuracy of an identification.A
The logic of Amaral is difficult to follow, considering that one of the
332. See Buckhout, supra note 106, at 25.
333. See id. at 27.
334. Id at 29.
335. See id. at 29-30.
336. Id at 31.
337. See McCord, Syndromes; Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 Or. L
Rev. 19, 26 (1987) (noting that many courts faced with such nontraditional psychological
evidence resort to "legal bromides [that] have diverted the legal system from a complete
and correct analysis of such evidence").
338. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973).
339. Id at 1153-54.
340. See id at 1153. Other courts have also taken this approach. See. e.g., United
States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 118 (1986); United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 641-42 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008
(1982); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1100 (1977). In the analogous case of United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st
Cir. 1979), the court held that expert testimony must present a system of analysis that
can add to common understanding. See id at 383. The court rejected psychological
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principal psychological findings shows that a witness' assurance, confi-
dence, and certainty do not correlate with accuracy or reliability. 34' Not
until the Arizona Supreme Court's 1983 decision in State v. Chapple,342
however, was a trial court reversed for excluding testimony about these
findings. Against a particularly egregious factual background,343 the
Chapple trial court's exclusion of psychological testimony was held to be
an abuse of discretion because the expert would have addressed "many
specific variables which affect the accuracy of identification and which
apply to the facts of this case." 3  The validity of the study was
assumed.345
Taking its cue from Chapple, the California Supreme Court in 1984,
also reversed a trial court's decision to exclude psychological evidence
regarding the problems with eyewitness recall. In People v. McDonald,346
which, like Chapple, involved facts that virtually demanded reversal,3 47
the California court reviewed the scientific literature in the area, and
noted that "[t]he consistency of the results of these studies is impressive,
and the courts can no longer remain oblivious to their implications for
testimony on witness reliability, however, without offering any explanation of why it had
failed this test; the circuit court simply deferred to the district court. See id. at 383-84.
341. See State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 294, 660 P.2d 1208, 1221 (1983) (en banc)
(noting that past event reinforcement "will often tend to heighten the certainty of identifi-
cation"); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 369, 690 P.2d 709, 721, 208 Cal. Rptr.
236, 248 (1984) (en banc) (noting that one of the foremost counterintuitive aspects of
eyewitness identification is "the lack of correlation between the degree of confidence an
eyewitness expresses in his identification and the accuracy of that identification");
Buckhout, supra note 106, at 30 (noting that good witnesses tend to express less certainty
than poor witnesses); Note, supra note 283, at 983 ("If a witness' description of a suspect
becomes more detailed as the investigation proceeds . . . the witness in this situation
probably unconsciously has changed the image in memory to include details subsequently
acquired from, for example, newspaper reports of the event or a mug shot of the
defendant.").
342. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (en banc).
343. The appellant in Chapple was convicted of murder based on the testimony of two
witnesses who picked his photograph out of a group of pictures more than one year after
the crime. See id. at 285, 660 P.2d at 1212. The witnesses had seen the murderer only on
the day of the killing, had smoked marijuana that day, and had no other knowledge of
him. See id. at 290-91, 660 P.2d at 1217-18. Further, the witnesses had selected the
appellant's picture only after some difficulty and hesitation. See id. at 291, 660 P.2d at
1218.
344. Id. at 293, 660 P.2d at 1220.
345. See id. at 292, 660 P.2d at 1219.
346. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984) (en banc).
347. The defendant in McDonald had been convicted of murder. Seven eyewitnesses
said that they had seen him commit the crime, and one said that the murderer was defi-
nitely not the defendant. See id. at 355, 690 P.2d at 711, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The
defendant was black, and the one witness who gave testimony favorable to him was black,
see id. at 362, 690 P.2d at 716, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 243, which raised the issue of the
problems associated with cross-racial identification. See generally Johnson, supra note
331. On top of this, the witnesses who had identified the defendant had not had a very
good opportunity to observe him, and the defendant had seemingly strong alibi testimony
that placed him in Alabama, rather than California, on the day of the crime. See 37 Cal.
3d at 360, 690 P.2d at 714-15, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42. Nonetheless, he was convicted
and sentenced to death. See id. at 355, 690 P.2d at 711, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
1988] UNIFIED THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 657
the administration of justice." '348 Oddly, the court went on to hold that
California's version of the Frye rule did not apply because testimony
based on such studies is not scientific in the sense that it derives from a
mechanism, instrument or procedure. 349
Despite its disclaimer, the McDonald decision evidences a clear con-
cern about the kind of validity analysis advocated in this Article. Where
Chapple reflects recognition of the need to consider the reliability of an
expert's conclusion, McDonald reflects concern about the validity of the
expert's reasoning, yet neither case displays a thorough analysis. Both
parts of the proposed framework are required, as illustrated by Judge
Becker's decision in United States v. Downing.310
The appellant in Downing, like the appellants in Chapple and McDon-
ald, was convicted solely on the basis of eyewitness testimony, and he
also sought to introduce evidence about its unreliability. In ruling on the
admissibility of such testimony, Judge Becker applied a standard that
included consideration of acceptance and the "relationship to more es-
tablished modes of scientific analysis... [and] [t]he existence of a special-
ized literature"-factors that "bear on the likelihood that the scientific
basis of the new technique has been exposed to critical scientific scru-
tiny. '351 This portion of the standard is, in effect, a test for validity.
Another component of the standard, "[t]he frequency with which a tech-
nique leads to erroneous results, "352 equates with reliability as the term is
used in this Article. The analysis in Downing led the court to find, based
on the record before it, that psychological evidence about eyewitness
identification satisfied Rule 702.3 " The court remanded the case, how-
ever, to allow the government to present more evidence on the issue and
to permit the trial court to determine whether or not the defendant could
provide an adequate "explanation of precisely how the expert's testimony
is relevant to the eyewitness identifications under consideration."' 13
On remand, the Downing trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
at which both the defendant's expert and a psychologist retained by the
government testified.355 The court then reaffirmed its doubts about the
contested evidence and reinstated the defendant's conviction. 356 Its anal-
ysis illustrates how the focus of a validity analysis may have to shift in
order to follow the reasoning of an expert.
The expert testimony at the Downing hearing on remand left the court
with serious questions about the methodology used to generate the basic
348. Id at 365, 690 P.2d at 718, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
349. Id at 372-73, 690 P.2d at 723-24, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 250-51.
350. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
351. Id at 1238-39.
352. Id at 1239.
353. See id at 1241.
354. Id at 1242.
355. See United States v. Downing, 609 F. Supp. 784, 785-86 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem.,
780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985).
356. See id. at 792.
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data,35 7 but even more telling was the court's finding that the next step of
the reasoning was wrong because extrapolating from the data to the fact
pattern at issue was inappropriate. 358 The witnesses who had identified
the defendant had seen him for five to forty-five minute periods in the
course of business dealings,3 59 which meant they had good reason to pay
attention to him. The studies, on the other hand, involved viewing peri-
ods of one minute or less 3 6 with observers who were more uninter-
ested.361 The defendant's expert even conceded that there were "all the
ingredients of a good memory of a person's face."' 362 Thus, reasoning
from the data to a conclusion about the unreliability of identifications
made under the circumstances of the case was neither scientifically ap-
propriate nor valid.3 63
4. The Need for an Understanding of the Philosophy of Science
The foregoing examples from psychiatry and psychology demonstrate
how an analysis based on distinguishing reasoning from conclusions and
validity from reliability can focus and clarify the legal evaluation of com-
plex and controversial scientific evidence. They also illustrate how the
problems that science poses for the law parallel and reflect the philosoph-
ical problem of defining science. As a practical matter, fixing on the
proper focus for legal analysis depends on understanding how theory,
observation, and confirmation form an interwoven scientific fabric.3"
Theories guide research and experimentation, and are then refined, re-
shaped and ultimately accepted in light of experimental results.3 65 Some-
times, as in the case of hypnotically-enhanced recall, the reasoning or
theoretical thread stands out as the source of difficulty. 366 For rape
trauma syndrome, the observational thread is the real issue.367 Testi-
mony about eyewitness identification demonstrates how the law must
often look at both strands.368
The two Downing decisions369 highlight the need to consider validity
apart from reliability and the need to shift the legal analysis of scientific
evidence to conform to the interwoven pattern of scientific reasoning.
Penetrating questions about the reasoning forced its flaws to surface.
When courts shy away from such questions, they lose control of science,
357. See id. at 790.
358. See id. at 791-92.
359. See id. at 785.
360. See id. at 787.
361. See id. at 788.
362. Id.
363. See id. at 792. The same problem often appears in cases involving matching evi-
dence. See supra notes 203-12 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
366. See supra Part II.D.1.
367. See supra Part II.D.2.
368. See supra Part II.D.3.
369. See supra notes 350-63 and accompanying text.
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and verdicts completely at odds with reality may result. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in toxic tort cases involving controversial medical
testimony.
III. THE PROBLEM OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
In most cases medical testimony relates to the legal issue of causation,
and the usual test for admissibility or sufficiency is "reasonable medical
certainty," 3  rather than acceptance or the reliability aspect of rele-
vancy. The certainty test involves the qualifications of the witness and
the factual basis for his or her testimony, in addition to the degree of
assurance he or she expresses. 37' The way courts apply the test reflects
the fact that medical testimony often derives from educated judgments
about specific patients rather than from the explicit development or di-
rect application of scientific principles or theories. 372 Although they use
370. The reasonable certainty test derives from the common law. Usually it is consid-
ered the standard against which to measure the sufficiency of medical testimony, though
some courts view it as a substantive fact in its own right, see Carpenter v. Nelson, 257
Minn. 424, 427-28, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960), or merely as a test to insure the reliabil-
ity of expert testimony. See Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d
722, 729 (Ind. 1982). It is this kind of confusion that makes the test such a poor stan-
dard. See infra Part III.A.3.
For courts using reasonable certainty, or reasonable probability, to determine suffi-
ciency, see Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 694 (1988); Maddocks v. Bennett, 456 P.2d 453, 457 (Alaska 1969); Murray v.
Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 190, 199, 349 P.2d 627, 633 (1960); Harris v. Josephs of
Greater Miami, Inc., 122 So. 2d 561, 562-63 (Fla. 1960); Bachran v. Morishige, 52 Haw.
61, 68-69, 469 P.2d 808, 813 (1970); Poweshiek County Nat'l Bank v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 261 Iowa 844, 857, 156 N.W.2d 671, 678 (1968); Hoard v. Shawnee Mission
Med. Center, 233 Kan. 267, 277, 662 P.2d 1214, 1221-22 (1983); Millard v. State, 8 Md.
App. 419, 426, 261 A.2d 227, 231 (Ct. Spec. App. 1970); Larson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 427 Mich. 301, 317, 399 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1986); Rael v. F & S Co., 94 N.M. 507, 511,
612 P.2d 1318, 1322 (1979); cf Zerr v. Trenkle, 454 F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 1972)
(trial court preferred "reasonable medical certainty" over "reasonable medical
probability"); Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 513, 518-19, 187 N.W.2d 138, 141 (1971)
(distinguishing medical certainty from medical probability, holding that the latter "more
accurately expresses the standard").
371. The qualification and factual basis aspects of the traditional approach are re-
flected in Rules 702 and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 &
703. The reasonable certainty test itself is most often applied to questions related to the
issue of sufficiency, while qualification is viewed as more related to admissibility. Com-
pare Bertram v. Wunning, 417 S.W.2d 120, 123-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (testimony ad-
mitted but held insufficient because not expressed in terms of certainty) with Dengler v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 135 Mich. App. 645, 649-50, 354 N.W.2d 294, 296 (1984)
(testimony excluded because expert not qualified). The factual basis falls in between. For
the judicial control of scientific evidence, however, these differences are not always im-
portant. See infra Part IV.D.
372. See, for example, Prokop v. Houser, 245 Iowa 480, 62 N.W.2d 781 (1954), in
which the defendant appealed the admission of a doctor's testimony concerning the ex-
tent to which the plaintiff might be able to perform normal functions with an artificial
arm. See id. at 481, 62 N.W.2d at 782. The defendant claimed that the doctor was not
qualified to testify on this point because this was not a matter of medical knowledge, and
because the testimony did not show that he had any general knowledge or experience
about the functioning or efficiency of artificial arms. See id. at 482, 62 N.W.2d at 782.
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a scientific approach to reach their conclusions, 373 doctors who testify
about most injuries have no explicitly articulated theory of causation.3 7 4
The doctor who testifies that a hernia very likely resulted from an auto-
mobile accident bases his or her conclusion on a knowledge of anatomy
and experience gained from treating and observing patients,375 as does a
doctor who describes an injury as resulting from a blunt force.376
Medical reasoning about the cause of a traumatic injury essentially
depends on the doctor's familiarity with a number of factors, such as the
appearance of injuries caused by differently shaped objects. The underly-
ing reasoning is scientific, 377 but it remains submerged, as do most of the
scientific concerns that courts have attempted to address with the accept-
ance or reliability standard in the context of forensic science. Because
The court, however, held that the testimony was admissible because it was based on the
doctor's learning and training. See id. at 483, 62 N.W.2d at 783. The court reached this
holding after considering the doctor's knowledge of artificial limbs, and the fact that he
had handled many amputation cases. See id. at 482, 62 N.W.2d at 782.
373. Although the holding in Prokop seems sound, it should be emphasized that mod-
em medicine does take an explicitly scientific approach. See L. King, Medical Thinking
(1982), where it is noted that the scientific aspect of medicine
lies not in formidable apparatus nor the myriads of available tests, nor in over-
flowing libraries, but in that still small voice that I call critical judgment. This
voice asks the important questions: 'Do you see a pattern clearly? How good is
your evidence? How sound is your reasoning? Can you support your inferences
with the means at your disposal? What are the alternatives? What hangs on
your decision?' This voice, I believe, goes to the heart of scientific medicine.
Id. at 309 (emphasis added). Also, in Schwartz, Patil & Szolovits, Artificial Intelligence
in Medicine: Where Do We Stand?, 316 New England J. of Medicine 685 (1987), it is
pointed out that
[p]rograms based on causal, pathophysiologic reasoning also have the great vir-
tue of leaving a trail that can be converted into an English-language explanation
of their diagnostic activities. Without such explanations, it is obviously unrea-
sonable for the physician to rely on such programs; ultimately, a program, like
any consultant, must justify its conclusions to the physician responsible for the
patient's care.
Id. at 687 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
374. See Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 486 (1962)
(a doctor's reasoning "most commonly serve[s] as a [more or less assumed] substratum").
375. See, e.g., Bertram v. Wunning, 417 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
376. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 348 Pa. Super. 117, 501 A.2d 675 (1985). This case
is particularly interesting because it shows not only the way in which doctors exercise
judgment, but also the way in which they sometimes are allowed to reach conclusions
well beyond the realm of medical practice. The case involved two abused children, one of
whom died and one of whom suffered serious injuries. See id. at 119-20, 501 A.2d at 675-
76. As to the child who died, expert medical testimony was offered that she had died
from injuries inflicted by some blunt force. See id. at 121, 501 A.2d at 677. The doctor
went on to testify, however, that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty the death
was the result of homicide, see id., 501 A.2d at 677, a conclusion clearly beyond the scope
of medical practice.
377. See Engle & Davis, Medical Diagnosis: Present, Past, and Future, 112 Archives of
Internal Med. 512, 516 (1963) ("Behind each diagnosis and classification is a complicated
set of attributes and theory as to their relationships involving structural, physiological,
and biochemical schemes which are continually being modified and which constitute the
science of medicine. Diagnosis is the foundation and skeletal framework of medical
science.").
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courts historically have dealt mostly with medical cases that are simple
and straightforward,3"' they tend to look to a doctor's qualifications
rather than to the validity of his or her reasoning, 379 and they often ac-
cept expressed certainty as an adequate indication of reliability.3" Such
surrogate tests often break down, however, even for testimony regarding
run-of-the-mill traumatic injuries. 381
For more explicitly scientific medical questions, such as whether or not
exposure to a chemical caused cancer or birth defects, the breakdown
becomes complete. Causation involves fundamentally scientific ques-
tions.38 2 As one writer puts it, "the patient seeks relief, the physician
tries to provide it, and the scientist seeks understanding. ' 3 3 The tradi-
tional reasonable certainty analysis, however, fails to address the scien-
tific aspect of causation, especially for the kind of evidence that now
frequently confronts the law in toxic tort cases. No coherent and princi-
pled scheme of analysis has emerged, and, as a consequence, the cases
sometimes point in opposite directions on virtually the same facts. Toxic
tort litigation, more than any other area of the law, needs the order and
rationality that the proposed approach to scientific evidence would bring.
A. The Traditional Approach to Medical Evidence
As usually applied, the three parts of the reasonable certainty analysis
generally become separate and discrete mechanisms for avoiding consid-
eration of either the validity of an expert's reasoning or the reliability of
his or her conclusions. Some courts hold testimony both admissible and
sufficient based solely on a doctor's qualifications.384 Others consider the
378. Testimony about what caused a person's death, for example, is usually relatively
simple and straightforward, though there may be questions about its legal significance.
For example, it is generally recognized that excessive exertion can trigger a heart attack
in a person who suffers from a heart condition. It is also generally recognized that arte-
riosclerosis predisposes a person to having a heart attack. If a person with heart disease
exerts himself at work and collapses from a heart attack, there is no real scientific ques-
tion about the cause of death. Both the predisposing condition and the exertion would
very likely be "but for" contributing factors. The fact that the law might try to distin-
guish which factor was the cause of death has little, if anything, to do with science. See.
e.g., Barksdale Lumber Co. v. McAnally, 262 Ark. 379, 383, 557 S.W.2d 868, 871 (1977)
(conflicting testimony on whether heart disease or work caused heart attack); Kostamo v.
Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 Mich. 105, 119-20, 274 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1979) (noting
that stress will more likely trigger heart attack in person with arteriosclerosis than in
other people, but that it is not possible to determine what particular stress caused what
particular injury).
379. See infra Part III.A.1.
380. See infra Part III.A.3.
381. See, e.g., Pike County Highway Dep't v. Fowler, 180 Ind. App. 438, 388 N.E.2d
630 (1979) (discussed infra notes 421-28 and accompanying text); Bertram v. Wunning,
385 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965), later appeal, 417 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967)
(discussed infra notes 431-36 and accompanying text).
382. See L. King, supra note 373, at 191 (the search for causes is the "essence of
science").
383. Id at 131.
384. See infra notes 389-402 and accompanying text.
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factual basis for a conclusion, but ignore the connective reasoning that
links facts to conclusions.385 Still others use the degree of expressed
certainty as the sole criterion.38 6 This piecemeal approach distorts legal
analysis, especially for the testimony of witnesses with experience in tai-
loring their testimony to legal requirements.387
1. Qualification
The qualification of any expert witness includes both his or her field of
expertise and the level of training and experience he or she has within
that field. For the kind of forensic science around which the Frye debate
over acceptance versus reliability has developed, the field itself tends to
be a central issue, while for medical testimony, the question usually is the
training of the individual expert. No matter what the education or expe-
rience of a polygraph expert, his or her testimony generally would be
inadmissible under any rule.38 ' Implicit in almost every case involving
human injury or disease, however, is an assumption that medicine, as a
field of knowledge, must have relevant evidence to offer.
The deference accorded physicians by courts and lawyers doubtless de-
rives from the rigorous education and licensing of medical doctors. The
law presumes that licensed physicians are qualified experts and, in prac-
tice, looks for little more by way of qualification.3"9 Most courts take the
view that a doctor need not be a specialist in the particular branch of his
profession involved in a case in order to present testimony.39 ° Thus, tes-
timony from a cardiologist about a plaintiff's neurosis (albeit about car-
diac problems) has been admitted, 39' as has testimony from a dentist
about the difference between the pain of neuralgia and the pain from an
infection,392 and testimony from a general practitioner on eye
problems.393 Even in medical malpractice cases, where the issue fre-
quently is the standard of practice within a specialty rather than causa-
tion, doctors usually are allowed to testify about areas outside their own
fields of specialization.394 Indeed, for a court to find a doctor unquali-
385. See infra notes 413-28 and accompanying text.
386. See infra notes 431-36 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 3.
388. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
389. See, e.g., Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wash. 2d 482, 490-91, 219 P.2d 79, 84-85, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
390. See generally Annotation, Competency of Physician or Surgeon as an Expert Wit-
ness as Affected by the Fact That He Is Not a Specialist, 54 A.L.R. 860, 861 (1928) ("[B]y
the great weight of authority, a physician or surgeon is not incompetent to testify, as an
expert, merely because he is not a specialist in the particular branch of his profession
involved in the case; although this fact may be considered as affecting the weight of his
testimony."); see also Rose, A Pragmatic Approach to Medical Evidence and the Lawsuit,
5 U. Tol. L. Rev. 237, 249 (1974) ("[Iln most jurisdictions, the possession of the status of
physician is the sole prerequisite to giving expert medical testimony.").
391. See Heinze v. Heckler, 581 F. Supp. 13, 14 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
392. See Sinclair v. Haven, 198 Wash. 651, 662, 89 P.2d 820, 825 (1939).
393. See Valmas Drug Co. v. Smoots, 269 F. 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1920).
394. See generally Annotation, Competency of General Practitioner to Testify as Expert
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fled, it must as a rule be confronted with overwhelming evidence, such as
a virtual admission from the witness.395
Some courts have accepted testimony explicitly acknowledged to be
weak because of the trust they place in doctors. In Boldt v. Jostens,
Inc.,396 for example, a doctor testifying about a plaintiff's lung and kid-
ney disease acknowledged that its etiology397 was unknown.398 He said
that the disease was immunologic, but "that the antigen to which a vic-
tim reacts 'can probably be many different things and different for differ-
ent people' and that it is not known whether the reaction results from
one exposure to an antigen or from multiple exposures." 399 Nonetheless,
he opined that exposure to glue fumes at the defendant's factory "had a
great deal to do with [the plaintiff's] illness, and certainly caused aggra-
vation."'  In sustaining a workers' compensation award based on this
evidence, the Supreme Court of Minnesota simply held that "the truth of
the opinion need not be capable of demonstration.'"" Even more ex-
treme are cases in which doctors are allowed to testify about matters
completely outside their profession. For example, forensic pathologists,
who examine gunshot wounds, often have been allowed to testify about
Witness in Action Against Specialist for Medical Malpractice, 31 A.LR. 3d 1163, 1166
(1970) (noting that "while there is authority to the contrary, it may be reasonably con-
cluded... that a general practitioner will not be held incompetent to testify in an action
against a medical specialist solely on the ground that he is not also a specialist in that
field"). Thus, in Baerman v. Reisinger, 363 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the trial court was
reversed for having refused to allow a general practitioner to testify about the standard of
care for a cardiologist. The plaintiff had tried to introduce the testimony of the general
practitioner to establish that the cardiologist should have diagnosed hypothyroidism. See
id at 310. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that "it is settled law
that '[a] physician is not incompetent to testify as an expert merely because he is not a
specialist .... Id (quoting Sher v. De Haven, 199 F.2d 777, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert
denied, 345 U.S. 936 (1953)).
395. See eg., United States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 (10th Cir. 1980) (defendant
attempted to introduce testimony of a psychiatrist who had not completed his training);
Arnold v. Loose, 352 F.2d 959, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1965) (testimony that diabetes caused
automobile driver's death given by a doctor who, by his own admission, had never even
read a text on diabetes or diabetic comas, was excluded in wrongful death action); State v.
Adams, 481 A.2d 718, 728 (R.I. 1984) (trial court improperly permitted witness, who
was not trained in forensic dentistry, to give forensic testimony about bite mark evidence
in a murder trial when he conceded that such training was required).
396. 261 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam).
397. Etiology relates to all the factors that contribute to a disease or abnormal condi-
tion. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Una-
bridged 782 (1961).
398. See 261 N.W.2d at 93.
399. Id
400. id
401. Id at 94; see also McGrath v. Irving, 24 A.D.2d 236, 238, 265 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378
(1965) (holding that, though expert doctor's knowledge of the cause of cancer was lim-
ited, "the medical qualifications of the plaintiff's expert were such as to entitle him to
give an opinion"); cf City of Seymour v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Wis. 2d 482, 491-92, 131
N.W.2d 323, 328 (1964) (expressing doubt about testimony of doctor, but concluding
that "[w]e cannot ... hold as a matter of law that [the] expert medical testimony is
incredible because contrary to scientific facts or knowledge.").
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how guns work and offer opinions about the caliber of deformed
bullets." 2
Most courts do recognize that experts other than physicians can pro-
vide highly relevant testimony about medical questions and that some-
times they may be the most qualified witnesses. 43 In such cases,
however, admissibility almost always is predicated upon the match be-
tween the field of expertise and the facts of the case. In evaluating this
match, courts may engage in an analysis strikingly similar to that some-
times undertaken when general acceptance is considered in forensic sci-
ence cases, thereby highlighting the fact that the qualification test is often
a substitute for reviewing the validity of reasoning. In Sandow v. Weyer-
haeuser Co.,' for example, the court reviewed the literature on clinical
psychology to determine what the field covered before holding that a
clinical psychologist was qualified to testify about depression allegedly
caused by a head injury. 405
Dengler v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co." 6 illustrates how using a
qualification test instead of a validity test can obscure and confuse the
real issue in a case. In Dengler, the court rejected the attempt by an
internist to establish that a fatal brain hemorrhage had been caused by a
minor head injury that had occurred a year before death.40 7 The witness
had used the technique of differential diagnosis, which involves listing all
possible causes and then eliminating those not present in the case in ques-
tion." 8 Though the reasoning behind assembling the list and striking
items from it was obviously the central issue, the court evaded it by find-
ing that it "would have required an expert in neurology to take the next
step and rule out all but hydrocephalus."''4 9 The witness had admitted
his lack of qualification in this area,410 which facilitated the court's deci-
sion, but what if he had not been so candid, or if a neurologist had given
the same testimony? Deciding the relevant field would then provide only
the context for a review of validity, a step that would never be reached if
the issue were viewed purely as a matter of qualification.
Merely looking at an expert's qualifications, therefore, proves a poor
surrogate for reviewing his or her reasoning, especially in view of the
judicial reluctance to require that medical doctors confine their testi-
mony to their specialty. Courts should regard medical fields of speciali-
zation as sources of standards by which to judge validity. Just as in Frye-
402. See Moenssens, supra note 4, at 558 n.60.
403. See, e.g., Backes v. Valspar Corp., 783 F.2d 77, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (chemist
might be more competent to give opinion on causation of disease than doctor who ex-
amined the plaintiff).
404. 252 Or. 377, 449 P.2d 426 (1969).
405. See id. at 381, 449 P.2d at 428.
406. 135 Mich. App. 645, 354 N.W.2d 294 (1984) (per curiam).
407. See id. at 647, 649, 354 N.W.2d at 295, 296.
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type forensic cases, when validity is the issue, the best evidence is accept-
ance. For medical testimony, the application of this test requires refer-
ence to the literature and practice of the appropriate area of medical
science. An opinion from a neurologist that does not conform to the
accepted practices of neurology should not be admissible solely because
of the expert's qualification in that field. Courts that use the Frye accept-
ance test intelligently recognize that several fields may contain useful in-
sights into the validity of an expert's reasoning, and the same rationale
may underlie the readiness to qualify medical experts without much re-
gard to their field of specialization. Unfortunately, in medical cases, the
analysis often ends with a determination of qualification.
2. Basis
When decisions about the admissibility or sufficiency of medical testi-
mony move beyond qualification, the next consideration is often the un-
derlying factual basis, which usually becomes another analytically
inappropriate end point. For example, courts prefer testimony based on
the personal observations of a treating physician.4 ' Subjective informa-
tion obtained from a patient is more suspect, especially when the patient
provides the information to the doctor for purposes of litigation.412
The legal distinction between a doctor who examines a patient and
takes his or her history in order to prepare for trial and a doctor who
testifies after providing treatment results from a common sense concern
about bias, but when the preference for treatment and observation be-
comes a substitute for further analysis, it can fail miserably. In Balti-
more Transit Co. v. Smith,4 1 3 a doctor who testified at trial first saw the
plaintiff almost a year after he had been injured in a collision with a bus
belonging to the defendant.4" 4 The doctor, who admittedly knew noth-
ing of the plaintiff's condition before the collision, testified at trial that a
long list of ailments had resulted from the accident, including headaches,
neck pains, hearing loss, arm pains, a cramped hand, a sore chest, and
difficulty in breathing.41 5 He was unaware (because the plaintiff had not
told him) 4 16 that the plaintiff had been discharged from the military for
psychoneurosis, and while in the Army had "suffered from 'shortness of
411. See, eg., McGuire v. Davis, 437 F.2d 570, 572 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting "well-
settled proposition that a physician who has examined an injured party may describe
what he has seen and give his expert inferences therefrom," and holding that doctor
could testify, based on his observation of plaintiff that she had felt pain during his exami-
nation of her) (footnote omitted).
412. See, eg., Fox v. Raftery, 45 A.D.2d 723, 723-24, 356 N.Y.S.2d 341, 342-43 (1974)
(holding nontreating physician's testimony based upon plaintiff's past history and other
medical reports inadmissible because the history and reports were not part of the trial
record).
413. 252 Md. 430, 250 A.2d 228 (1969).
414. See id at 431-32, 250 A.2d at 229.
415. See id at 433, 250 A.2d at 229-30.
416. See id. at 436, 250 A.2d at 231.
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breath' and 'a nervous heart.' "417 The doctor apparently gave little ex-
planation of his reasoning, except to say that the plaintiff's complaints
and unspecified physical findings were "consistent" with the kind of in-
jury sustained in the accident.418
After a plaintiff's verdict at trial, the defendant in Baltimore Transit
appealed, contending that no "proper foundation was laid which would
enable the doctor to establish a causal connection., 419 The Maryland
Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the doctor had been approached
for treatment, and that "[t]hrough personal examination he had knowl-
edge of [the plaintiff's] injuries. Had he failed to consider any essential
facts in forming his opinion... then the weight of his testimony might be
weakened, but its admissibility would not have been destroyed."42 By
looking only at the fact that the witness had examined the plaintiff, the
court overlooked the gaps in the reasoning connecting his observations to
his conclusions. Because nonspecific symptoms like headaches are con-
sistent with many causal explanations, the expert's conclusion amounted
to nothing more than a preliminary speculative hypothesis.
The predilection for observation and treatment sometimes leads courts
to base decisions on these factors even when an expert does explicitly lay
out his reasoning and the issue clearly concerns its validity. In Pike
County Highway Department v. Fowler,421 the plaintiff suffered a work-
related injury to his foot, which eventually had to be amputated.422
When he was awarded workers' compensation, the defendant employer
appealed, claiming that an adequate foundation had not been laid for the
testimony of the osteopath who had initially treated the plaintiff.423
Though the general surgeon who performed the amputation thought the
loss of the foot had resulted from arteriosclerotic obstructive disease, 424
the osteopath thought otherwise, expressing the opinion that trauma had
caused the plaintiff's circulatory problems. 4 25 He also testified that he
based his opinion on the temporal relationship between the trauma and
the plaintiff's circulatory problems, and on his observations and exami-
nations of the plaintiff over the years.426
417. Id. at 432, 250 A.2d at 229.
418. Id. at 435, 250 A.2d at 231.
419. Id. at 436, 250 A.2d at 231.
420. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 329 Mass. 333, 335, 108 N.E.2d 559, 561
(1952) (in murder case in which medical examiner's testimony as to time of death was
challenged, court held that "[i]t was not an essential requirement that the question call
for the grounds or reasons upon which the opinion was based").
421. 180 Ind. App. 438, 388 N.E.2d 630 (1979).
422. See id. at 440, 388 N.E.2d at 632.
423. See id. at 444, 388 N.E.2d at 634.
424. See id. at 446, 388 N.E.2d at 635.
425. See id., 388 N.E.2d at 636. Osteopathy is one of several forms of drugless ther-
apy, and is considered far less scientifically valid than mainstream medicine. On the legal
implications of osteopathy, see Annotation, Liability of Drugless Practitioner or Healer for
Malpractice, 19 A.L.R.2d 1188 (1951).
426. See 180 Ind. App. at 443-44, 388 N.E.2d at 634.
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The defendant in Pike County directly challenged the osteopath's rea-
soning, pointing out that for it to be correct, an embolism would have
had to travel from the foot, through the heart and lungs, and back to the
leg, and that this would have killed the plaintiff.4" The real issue obvi-
ously was the validity of the osteopath's explanation, and it should have
been argued and decided in terms of accepted medical principles. In-
stead, the court dismissed the reasoning as unimportant. "Except for his
subsequent explanation.... [the osteopath] had already laid out a thor-
ough factual foundation for his opinion." '428 Although Pike County is
unusual in explicitly abstaining from an evaluation of an expert's reason-
ing, it serves to highlight the consequences of misplacing emphasis on the
factual basis for an expert opinion.
3. Expressed Certainty
In many cases, disputes about medical testimony center on the degree
of certainty expressed by an expert, yet this shift of attention from quali-
fications and factual basis brings no improvement.4"9 "Reasonable medi-
cal certainty" usually serves as nothing more than an undefined label.430
In Bertram v. Wunning,4 31 for example, the issue was the admissibility of
a doctor's testimony about the cause of the plaintiff's hernia, which had
developed three months after she was injured in an automobile acci-
dent.4 32 The doctor said there was a ninety percent chance that the acci-
dent had caused the hernia, but he would not use the magic words
"reasonable medical certainty. 4 33 On appeal from a plaintiff's verdict,
the appellate court held that this constituted mere speculation and re-
manded for a new trial.434 The second time around, the witness was
asked if ninety percent meant reasonable certainty to him, and he re-
427. See id at 446, 388 N.E.2d at 635-36.
428. Id at 445, 388 N.E.2d at 635 (emphasis added).
429. See e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 48 Pa.
Commw. 161, 169, 409 A.2d 486, 491 (1979) (in holding medical testimony admissible
because expressed with sufficient positiveness, court noted that lack of possible scientific
verification does not detract from positiveness).
430. See Almy, supra note 286, at 238-39 (noting that traditional rules require that
expert testimony be sufficiently certain, and that certainty standard varies with jurisdic-
tion). By way of contrast, see Zatz & Sherwood, Defending Speculative Injury Claims,
Toxics Law Reporter at 76 (June 17, 1987), which argues that Judge Enslen's decision to
grant partial summary judgment in Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp.
1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987) demonstrates that "reasonable certainty" is not just "a pair of
'magic words.'" Zatz & Sherwood, supra, at 78. The summary judgment in the Stites
case went to claims for increased risk and increased fear of cancer. Under these circum-
stances, the court held that a fifteen percent probability that cancer would develop was
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' experts could give
no quantitative estimate of probability. See Stites, 660 F. Supp. at 1524-25.
431. 385 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
432. See id. at 804 (accident occurred on April 23, 1960; hernia discovered on July 19,
1960).
433. Id at 805.
434. See id. at 807-08.
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sponded that it did.4 35 For other reasons, the appellate court ordered
still another trial, but on the expert opinion issue, the court made it clear
that "testimony in the instant case materially differs from that [the doc-
tor] gave at the first trial .... [because there was] a definite affirmance
[of] 'reasonable medical certainty.' "436
Courts that have endeavored to avoid Wunning's magic words ap-
proach to medical certainty generally have failed. The wide variation in
the way they apply the concept of reasonable medical certainty makes it
clear that the standard has no analytical value. Some decisions, includ-
ing the two in Wunning, indicate that probabilistic evidence by itself can-
not be reasonably certain, even if the probability is very high,437 while
others indicate that a statement of mere possibility will pass the test if
properly phrased.438 In Maddocks v. Bennett,a39 for example, the plain-
tiff claimed that improper application of hair dye had caused her to go
bald. The court accepted as sufficient an expert's medical testimony that
"there is a reasonable probability that the application might have been a
cause."'  By way of further contrast, at least one court has viewed rea-
sonable certainty as a substantive fact that must be proved by a prepon-
derance of evidence, though it conceded that "[c]onfusion under-
standably arises because the fact to be proved is, in itself, a matter of
probability."" Still other courts have held that reasonable certainty is
not a fact to be proved, but rather "a formulation designed to guarantee
the trustworthiness or reliability of the opinion offered.""' 2
Given these mixed precedents, many courts have abjured any require-
435. Bertram v. Wunning, 417 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
436. Id. at 125; see also McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 485-86, 276 A.2d 534, 535
(1971) (statement that defendant's conduct probably caused plaintiff's condition is not
enough; medical expert must form opinion with sufficient certainty).
437. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984) ("A
statistical method which shows a greater than 50% probability does not rise to the re-
quired level of proof."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
438. See infra notes 439-41 and accompanying text.
439. 456 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1969).
440. Id. at 458 (emphasis added); see also Exxon Corp. v. Fleming, 253 Ark. 798, 801,
489 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1973) (both of plaintiff's medical experts' statements that there was
a possibility that an accident had caused death by triggering a pre-existing condition
satisfied reasonable certainty requirement); cf deMars v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc.,
610 F.2d 55, 58 (1st Cir. 1979) (witness testified that "there is a reasonable certainty that
[death] could have happened independently of his lung disease," but on cross-examina-
tion, stated that this meant that death had in fact happened independent of the underly-
ing condition); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd., 48 Pa. Commw.
161, 166-67, 409 A.2d 486, 488-89 (1979) (strength and positiveness of doctor's belief
made testimony sufficient).
441. Carpenter v. Nelson, 257 Minn. 424, 428, 101 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1960).
442. Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind.
1982); see also Boose v. Digate, 107 Ill. App. 2d 418, 423, 246 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1969)
("[R]easonable [medical] certainty refers to the general consensus of recognized medical
thought and opinion concerning the probabilities of conditions in the future based on
present conditions.").
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ment that a medical expert use particular phraseology." 3 Nonetheless,
most courts persist in the assumption that some rule other than the tradi-
tional tort law preponderance of the evidence standard applies when
judging the sufficiency of medical testimony. 4 In practice, the "other
rule" may just be preponderance in disguise," yet if this is the case, it
only emphasizes that reasonable certainty adds nothing to the law except
the opportunity for confusion. ' It elevates form over substance, and it
leads courts to deviate from established tort law principles by requiring
either more than the preponderance test or less.' 7
4. The Failure of the Traditional Approach
Because the traditional approach to medical evidence avoids review of
the reasoning of medical experts, courts cannot consistently and ration-
ally resolve disputes about expert medical testimony. When equally
qualified experts review the same data and arrive at opposite conclusions
that they express with equal certainty, the traditional approach provides
no guidance. Some cases represent a legitimate battle of the experts,4"
but in many, the testimony on one or both sides is patently unscien-
tific." 9 Only by evaluating the validity of the reasoning lirocess through
which the experts connect the data to their conclusions can courts decide
such cases in a consistent way and avoid the confusion and injustice that
443. See, e.g., Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109 (1959)
("The matter does not turn on the use of a particular form of words by the physicians in
giving their testimony."); Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d
722, 729 (Ind. 1982) (citing several cases that hold that no particular phraseology is re-
quired for admissibility); Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, Inc., 12 N.Y.2d 414, 416, 190
N.E.2d 528, 529, 240 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 (1963) (affirning holding that record as a whole,
rather than specific words, can be sufficient evidence of required degree of certainty).
444. See supra note 370.
445. See Noblesville Casting Div. of TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ind.
1982) ("The rule is simply a counterpart to the standard and burden of proof."); cf
Kostamo v. Marquette Iron Mining Co., 405 Mich. 105, 135, 274 N.W.2d 411, 425
(1979) (a workers' compensation claimant "need establish causality only by a preponder-
ance of the evidence").
446. For example, see Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978), in which
the court required the plaintiff to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence.
See id. at 265, 392 A.2d at 1284. The court somehow concluded, however, that testimony
that there was a 75 percent chance that defendant's conduct had caused death of plain-
tiff's husband would be insufficient because it did not constitute reasonable medical cer-
tainty. See id. at 263, 273, 392 A.2d at 1283, 1288. The court relaxed what it viewed as
the usual certainty test to accommodate the facts of the case, which involved a negligent
failure to treat a heart attack victim. Cf Poweshiek County Nat'l Bank v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 261 Iowa 844, 857, 156 N.W.2d 671, 678 (1968) (preponderance and rea-
sonable medical certainty apparently treated as equivalent; reasonable certainty seen as
recognition that absolute certainty is not required).
447. For a case requiring a higher standard, see Johnston v. United States, 597 F.
Supp. 374, 412 (D. Kan. 1984), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988). For a case setting a
lower standard, see Maddocks v. Bennett, 456 P.2d 453, 458 (Alaska 1969).
448. See supra notes 372-78 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 396-401 and accompanying text.
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result from reliance on the unfounded personal opinions of individual
doctors.
In addition to obscuring issues related to the validity of reasoning, the
traditional approach also tends to prevent thorough analysis of the relia-
bility of medical conclusions. Beyond the fact that invalid reasoning can-
not lead to reliable conclusions, reliance upon an expressed certainty test
has the effect of turning over to doctors most of the decisions about legal
sufficiency that courts should make. In most cases, it is unclear what the
witness' opinion really means, and it is equally unclear how he or she
arrived at it.450
B. The Special Problems Created by Non-traditional Medical Evidence
Scientific research has increased greatly our knowledge of latent dis-
eases, such as cancer, and public concern and litigation have followed in
short order.451 Many cases have multiple plaintiffs and widespread pub-
licity, and almost all involve complex and controversial scientific ques-
tions.4 2 The validity of reasoning about causation, more than ever, often
becomes the central issue, but courts continue to avoid it. Some essen-
tially have stuck with the reasonable certainty approach,45 3 which does
not work very well, even for traditional medical evidence. Other courts
have undertaken more searching analyses, but only a few have directly
450. This problem rarely becomes explicit. Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
224 Pa. Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973) (per curiam), provides an example, however.
Leibowitz involved thrombophlebitis allegedly caused by oral contraceptives. At trial, the
testimony of one of the plaintiff's doctors became so confused that the judge intenened
to ask if the doctor meant to say there was "reasonable medical certainty" about causa-
tion. Id. at 425, 307 A.2d at 454. Thus pressed, the witness said he thought taking the
contraceptives had been a "significant factor." Id. On cross-examination, he stated, "I
refuse to use the term 'cause' in any part of my practice." Id. at 426, 307 A.2d at 454.
He never made clear what he really thought about medical certainty.
451. This does not mean that science has established specific causal connections, as
Professors Schroeder and Shapiro have noted in discussing occupational diseases:
Articles and books about occupational disease routinely report dramatic evi-
dence of its epidemic proportions. Data revealing that thousands die or are
disabled each year are regularly cited. Documentation of specific instances of
diseases that have taken terrible tolls is readily available. The usefulness of
these studies is limited, however, by the nature of the data upon which they
rely. There are tens of thousands of chemicals used in the workplace,
thousands of which may be toxic or carcinogenic. In order to establish the
specific dangers posed by these chemicals, researchers must use animal experi-
mentation and epidemiological studies. Using these methods to correlate expo-
sure to vapors or dusts with harmful effects is difficult. As a result, estimates of
the total incidence of occupational disease are little more than a statistical house
of cards.
Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regula-
tion, and Information, 72 Geo. L.J. 1231, 1231-32 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
452. See Wagner, The New Elite Plaintiffs'Bar, 72 A.B.A. J. 44, 44 (Feb. 1986) (noting
that cases such as the Agent Orange litigation, Dalkon Shield litigation, asbestos litiga-
tion, tampon litigation, Bendectin litigation, and the Bhopal litigation "have thousands of
clients, a national scope and involve complex scientific causation questions").
453. See infra Part III.B. .
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addressed the reasoning of the experts upon whose opinions the cases
turn.
4 5 4
1. Use of the Traditional Approach
a. Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.
Two recent cases exemplify the passive acceptance of medical testi-
mony in toxic tort litigation and the untoward consequences that can
result. The first case, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,415 was decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in 1984. Ferebee involved an agricultural worker who allegedly con-
tracted a fatal lung disease as a result of long-term skin exposure to
paraquat, an herbicide distributed by the defendant, Chevron.45 6 After
losing at trial, Chevron appealed, claiming that the plaintiff's evidence of
causation did not support the jury's verdict.457
Chevron argued that all recognized ill-effects of paraquat occur within
a short time of exposure, and cease when exposure ends, and that the
plaintiff's illness did not come close to this pattern. 458 The plaintiff had
not experienced any symptoms until ten months after he had last used
the herbicide.459 Nonetheless, the plaintiff's experts, two pulmonary spe-
cialists who had treated him, opined that paraquat had caused his ill-
ness.'" Both admitted that cases like the plaintiff's were rare,46 1 but one
of them identified three other cases that he felt were "similar.
462
Refusing to probe the validity of the experts' reasoning, the court held
that
[j]udges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to re-
solve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to
link low-level exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease On
questions such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical
and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such a
link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such
testimony.
463
The case thus came down to a "classic battle of the experts, a battle in
which the jury must decide the victor."' 4
454. See infra Part III.B.2. The separation of cases according to the level of judicial
inquiry into the scientific evidence follows the analysis of Rothstein and Crew. See Roth-
stein & Crew, When Should the Judge Keep Expert Testimony From the Jury?, 1 Inside
Litigation at 19 (Apr. 1987).
455. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
456. See id. at 1531-32.
457. See id at 1532.





463. Id. at 1534 (emphasis added).
464. Id at 1535.
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The Ferebee court did add that the methodology used by an expert to
reach a conclusion had to be sound,4 6' but by this it only meant that the
"use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examination ' 4 66 con-
stituted an appropriate method of diagnosis, a point that was not in dis-
pute.46 7 Though the trial court explicitly recognized that the crucial
question was how the experts had concluded that causation followed
from the diagnosis, 468 neither the appellate nor the trial court examined
the reasoning connecting the diagnosis to this conclusion. Unlike the
district court in United States v. Downing,469 both Ferebee courts failed to
shift their analysis to follow the expert's reasoning through to its final
conclusion.
Ferebee reveals not only the usual legal deference to the testimony of
medical doctors,470 but also represents an open retreat from scientific
standards. The court of appeals in Ferebee held that "[iln a courtroom,
the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not
scientific certainty but legal sufficiency .... [T]he fact that ... science
would require more evidence before conclusively considering the causa-
tion question resolved is irrelevant."'471 In effect, the court miscast sci-
ence in terms of absolute certainty only to cast it aside. Instead, the
court relied on each of the three elements of the traditional test. The
experts were well-qualified, they based their opinions on the results of
accepted diagnostic techniques, and they expressed sufficient certainty.472
Unfortunately, this mode of analysis can produce legal verdicts com-
pletely out of keeping with scientifically established facts or scientific
reasoning.
b. Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,4 7 the second recent case illus-
trating passive acceptance of medical testimony, shows the full conse-
quence of stretching the Ferebee standard to its limits. In Ferebee, the
court merely failed to address the scientific merit of the plaintiff's evi-
dence, but in Wells, ignoring science meant the rejection of valid evi-
465. See id. at 1535-36.
466. Id. at 1536.
467. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd,
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
468. See id.
469. 609 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussed
supra notes 355-63 and accompanying text).
470. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535 (court referred to the plaintiff's experts as "eminent
specialists," and was impressed by the fact that they had been plaintiff's "treating
physicians").
471. Id. at 1536.
472. See Ferebee, 552 F. Supp. at 1296 (plaintiff's experts testified at trial that "diagno-
sis of paraquat poisoning was made, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, long
before [plaintiff's] death").
473. 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986).
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dence favorable to the defendant. The issue in Wells, which was tried
without a jury, was whether the plaintiff's birth defects had been caused
by a spermicidal jelly used by her mother for approximately four weeks
between conception and the time she discovered she was pregnant.47 4
Although some preliminary epidemiological studies had suggested such a
causal relationship, further research had failed to bear out this hypothe-
sis."' Indeed, the trial court had found the studies inconclusive, and
therefore had based its decision on the demeanor, tone, motives, biases,
and interests that might have influenced each expert's opinion.47 6 Find-
ing that the plaintiff had established causation to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, the court awarded $5.1 million in damages.4" On ap-
peal, Ortho renewed its arguments that the scientific evidence was in its
favor rather than the plaintiff's, but the Eleventh Circuit, following Fer-
ebee, held that "it does not matter in terms of deciding the case that the
medical community might require more research and evidence before
conclusively resolving the question. What matters is that [the] factfinder
found sufficient evidence of causation in a legal sense in this particular
case ... 478
The impact of the decision in Wells is not, however, limited to the
particular litigants in the case. The court's decision ran counter to the
widely held scientific view that spermicides cause no birth defects. The
case therefore has prompted the medical community to take the two
Wells courts to task for ignoring accepted, well-established (not certain)
scientific facts. Writing in the New England Journal of Medicine, two
physicians from the National Institute of Child Health and Human De-
velopment noted that the Wells "decision took the medical community
by surprise, because the overwhelming body of evidence indicates that
spermicides are not teratogenic."479 They further wrote that the plaintiff
474. See id. at 742-43.
475. See id. at 744 n.4.
476. See Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 266-67 (N.D. Ga.
1985).
477. See id. at 298.
478. Wells, 788 F.2d at 745; see also Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d
908, 915 (5th Cir. 1987) (expert's opinion "need not be generally accepted in the scientific
community before it can be sufficiently reliable and probative to support a jury finding")
(citing Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 744-45 (1lth Cir.), reh'g
denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (1 1th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 437 (1986) and Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)),
cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3718 (April 19, 1988).
479. Mills & Alexander, Occasional Notes Teratogens and "Litogens , 315 The New
England J. of Med. 1234, 1235 (1986). Also see 256 J.A.M.A. 3095-96 (1986), in which
three letters relative to vaginal spermicides and congenital disorders are published. The
first, by one of the co-authors who originally had suggested that exposure to spermicide
might cause certain birth defects, noted that "our article was not corroborated by subse-
quent studies." Id. at 3095.
In the second, others of the co-authors replied to defend the study, but even they cau-
tioned that "[o]ur original publication.., listed a number of caveats against a causal
interpretation of the findings .... We concluded that 'the results should be considered
tentative until confirmed by other data.'" Id at 3096. They went on to add that "[n]ow,
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had won "despite testimony citing the considerable medical evidence that
spermicides do not cause birth defects," and despite the United States
Food and Drug Administration's decision that warnings about birth de-
fects were not warranted.48 °
This kind of scientific outcry is not common, and should not be taken
lightly. The two courts that decided Wells reached a conclusion purport-
edly based on science, but at odds with the scientific community. This is
akin to deciding that the earth is fiat, despite significant scientific opinion
to the contrary. Rejecting science and passively accepting the opinions
of "willing testifiers" leads to such results. When the scientific merit of a
scientific conclusion is disputed, courts cannot rationally and consist-
ently resolve the dispute without at least some consideration of scientific
criteria.
2. Active Review
a. Agent Orange Litigation
In contrast to the passive approach of Ferebee and Wells, a number of
courts have endeavored to hold medical experts to the standards of scien-
tific practice. The best known examples come from the Agent Orange
litigation, in which Judge Weinstein approved the settlement of class
claims481 and granted summary judgment against opt-out plaintiffs,
largely because of inadequate evidence of causation.482 In approving the
settlement, Judge Weinstein reviewed most of the available literature on
the health effects of low-level dioxin exposure, and concluded, notwith-
standing expert deposition testimony to the contrary, that adequate proof
was lacking.4
83
To avoid summary judgment, the opt-out plaintiffs had to overcome
six years after our study, the possibility of a teratogenic effect of spermicides in relation to
limb reduction anomalies remains in substantial doubt." Id.
Still another of the original co-authors wrote in a third letter:
No articles published subsequently have shown unequivocal evidence that
spermicides are teratogenic. In retrospect, I believe our article should never
have been published. In our present litigious environment, the reservations and
qualifications written into a published report are often ignored, and the article is
used as 'proof' of a causal relationship. It would have been much more appro-
priate for our findings to have gone through the more traditional process of
being discussed among colleagues at scientific meetings . . . this peer review
process could have altered the way the manuscript was written or might have
delayed its submission until more information was available.
Id.
480. Mills & Alexander, supra note 479, at 1235.
481. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
482. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1260-63 (E.D.N.Y.
1985).
483. Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at 782-95; see also Lilley v. Dow Chem. Co., 611 F.
Supp. 1267, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (in rejecting expert testimony offered by plaintiff who
had opted out of Agent Orange settlement, the court noted that the expert had relied
improperly upon certain studies: "The authors of these studies acknowledge that more
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strong epidemiologic evidence favorable to the defendants and had to of-
fer sufficient evidence in support of their claims. They failed on both
counts. Judge Weinstein recognized at the outset that sound epidemio-
logic studies were "the only useful studies having any bearing on causa-
tion," and that "all reliable studies of the effect of Agent Orange on
members of the class so far published provide no support for plaintiffs'
claims of causation." 4 He then moved on to an evaluation of the affida-
vits of the plaintiffs' two principal experts, Drs. Singer and Epstein.
Cutting to the core of Dr. Singer's reasoning, he found that it
"amounts to this: the [plaintiffs] complain of various medical problems;
animals and workers exposed to extensive dosages of [dioxin, the toxic
impurity in Agent Orange] have suffered from related difficulties; there-
fore assuming nothing else caused the [plaintiffs'] afflictions, Agent Or-
ange caused them." '485 The assumption circumvented the causation
problem, but only at the expense of making the analysis "so guarded as
to be worthless." '486 Dr. Epstein's reasoning was similarly flawed, be-
cause it contained "no showing that the incidence of the diseases [in
question] are [sic] greater in the Agent Orange-exposed population than
in the population generally." '487 In fact, his deposition testimony re-
vealed that he "failed to apply what he himself recognized as appropriate
criteria." '88
Despite these devastating findings, Judge Weinstein held that Dr.
Singer's general scientific technique had been accepted by a sufficient
number of courts to allow judicial notice of its general acceptance.489 He
further held that the doctor's method of drawing inferences "could with-
stand the flexible approach to Rule 702 admissibility followed in the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits," 4" and that Dr. Epstein's testimony would also
pass Rule 702 muster.49' Thus, Judge Weinstein did not base his holding
directly on the defects in their reasoning. In rejecting their testimony, he
instead invoked Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,492 which al-
lows expert reliance on otherwise inadmissible facts or data only if "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
research is necessary and that no more than a suggestion or vague association may be
hypothesized at present.").
484. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (Weinstein, J.); see also In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 508 F.
Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo. 1981) ("Where... the exact organic cause of a disease cannot
be scientifically isolated, epidemiologic data becomes highly persuasive."), aff'd sub nom.
Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
485. 611 F. Supp. at 1237-38 (emphasis added).
486. Id. at 1238.
487. Id. at 1239.
488. Id. at 1254.
489. See id. at 1243. Why another court's acceptance should influence a judgment
about scientific validity is unclear.
490. Id. at 1243.
491. See id.
492. For a detailed discussion of Judge Weinstein's use of Rule 703, see Carlson, Polic-
ing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 577, 579-83 (1986).
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opinions or inferences upon the subject [at issue]. ' 4 93 He also cited Rule
403, which requires a balancing of probative value against the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury.4 9 4 The ex-
perts had relied upon questionnaire checklists for information about the
plaintiffs, and on animal studies for information about the health effects
of dioxin,495 yet had ignored available epidemiologic information.496
The court's reliance on Rules 703 and 403 in the Agent Orange deci-
sion reflects the absence of clear guidance about the role of reasoning in
expert testimony. Though the court obviously understood the deficien-
cies in how the experts had reached their conclusions, it framed its deci-
sion in terms of the bases upon which the experts relied,497 which
harkens back to the traditional approach to medical testimony. Agent
Orange demonstrates that even without clarification, the Rules can be
used effectively to bar certain scientific expert testimony,498 but its articu-
lated rationale tends to confuse the facts relied upon with the conclusions
based on those facts. A more direct evaluation of the validity of reason-
ing is also possible under the current Rules,499 but a clearly separate re-
quirement for valid reasoning would eliminate this confusion, which has
sometimes led to poor results.5°
b. Johnston v. United States
Johnston v. United States,50 ' a case involving cancers allegedly caused
by low-level radiation exposure, illustrates a more direct analysis of va-
lidity. Johnston was tried without a jury under the Federal Tort Claims
Act,50 2 but in rejecting the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts, the court
took pains to make it clear that it found their reasoning and conclusions
deficient as a matter of law.5"3 The decision concentrated on the lack of
493. Fed. R. Evid. 703.
494. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
495. See Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1246-48.
496. See id. at 1248.
497. See supra notes 492-96 and accompanying text.
498. Other cases have also used the existing Rules effectively to exclude certain scien-
tific evidence. See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420, 1424-26 (E.D.
Tex. 1986) (citing Agent Orange decision), aff'd, 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987); see also
Bendectin cases cited infra notes 517-26; cf. Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp.
1087, 1090 & 1094 (D. Md. 1986) (excluding expert testimony under Rule 703, court
noted that foundation for one expert's testimony was lacking, and that his explanation of
causation was speculative and based on an untested theory), aff'd mem., Wheelahan v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 814 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987).
499. See infra notes 501-05 and accompanying text.
500. See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.) (dis-
cussed supra Part III.B. .b), reh g denied en banc, 795 F.2d 89 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 437 (1986).
501. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984).
502. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (Supp. IV 1986).
503. See Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 383 ("[s]urely, if the United States had timely ob-
jected to [the expert] testimony, these cases would probably have been over in the course
of two days"). But see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 419-23 (D. Utah 1984)
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confirmation for the conclusions, which under the circumstances ren-
dered them unscientific:
Anyone who has been trained in the scientific method realizes that a
hypothesis is a scientist's educated speculation. The scientist then de-
signs experiments to test his hypothesis in order to determine whether
or not his speculation is correct. ... That is how scientists learn what
is fact and what is not true.504
When their reasoning was measured against scientific practice in this
way, the plaintiffs' experts failed miserably. The court found that their
conclusions are not supported by any fact other than that the instru-
ments are coated with a radioactive paint and each plaintiff has can-
cer.... This Court is disappointed with the apparent fact that these
so-called experts can take such license from the witness stand; these
witnesses say and conclude things which, in the Court's view, they
would not dare report in a peer-reviewed format.505
Just as in Agent Orange, the connective reasoning in Johnston came down
to the coincidence of the plaintiffs' exposure and their diseases, and, just
as in Agent Orange, this was not enough. The Johnston court, however,
looked directly to accepted scientific practice, as evidenced by peer re-
view, and based its decision on the expert's failure to conform with this
practice.
3. Impatience with Limited Knowledge
The difference between the level of review in the Ferebee- Wells cases
and in the Agent Orange-Johnston cases may reflect different views of the
competence of courts to assess scientific reasoning, but another impor-
tant factor is judicial unwillingness to accept the limited knowledge that
science sometimes provides. To recognize, as the Ferebee and Wells
courts did, that a question stands at the frontier of scientific inquiry and
then to accept the testimony of those willing to go beyond the frontier
seems an obvious self-contradiction. Such decisions show that distaste
for science has two sides. Ignorance leads not only to deference to ex-
perts, but also to arrogance toward them.
Some commentators have maintained that for legal purposes, science
does not have to be scientific, and that the law can dictate how scientists
should reach their conclusions. A recent student Note concludes that
"[a]t the heart of the problem presently confronted by the courts in toxic
tort suits is the inability to determine causation quantitatively when
(admitting testimony from the same experts rejected in Johnston), rev'd on other grounds,
816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988).
504. Id at 393. It should be noted how the vestiges of Logical Positivism still perme-
ate the court's opinion. For a discussion of Logical Positivism, see supra Part I.C. 1.
505. 597 F. Supp. at 415. On the importance of peer review, see Perry v. United
States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (swine flu case); Kubs v. United States, 537 F.
Supp. 560, 562 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (same); supra note 479.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
trans-scientific issues are involved. '5 ° 6 "Trans-science" relates to ques-
tions that science cannot answer.50 7 Normally, no answer would mean
no proof, and plaintiffs would lose. For unspecified reasons, however,
the Note assumes that scientists somehow can come up with the needed
evidence. It thus calls for a new standard of liability: "The standard
must adjust to the inability of trans-science to quantify the effects of a
substance. It must also resolve or circumvent the evidentiary and proce-
dural problems resulting from the inherently hypothetical, rather than
factual, nature of trans-science. 50
8
An article by Professor Charles Nesson"°9 goes even further. It not
only advocates relaxed standards but actually presumes to explain how
scientists should conduct their work. Although researchers who have
studied the effects of dioxin on laboratory animals are very reluctant to
extrapolate their results to humans,51 0 Professor Nesson believes they
should. Without citing any support for his position, he maintains that
"[ilf a chemical shows carcinogenic effects in a population of healthy lab
animals, a doctor might anticipate similar results ... [in] human be-
ings."5 '1 He assumes the "[l]ab rats are extremely healthy, bred to be
strong, without a history of disease or defect." '512 In fact, the animals
used to test for carcinogenicity usually are bred to be very sensitive to
chemicals, because for the purpose of regulation, it is better to err on the
side of caution. 13 For a crusader impatient with the limits of science,
506. Note, supra note 86, at 431.
507. Id. at 431 n.20 ("questions that seemingly are part of science yet in fact transcend
science").
508. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
509. See Nesson, supra note 27.
510. See Lilley v. Dow Chem. Co., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); infra
note 513.
511. Nesson, supra note 27, at 532.
512. Id.
513. The difficulty of extrapolating results of mouse and rat tests for carcinogenicity
has been a particularly hot topic lately for a number of prominent scientists, particularly
Bruce Ames of the Department of Biochemistry at the University of California, Berkeley.
See Ames, Magaw & Gold, Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 Science 271
(1987), which states:
Extrapolation from the results of rodent cancer tests done at high doses to ef-
fects on humans exposed to low doses is routinely attempted by regulatory
agencies when formulating policies attempting to prevent future cancer. There
is little sound scientific basis for this type of extrapolation, in part due to our
lack of knowledge about mechanisms of cancer induction, and it is viewed with
great unease by many epidemiologists and toxicologists. Nevertheless, to be
prudent in regulatory policy, and in the absence of good human data (almost
always the case), some reliance on animal cancer tests is unavoidable.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Ames, Testimony Before Calif. State Senate Committee
on Toxics and Public Safety Management. (Nov. 11, 1985):
All risk calculations based on rat and mouse cancer tests, both from natural and
man-made carcinogens, are hypothetical: thus, they should be taken with a
great dose of skepticism .... Of the carcinogens tested in both rats and mice in
our database on potency, 42% of the chemicals were positive in the mouse and
negative in the rat, or vice versa. Thus, even two closely related short-lived
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neither scientific facts nor the standards accepted by scientists seem to
matter.
4. The Bendectin Example: The Larger Benefits of Active Review
When courts accept qualified, willing testifiers5' 4 they not only lose
control of scientific evidence, but they also create the kind of litigation
"crapshoot" for which the law is often criticized.5"5 The Bendectin
cases, more than any others, illustrate how this can occur. They also
demonstrate that active review of scientific evidence can prevent it.
Bendectin was a drug designed to alleviate the "morning sickness"
nausea that commonly accompanies pregnancy. The drug was pre-
scribed routinely from 1957 until 1983,5"6 when litigation about birth
defects drove it from the market. Because it was so widely used and
because about two to five percent of all children are born with defects,
whether or not their mother used Bendectin during pregnancy, 517 the
pool of potential plaintiffs is large and ubiquitous. Courts in forty-nine
states and the District of Columbia have had to deal with Bendectin
creatures, the rat and the mouse, don't predict very well for each other whether
a substance is a carcinogen.
Ia at 3. Similar views are expressed by Philip Abelson:
Many of the experiments that have been cited as proving a potential carcinoge-
nicity of a chemical for humans have been performed on inbred strains of mice
that have a natural incidence of liver tumors. In humans, there are taboos
against inbreeding, which often leads to genetic impairments. Thus the use of
inbred mice, though convenient experimentally, is suspect. More important is
the fact of high natural incidence of liver tumors in the test mice. The usual
response of these animals to massive doses of a chemical is to develop an even
higher incidence of liver tumors. When this happens, the chemical is labeled a
potential carcinogen in humans. It so happens that in humans primary liver
cancer is rare with the exception of alcoholics and those who have suffered from
hepatitis.... Thus extra liver tumors in a naturally tumorigenic mouse is of
dubious relevance to humans.
Abelson, Cancer Phobia, 237 Science 473 (1987); see also Schroeder & Shapiro, supra
note 451, at 1232-33 (noting problems attending extrapolation from animal studies to
man); Scroggin, Cancer-Risk Assessments, Trial, Oct. 1987 at 49, 50 (pointing out that
many scientists question the validity of extrapolating high exposure data to predict the
effects of very low exposures).
514. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir.) ("if experts
are willing to testify... it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony"),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
515. Jerome Skinner, one of the plaintiffs' lawyers in the Bendectin litigation, once
referred to the trial of the consolidated cases in the Southern District of Ohio, see infra
note 528 and accompanying text, as "'the biggest crapshoot that ever occurred in the
American legal system."' Kaufman, Jury Concludes Bendectin Caused No Birth Defects,
The Cincinnatti Enquirer, March 13, 1985, A-i, col. 5, at A-16, col. 3.
516. See Letter from Dr. Frank C. Woodside, III, of Dinsmore & Shohl, a Cinncinatti
law firm, to the author (Sept. 28, 1987) (available in the files of the Fordham Law Re-
view). Dr. Woodside, who also is an attorney, has represented Merrell-Dow in a number
of Bendectin cases.
517. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 800 (D.D.C. 1986)
(two to four percent); In Re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
624 F. Supp. 1212, 1229 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (two to five percent).
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cases,5 18 and in almost every instance, the litigation has boiled down to a
fight over causation, often with the same expert witnesses doing battle.
The results have been anything but consistent.
In Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals reversed a trial court that had granted a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the defendant manufacturer.
The trial court had found the testimony of the plaintiff's expert un-
founded and insufficient.520 The appellate court relied on Ferebee and
simply repeated the explanation of the plaintiff's sole causation witness,
with little consideration given to whether or not his reasoning conformed
to accepted scientific practice.521
Undeterred by Oxendine, a federal district court judge in the District
of Columbia granted another judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 522 after a trial dubbed a "virtual
reprise of Oxendine.' ' 523 The judge in Richardson pointed out that
although the Oxendine appellate court had accurately summarized the
testimony, it had not addressed "the significance of certain evidence
bearing upon the current state of scientific knowledge. In consequence, it
judicially reopened an esoteric twenty-year-old controversy which is by
now essentially settled within the scientific community."524 Based on
"the totality of the published scientific literature on the subject of
Bendectin, ' '5 25 the Richardson court held that
the issue being a scientific one, reasonable jurors could not reject [the
scientific] consensus without indulging in precisely the same specula-
tion and conjecture which the multiple investigations undertook, but
failed, to confirm. That Dr. Done [plaintiff's principal expert] remains
an unbeliever and was willing to testify to his disbelief 'with reasonable
medical certainty' does not mandate that this case be left as the jury
decided it.5 26
In addition to the conflict between Oxendine and Richardson, various
courts have returned four verdicts for plaintiffs and twelve for the de-
fendant,127 including a verdict for the defendant when causation was
tried to a jury as a separate issue for 1,174 consolidated cases in the
518. See Letter from Dr. Frank C. Woodside, III to the author (Sept. 28, 1987) (avail-
able in the files of the Fordham Law Review). Vermont is the sole exception. See id.
519. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986).
520. See id. at 1103.
521. See id. at 1104-08.
522. 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986).
523. Id. at 799.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 802.
526. Id. at 803; see also Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs., 646 F. Supp. 856, 862-67 (D.
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); cf Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
647 F. Supp. 544, 547-48 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (testimony of surgeon excluded because he
admitted he was not an expert on teratogenicity).
527. See I Inside Litigation 44 (Sept. 1987).
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Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, 2' and a $95 million plaintiff's
verdict in still a third District of Columbia case.529 Further clouding the
picture is the fact that the Oxendine case has been reopened recently, due
to a finding that the plaintiff's most important expert witness had per-
jured himself. 3° Thus, the law on the issue of causation of birth defects
by Bendectin is uncertain at best. Different courts treat the same evi-
dence differently, and some juries credit expert testimony that others ap-
parently do not.
This state of uncertainty has driven the drug from the market and
must give pause to manufacturers contemplating the development of new
drugs and other products.5 31 Some uncertainty is of course unavoidable,
but a manufacturer should not be subject to liability when valid scientific
reasoning does not support the inference that its product has caused an
injury. Conflicting legal mazes such as the Bendectin litigation result
from the unwillingness of some courts to keep scientific testimony within
the bounds of scientific practice.
Although scientific knowledge is neither certain nor conclusive,
neither is it impossible to tap. The fundamental scientific commitment to
objective reasoning and objective evidence and the process of criticism,
testing, and review, through which that commitment is maintained, al-
low a court to separate valid scientific reasoning from the personal biases
of individual scientists. This is what the judge in Richardson did, 32 and
if others followed suit, the uncertainty about Bendectin litigation would
not exist.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE UNIFIED THEORY
Distinguishing reasoning from conclusions, and validity from reliabil-
ity leads to a unified theory that encompasses all forms of scientific evi-
dence, but using this theory to achieve rationality and consistency raises
528. See Lynch, 646 F. Supp. at 858. Some uncertainty exists about the exact number
of cases consolidated. See In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Li-
tig., 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (indicating total of 1,186 cases with
which the court had some contact).
529. See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, No. 83-3504, slip op. at 1-2 (D.D.C. Oct. 1,
1987). The award subsequently was reduced by $75 million because plaintiff's evidence
was insufficient to serve as the basis for punitive damages. See Order dated Oct. 1, 1987.
530. See Findings of Fact Relevant to Defendant's Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule
60(b), and Memorandum Order, Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No.
1245-82, slip op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 1988) ("The court finds that [Dr. Done's]
testimony was so deliberately false that all his testimony on behalf of plaintiff is sus-
pect.") (emphasis in original).
531. See Fladwell, U.S. Firms Abandoning Birth Control Industry in Wake of Lawsuits,
Washington Post, May 1, 1988, at HI, col. I (noting that private companies are with-
drawing not only from marketing birth control technology but also from developing it;
also quoting Harold Nash, a senior scientist at the Population Council, a nonprofit group:
"It is possible that pharmaceutical companies with their large stores of chemicals might
have found entirely new leads to contraception if they had continued research"); see gen-
erally Huber, supra note 3.
532. See supra notes 522-26 and accompanying text.
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a number of practical concerns. Lawyers would have to force scientific
issues into the open, and courts would then have to base their evidentiary
rulings upon accepted scientific practice, tasks for which members of
both bar and bench traditionally have had little taste.533 Nonetheless,
when courts have to confront the question of scientific validity, they usu-
ally deal with it successfully. 53
4
The problem lies more in a failure to confront the issue of valid versus
invalid reasoning than in explicitly deciding it incorrectly. The solution
is to require experts to explain the reasoning leading to their conclusions
and then to have courts judge the reasoning against scientific practice.
The reliability of the conclusions themselves should be judged against
legal standards involving probativeness, potential prejudice, and, ulti-
mately, the burden of proof.
Adoption of this Article's proposed clarification of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702135 would focus legal attention on these fundamental ques-
tions. In some cases, the result would be to facilitate the evidentiary use
of new scientific developments. In others, unscientific reasoning would
be excluded. Procedurally, the kind of changes envisioned would best be
effected through the use of pretrial motions.
A. The Ability of Courts to Deal with Science
Most of the controversy about scientific evidence has arisen in the con-
text of cases involving medical testimony or Frye-type forensic science.
When courts have to deal with science that is neither forensic nor medi-
cal, however, their response to scientific issues has often been consistent,
well-informed, and appropriate. In a variety of contexts, ranging from
patent disputes to so-called creation science, the ability of courts to un-
derstand science is quite apparent.
1. Patent Cases
Patent litigation often requires courts to evaluate science at a very de-
tailed level, and they generally prove more than equal to the task. For
example, a patent case may turn on the question of whether an invention
is an obvious application of "prior art. ' 536 A party mounting a challenge
to a patent will endeavor to establish that its subject matter "would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which [the] subject matter pertains." 537 Under
533. See supra note 31.
534. See infra notes 536-59 and accompanying text.
535. See supra text accompanying note 79.
536. See, e.g., Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Business Comms., Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 654
(10th Cir.) (in affirming validity of plaintiff's patent for device facilitating computer tele-
communication, court held that obviousness turns on whether the device would have
been conceivable to a worker of ordinary skill in the particular field, noting that in each
case the prior art must be considered), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980).
537. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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this rule, courts frequently must determine how a scientist would reason
to broaden existing knowledge into new areas. The inquiry underlying
such decisions involves consideration of a variety of evidence, including
scientific journals and studies, as well as expert testimony and prior pat-
ents. The detailed judicial understanding of science that results is quite
remarkable.
In Ashland Oil, Ina v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Ina ,3' for exam-
ple, the court had to consider the molecular structure of resins used to
form molds for metal casting. Ashland held a patent for making the
resins and claimed that Delta had infringed upon it.539 The district court
held the patent invalid,5" and Ashland appealed. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded because the lower court
had misconstrued the burden of proof regarding Ashland's patent
claim.54 1 To guide the lower court on remand, the circuit court also re-
viewed the evidence and explained in detail how differences in bridging
mechanisms between phenol rings in various molecules affected the de-
gree to which certain prepatent publications had pointed the way to the
discovery of the resin at issue.5"2 The court clearly had mastered several
complex principles of organic chemistry, and, even more significantly,
considered the literature more probative than the expert testimony of-
fered by Delta.543 This refusal to rely blindly upon experts accords with
the usual practice in patent cases, and further emphasizes the depth of
substantive scientific review often undertaken by courts.
2. Creation Science
While patent cases illustrate judicial ability to grapple with science at a
detailed level, cases involving the first amendment and creation science
demonstrate that courts are equally capable of addressing issues related
to the philosophical nature of science and scientific knowledge. Creation
science, or "scientific creationism," arose in the 1960's in response to an
increased emphasis on the theory of evolution in the biology curriculum
of many schools.' The idea that species have evolved and developed
over time contradicts a literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis be-
cause evolution implies that complex organisms such as man were not
created instantly by God. 5 For religious fundamentalists who believe
538. 776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1017 (1986).
539. See id, at 284.
540. See id. at 283; Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 587 F. Supp.
1406 (E.D. Mich. 1984), rev'd, 776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U..S 1017
(1986).
541. See 776 F.2d at 293.
542. See id at 296-97.
543. See id at 294.
544. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
545. In fact, evolution does not explain, or even address, the origin of life. It deals
only with how life has developed since its origin. See id at 1266 ("the scientific commu-
nity does not consider origins of life a part of evolutionary theory").
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in the literal truth of the Bible, this contradiction means that evolution
must be wrong.
To prove the error of evolution, some fundamentalists have sought to
put their creationist view on a scientific footing,54 6 and, by about 1977,
one fundamentalist group began to advocate that states require the teach-
ing of creation science as well as evolution. 47 Arkansas passed a Bal-
anced Treatment Act in 1981,548 as did Louisiana.54 9 Both laws quickly
drew challenges and ultimately both were struck down as violative of the
first amendment's establishment clause. 5 0 The decision in McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education551 provides a particularly thoughtful and
thorough analysis of how science works and how courts can distinguish it
from efforts to clothe religious beliefs in scientific garb.552
In order to determine if the challenged statute had any legitimate edu-
cational value that might counterbalance its advancement of fundamen-
talist precepts, the McLean court undertook an analysis of the scientific
validity of creationism. The court noted that science is what scientists do
and what is accepted by the scientific community,553 and listed five essen-
tial characteristics of science: "(1) It is guided by natural law; (2) It has
to be explanatory by reference to natural law; (3) It is testable against the
empirical world; (4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily
the final word; and (5) It is falsifiable. '55 4
The court found that creationism lacked these characteristics and that
not a single recognized scientific journal had ever published an article
espousing creation science.555 In response to the argument that a con-
spiracy against new ideas might explain the paucity of publication, the
court noted that the scientific community *consists of individuals and
groups who work independently in a variety of fields.5 56 The court ob-
served that a scientist's work "is published and subject to review and
testing by [his] peers, ' 55 7 and it is "inconceivable that such a loose knit
546. See id. at 1259.
547. See id. at 1261.
548. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 80-1663 to -1670. (Supp. 1985).
549. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
550. U.S. Const. amend. I.
551. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
552. Litigation over the Arkansas creationism statute ended with the district court
decision, see id., but a challenge to the almost identical Louisiana statute eventually
reached the United States Supreme Court. In Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 427
(E.D. La. 1985), the court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs who had challenged
the law's constitutionality. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. See
Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985). Applying a more limited analysis
than that used by the Eastern District of Arkansas in McLean, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit but it never explicitly plumbed the meaning of "science."
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
553. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
554. Id.
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group of independent thinkers in all the varied fields of science could, or
would, ... effectively censor new scientific thought.'" '  Guided by a
sound and thorough understanding of what comprises the actual practice
of science, the McLean court easily focused on the scientific deficiencies
of creationism and rejected it.519
B. The Need to Make Reasoning Explicit and to Judge It Against
Scientific Practice
The above-described patent and creation science cases indicate that
courts have the ability to deal with scientific issues, which suggests that
in the areas of forensic science and medical testimony, the real problem
may be that these issues never get considered. Experts often use ill-de-
fined terminology,s" ° and give vague and ambiguous testimony that law-
yers simply fail to challenge 61 and that courts often accept even when it
is challenged. Eliminating these problems requires a clear evidentiary
standard that makes explicit the need to examine reasoning as well as
conclusions. Such a standard would focus attention on the validity of
reasoning and would provide the basis for appellate review when trial
courts refuse to address it.
If courts in cases involving forensic science and medical testimony fol-
lowed the lead of the McLean court and based their decisions about sci-
entific evidence on accepted scientific practice,562 most of the evidentiary
problems surrounding science in these areas would disappear. Courts
that have effectively controlled medical and forensic scientific evidence
generally have done so because they identify and examine the reasoning
behind conclusions.563 They compare that reasoning to the accepted
558. Id
559. An excellent account of the McLean case is provided in Thomas, Commentary:
Science v. Creation Science, 11 Science, Technology & Human Values 47 (Summer 1986).
Interestingly, some philosophers of science think that creation science could pass Mc-
Lean's five-part test, see McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1267 (though not necessarily the "sci-
ence is what scientists do" test). One philosopher has written that members of his
profession should only testify about generally accepted philosophy. See Thomas, supra, at
48-49 (citing Quinn, The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness, in Science and Reality
32 (J. Cushing, C. Delaney & G. Gutting eds. 1984)).
560. See Smith, What's in a Word: Expert Jargon and the Reasoning Behind It, De-
fense Research Institute Monograph (in press).
561. Professor Giannelli has warned against inferring that testimony is reliable simply
because it is unopposed. See Giannelli, supra note 4, at 1243; see also United States v.
Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.) (defense lawyer neither objected to nor cross-
examined witness about alleged deficiencies in scientific evidence later raised on appeal),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980); supra note 31; cf Fensterer v. State, 493 A2d 959, 964
(Del.) (noting that effective cross-examination requires that expert commit to the basis
for his opinion), rev'd, 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
562. See supra notes 553-59 and accompanying text.
563. See. e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1242-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussed supra notes 482-96 and accompanying text); Johnston v.
United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 431 (D. Kan. 1984), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988)
(discussed supra notes 501-05 and accompanying text); People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470,
477-78, 490-91, 391 N.W.2d 270, 273, 279 (1986) (involving electrophoresis blood typ-
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practices of the scientific community, often turning to its literature for
guidance,"6 and determine if the reasoning is appropriate to the facts of
a given case.5 65 Their analysis focuses not simply on the legal sufficiency
of what an expert concludes, but on the way the conclusion was reached.
The New York trial court that prohibited the use of voiceprints for
identification in People v. Collins 66 took precisely this approach. The
court's analysis centered on the crucial element in the reasoning behind
the voiceprint technique-the premise that voice spectrographs for an
individual are relatively invariable, and that there is significant variation
between different individuals.5 67 Although the tradition that encrusts the
judicial evaluation of medical testimony tends to prevent the kind of re-
view of reasoning seen in Collins, some courts have taken a similar ap-
ing); People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 709-10, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-69 (1978) (dis-
cussed supra notes 270-82 and accompanying text). The Young case is discussed in detail
in Black, supra note 193, at 1509.
564. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.D.C.
1986) (discussed supra notes 522-26 and accompanying text); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1240 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussed supra notes 482-
496 and accompanying text); Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 428-30 (D.
Kan. 1984) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 694 (1988) (discussed supra notes 501-05 and accom-
panying text); People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 489-90, 391 N.W.2d 270, 279 (Mich.
1986) (discussed supra note 563); People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 709-11, 405
N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-70 (1978) (discussed supra notes 270-82 and accompanying text).
565. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.), on remand,
609 F. Supp. 784, 791-92 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussed
supra notes 350-63 and accompanying text); People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470, 490, 391
N.W.2d 270, 279 (Mich. 1986) (discussed supra note 563); People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d
704, 712-13, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 370-71 (1978) (discussed supra notes 270-82 and accom-
panying text).
566. 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1978) (discussed supra notes 270-82 and ac-
companying text).
567. See id. at 712-18, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 370-74. The technique's principal advocate
had acknowledged that the parameters responsible for variation were not well deter-
mined, and that the premise had been inferred indirectly. See id. at 713-14, 405 N.Y.S.2d
at 371. The court noted, moreover, that "there has been no experimentation to show that
two different voices will always appear different spectrographically." Id. at 713, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 371. The inference had not been tested "in the crucible of controlled experi-
mentation ... and scrutiny of the results in various scientific journals." Id. at 709, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 369.
It was not necessary in Collins to consider the appropriateness of voiceprint identifica-
tion to the specific facts of the case because the invalidity of the reasoning made any
forensic application improper. Sometimes, however, the court must follow the reasoning
further. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.), on remand, 609 F. Supp. 784
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd mem, 780 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussed supra notes 350-63 and
accompanying text), which involved the psychology of eyewitness identification, demon-
strates how the relationship between reasoning and specific facts can become the main
concern. On remand, the trial court in Downing noted a number of differences between
the situations covered by psychological studies and the circumstances at issue in the case.
See 609 F. Supp. at 792 ("It is perhaps in establishing the 'fit' between the scientific
research presented by Dr. Buckhout and the disputed factual issues of this case that de-
fendant's argument... is weakest."). The court held that testimony based on the studies
was inadmissable because they bore too little relationship to the circumstances involved
in the case at bar. See id. at 792.
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proach to medical issues. Cases such as Johnston v. United States568 and
the Agent Orange opt-out cases569 demonstrate that, even for medical evi-
dence, courts do have the ability to isolate an expert's reasoning for anal-
ysis and to compare it with accepted practices. 570
C. The Unified Theory's Effect on Admissibility.
Two Contrasting Examples
Although application of the unified theory often would make it more
difficult to introduce some kinds of scientific evidence, in other cases the
theory would facilitate admissibility. Requiring an accepted explanation
of the reasoning behind expert testimony leads not only to the exclusion
of specious and unscientific opinions but also makes it easier for courts to
admit new, well-founded conclusions. Two examples highlight these
contrasting, though consistent, results.
The first example involves the recognition, about twenty years ago,
that some heart attacks suffered by munitions workers occurred as a re-
sult of withdrawal from exposure to nitroglycerin. 571 The second in-
volves the generally rejected idea that common environmental exposures
can compromise a person's immune system, thereby causing a host of
non-specific and otherwise unexplained symptoms.5 72 Courts have al-
lowed expert witnesses to testify about each of these conclusions, 573 even
though neither would have survived a typical application of the Frye test.
Under the unified theory approach, the nitroglycerin evidence would eas-
ily qualify, but the immune deficiency evidence would not.
568. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984) (discussed supra notes 501-05 and accompany-
ing text).
569. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (discussed supra notes 482-96 and accompa-
nying text).
570. In both of these cases, the experts essentially based their conclusions about causa-
tion on the fact that plaintiffs had been exposed, at very low levels, to substances that had
been shown to be at least potentially harmful at higher levels. See In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1237-39; Johnston, 597 F. Supp. at 389, 415. As the
Johnston court put it, reasoning that plaintiffs contracted cancer from the mere fact that
instruments used by them were coated with radioactive paint, without experimental test-
ing, constituted nothing more than speculation, see 597 F. Supp. at 393, which the ex-
perts "would not dare report in a peer-reviewed format." Id at 415.
571. See Lange, Reid, Tresch, Keelan, Bernhard & Coolidge, Nonatheromatous Ische-
mic Heart Disease Following Withdrawalfrom Chronic Industrial Nitroglycerin Exposure,
46 Circulation 666, 675-77 (1972) [hereinafter Lange]; Lund, Haggendal & Johnsson,
Withdrawal Symptoms in Workers Exposed to Nitroglycerin, 25 Brit. J. Indus. Med. 136,
136 (1968) [hereinafter Lund].
572. See American Academy of Allergy and Immunology, Position Statement on
Clinical Ecology, 78 J. of Allergy & Clinical Immunology 269, 270 (1986) [hereinafter
Academy Statement]; California Medical Association Scientific Task Force on Clinical
Ecology, Clinical Ecology-A Critical Appraisal, 144 W. J. of Med. 239, 239 (1986) [here-
inafter Task Force Appraisal].
573. See, eg., Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1983) (nitro-
glycerin); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 499-507 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)
(chemically induced immune deficiency syndrome), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 86-
6087, slip op. (6th Cir. May 24, 1988).
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1. Nitroglycerin and Heart Attacks: Clear Proof
Based on Clear Reasoning
Doctors long have recognized that workers who handle nitroglycerin
and nitroglycol in the course of making munitions and explosives may
experience immediate reactions that include headaches, nausea, and
heart palpitations, 574 but that, except in severe cases, a tolerance develops
within approximately one week.5 75 In the early 1950's, however, an ad-
ditional concern developed when reports appeared that some workers
were suffering chest pains, and even death, due to withdrawal from expo-
sure.576 These effects generally were attributed to nitroglycol 7 7 Then,
in 1967, three Swedish researchers pinpointed withdrawal from nitro-
glycerin as the more probable cause.578 Their study, based on nine
cases, 579 soon was confirmed by an American study first presented in
1971.580 The American work also was based on only nin6 cases, 81 but
through careful analysis of electrocardiograms, angiograms, and other
data it revealed the mechanism responsible for the problems associated
with withdrawal: nitroglycerin exposure causes arteries to dilate, making
it easier for the heart to pump blood,5 82 but when exposure ends, the
arteries tend to contract, which has the opposite effect and can lead to
spasms and heart attacks.58 3
The relationship established by the American study was thoroughly
explained and documented and was verified by detailed testing. In addi-
tion, both the American and the Swedish studies appeared in well-estab-
lished, peer-reviewed journals. Nonetheless, this relationship was neither
widely known nor generally accepted in the early 1970's.4 If Frye had
been applied to the conclusion and not to the reasoning, testimony about
the relationship would have been inadmissible. Under the approach pro-
posed in this Article, however, such a clear and verified explanation, ap-
pearing in a peer-reviewed journal, would have indicated admissibility.
The absence of dissenting views would also have favored admissibility.





579. See id. at 136-38.
580. See Lange, supra note 571.
581. See id at 667.
582. See id. Indeed, doctors often use nitroglycerin to treat patients who have heart
conditions. See Jordan, Seth, Henry, Wilen & Franciosa, Dose Requirements and
Hemodynamic Effects of Transdermal Nitroglycerin Compared with Placebo in Patients
with Congestive Heart Failure, 71 Circulation 980, 980 (1985).
583. See Lange, supra note 571, at 677.
584. See Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that the
Lange study documented for the first time the relationship between angina and chronic
exposure to nitroglycerin, and that this "marked the first medical identification of the
causal relation; neither clinical cardiology texts nor medical journals had previously dis-
cussed or described the phenomenon of angina among workers regularly exposed to
nitroglycerin.").
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Of course, if the probability were too low that the relationship applied to
a specific, individual plaintiff's case, the evidence would fail the reliabil-
ity portion of the proposed test. In fact, when a Wisconsin munitions
plant worker sued the government in 1972 because of heart problems,
causation was not contested.585
2. Clinical Ecology: Defective Reasoning Leads
to Defective Conclusions
In recent years, some plaintiffs have attempted to establish a causal
link between chemical exposures and diseases by introducing testimony
based on "clinical ecology." '5 86 Experts in this field have testified that
exposure to common industrial chemicals damages the immune system,
and they maintain that this damage can in turn cause cancer and other
diseases.587 This line of reasoning provides plaintiffs with a wonderful
argument because it relates virtually any disease to chemicals.588 The
only problem is that the scientific community generally has condemned
the theories of clinical ecologists as unfounded and unscientific.58 9
Clinical ecology provides a classic example of how a court can resolve
evidentiary disputes about science by reference to scientific literature. It
also illustrates the need to view the literature critically, with an eye to-
ward why articles are published and in what journals. Science thrives on
new ideas, and journals often accept articles to generate debate and to
foster the criticism and review so necessary to maintaining scientific ob-
jectivity. Thus, proponents of the theory of clinical ecology, which goes
back some fifty years, 590 occasionally have published in well-regarded
journals.5 91 They also have their own publications, though these are not
cited often by other scientists. 592 A quick and uncritical review of the
literature therefore might indicate that the reasoning of clinical ecologists
passes the threshold test of publication, but further review reveals that
this does not necessarily imply acceptance.
585. See id. at 1267-68.
586. Marshall, Woburn Case May Spark Explosion of Lawsuits, 234 Sci. 418, 418(1986).
587. See i.d; see also Marshall, Immune System Theories on Trial, 234 Sci. 1490, 1490
(1986).
588. See Marshall, supra note 586, at 418 (statement of Donald Evans, Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel of the Chemical Manufacturers Association).
589. See Marshall, supra note 587, at 1491 (pointing out that even a scientist on the
staff of the Environmental Defense Fund, who is a strong advocate of chemical regula-
tion, has referred to clinical ecologists as "unspeakable"); see also Brodsky, 'Allergic to
Everything'. A Medical Subculture, 24 Psychosomatics 731, 731 (1983) (referring to
clinical ecology as a movement "on the fringe of established medicine").
590. See Task Force Appraisal, supra note 572, at 243.
591. See, e.g., Randolph, Ecologic Orientation in Medicine: Comprehensive Environ-
mental Control in Diagnosis and Therapy, 23 Annals of Allergy 7 (1965).
592. For example, the Journal of Clinical Ecology cannot be found at either the Johns
Hopkins Medical Library, or the University of Maryland Medical School Library, librar-
ies at two of the nation's top medical schools.
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Both the American Academy of Allergy and Immunology 593 and the
California Medical Association 594 have published official positions in
their journals denouncing clinical ecology. Their disapproval derives
from the fact that clinical ecologists tend only to describe their hypothe-
ses and to give anecdotal examples.595 The California group has ob-
served that the few studies that have "used scientifically sound methods
have provided evidence that the effectiveness of certain treatment meth-
ods used by clinical ecologists is based principally on placebo re-
sponse. ' ' 596  The group found no convincing evidence that unique,
recognizable syndromes occur in clinical ecology patients, or that the di-
agnostic tests used by practitioners in the field are either effective or
reliable.597
The American Academy of Allergy and Immunology similarly has
concluded that:
The theoretical basis for ecological illness... has not been established
as factual, nor is there satisfactory evidence to support the actual exist-
ence of "immune system dysregulation" or maladaption. There is no
clear evidence that many of the symptoms [cited by clinical ecologists]
are related to allergy, sensitivity, toxicity, or any other type of reaction
from foods, water, chemicals, pollutants, viruses, and bacteria ....
Properly controlled studies defining objective parameters of illness,
properly controlled evaluation of the treatment modalities, and appro-
priate patient assessment have not been done. Anecdotal articles do
not constitute sufficient evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship be-
tween symptoms and environmental exposure. The major techniques
used by the clinical ecologists are controversial and unproven. 598
Given such clear expositions of the flawed reasoning behind clinical
ecology, a court should have no trouble excluding evidence based upon
its tenets. At least one court, however, has accepted the testimony of
clinical ecologists. In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,599 damages
593. See Academy Statement, supra note 572.
594. See Task Force Appraisal, supra note 572. California has a particular interest in
clinical ecology because the current advocates of the theory come mostly from the west
coast and Texas. See Marshall, supra note 587, at 1490-91. Prominent among such ex-
perts is Dr. Alan Levin, who is from San Francisco. See id. at 1490.
595. See Task Force Appraisal, supra note 572, at 243.
596. Id.
597. See id.
598. Academy Statement, supra note 572, at 270; see also American Academy of Al-
lergy and Immunology, Candidiasis Hypersensitivity Syndrome, 78 J. of Allergy &
Clinical Immunology 271, 272-73 (1986) (recommending that the concept of candidiasis
[yeast germ] hypersensitivity syndrome not be accorded recognition); American Acad-
emy of Allergy and Immunology, Unproven Procedures for Diagnosis and Treatment of
Allergic and Immunologic Diseases, 78 J. of Allergy & Clinical Immunology 275, 275-76
(1986) (editorial calling for appropriate evaluation and testing); Lowell, Some Untested
Diagnostic and Therapeutic Procedures in Clinical Allergy, 56 J. of Allergy & Clinical
Immunology 168, 168-69 (1975) (same); cf. Grieco, Controversial Practices in Allergy,
247 J.A.M.A. 3106, 3110 (1982) (discussing lack of objective evidence to support the use
of certain diagnostic and therapeutic techniques).
599. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 86-6087, slip
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were awarded explicitly for harm to the plaintiffs' immune systems.'
Another court, in dealing with one of the same experts who testified in
Sterling, reached the opposite conclusion. In Schickele v. Rhodes,"' the
defendants were granted a motion in limine to exclude the expert's testi-
mony insofar as it was based on clinical ecology.
3. The Contrast Between the Examples and Why Scientific
Deficiencies Should Be Apparent to Courts
The foregoing examples demonstrate the ways in which valid scientific
reasoning differs from invalid reasoning. The nitroglycerin/heart attack
relationship was established through painstaking objective analysis that
conformed to the scientific criteria of testability, objectivity and imparti-
ality, and to the requirement that evidence and reasoning be con-
nected." 2 Clinical ecology fails on all of these counts. Comparison of
one of the basic clinical ecology publications 6" 3 with the 1971 American
nitroglycerin study' illustrates the difference between the two exam-
ples. Where the nitroglycerin article contains a wealth of data, the
clinical ecology article contains virtually none. It merely sets forth the
hypotheses of the field and describes treatment regimes based on those
hypotheses. Clinical ecologists have, in effect, attempted to create their
own niche, separate from the rest of science. Their maneuver may avoid
the crucible of criticism, but it is precisely this avoidance that makes
their field unscientific." 5
A court having to decide the admissibility of evidence based upon
clinical ecology .would find an almost complete absence of supporting
op. (6th Cir. May 24, 1988). The Sixth Circuit held Velsicol liable for some damages,
but rejected clinical ecology and reversed on the issue of immune system damage. Cf
Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding
that allegations of injury to immune system can survive a motion to dismiss, although
noting that current medical science "cannot supply to the legal system information con-
cerning the nature of present injury or of causation"); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (D. Mass. 1986) (expert's affidavit suffices to bar summary judg-
ment despite the fact that the affidavit did not specifically identify the illnesses suffered by
each plaintiff as a result of immune system changes, nor state that plaintiffs suffered more
ailments than the average person would have over the same time span).
600. See 647 F. Supp. at 344-47. This decision has sparked the same kind of scientific
outcry as that which followed Wells. See Miller, Courtroom Science and Standards of
Proof, The Lancet, Nov. 28, 1987, at 1283 (noting that in the Sterling and Wells cases and
others, "[s]ubjectivity and impression [have] superseded scientific judgement; packaging
and presentation rate higher than the scientific validity of the testimony."); supra Part
III.B.l.b.
601. No. C-451843, slip op. (Ariz. Superior Ct. Maricopa County July 30, 1986); cf
Higgins v. Aerojet-General Corp., 1986 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1183 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986)
(jury verdict for defendant in action alleging injuries, including immune system damage,
resulting from defendant company's disposal of trichloroethylene and other solvents in
unlined ditches on its property).
602. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
603. See Randolph, supra note 591.
604. See Lange, supra note 571.
605. See supra notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
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data. 6 It also would have the benefit of the criticism that has appeared
in the literature. To the extent that clinical ecology has been subjected to
the process of testing and critical review that provides the basis for scien-
tific objectivity, it has failed miserably. Courts should have no trouble
distinguishing such shoddy work from the kind of thorough effort that
led to the understanding of the effects of nitroglycerin withdrawal. Ap-
plication of the unified theory, with its focus on reasoning, will not im-
pose an impossible burden on courts. They can and should exercise
control over the use of scientific evidence.
D. Procedural Issues
When the unified theory approach leads to the conclusion that scien-
tific evidence does not conform to accepted scientific practice, a court
should either exclude the evidence as inadmissible or find it insufficient to
sustain a verdict." 7 Inadmissibility offers the more appropriate basis for
control when a conclusion is based on invalid reasoning, but as the judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict in the Richardson Bendectin case illus-
trates, insufficiency can serve just as well once an invalid conclusion is
admitted."°s In practice, the distinction between admissibility and suffi-
ciency may really be just a question of how central the disputed scientific
evidence is to the litigation.
If, in addition to the challenged evidence, a party has undisputed evi-
dence sufficient to meet its burden of proof, the challenge usually will be
decided on the basis of admissiblity. On the other hand, if the evidence
at issue is vital to the party's case, summary judgment based on insuffi-
ciency may result. In either case, however, the court's analysis of the
evidence probably will be the same. For example, whether a pretrial dis-
pute about scientific evidence is framed in terms of a motion for sum-
mary judgment based on an insufficient opinion expressed at a
deposition, or on a motion in limine based on the inadmissibility of the
same opinion, a court's decision about the evidence most likely will turn
on the same set of facts.
Although a court has available a variety of mechanisms for exercising
control either before, during, or after trial," pretrial resolution of dis-
606. The clinical ecology testimony relied upon by the trial court in Sterling illustrates
the paucity of supporting data. When asked to explain immunology and allergy, one of
the plaintiffs' principal witnesses simply gave a history of who had developed the field and
how its two component parts once had been pursued separately. See Sterling v. Velsicol
Chem. Co., 647 F. Supp. 303, 499-500 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No.
86-6087, slip op. (6th Cir. May 24, 1988).
607. Even if courts do not exercise control directly, forcing reasoning into the open,
and making it clear to the jury that scientific acceptance is to be the basis for finding it
valid, would vastly improve the use of scientific evidence.
608. See Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 799-800 (D.D.C.
1986); see also supra notes 522-26 and accompanying text.
609. Motions in limine or motions for summary judgment would provide the principal
opportunities before trial. Objections also will be raised during testimony at trial. After
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putes about scientific evidence through summary judgment or orders in
limine should be particularly encouraged. 61' Existing discovery proce-
dures can generate adequate information before trial upon which to base
decisions.6"' Indeed, the Manual for Complex Litigation contemplates
the use of court-appointed experts, special masters, and magistrates to
resolve evidentiary issues.612 This kind of collateral factfinding requires
significant time and effort, however, and would not be appropriate during
trial. Prompted by this concern, the Third Circuit, in In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,6" 3 held that in limine considera-
tion of the evidentiary issues raised by expert testimony is more efficient
than delaying a ruling until trial, reasoning that this procedure would
permit more thorough briefing and argument.614
The more conclusive procedure of summary judgment also can be used
to handle questionable scientific evidence, as illustrated by the disposition
of the Agent Orange opt-out cases.6" 5 Since the Agent Orange decision,
Supreme Court rulings in three landmark cases have made summary
judgment an even more viable alternative.61 6 Under the holding in An-
both sides have presented their cases, a motion for a directed verdict would be appropri-
ate, and finally, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
610. See Imwinkelried I, supra note 16, at 577-81 (advocating preliminary screening of
validity by judge under Rules 901, 611, and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Pro-
fessor Imwinkelried's proposal essentially is limited to forensic techniques and is predi-
cated on a Logical Positivist view of the scientific method that would not provide a
workable test for the complex patterns of expert reasoning seen in toxic tort cases. None-
theless, the procedural part of his proposal fully accords with the analytical framework
proposed in this Article. See also Epstein, Motions in Limine-A Primer, 8 Litigation 34
(Spring 1982) (discussing utility of motions in limine); Saltzburg, Tactics of the Motion in
Limine, 9 Litigation 17 (Summer 1983) (same).
611. See Note, supra note 1, at 695; see also Manual for Complex Litigation, Second
§ 21.5 (1985) (covering special referrals to court-appointed experts, special masters, mag-
istrates, and others); Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D.
599 (1983).
612. See Manual for Complex Litigation, Second § 21.5 (1985). In addition, Rule
43(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates full evidentiary hearings, if
necessary, on pretrial motions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(e).
613. 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
614. See 723 F.2d at 260; see also Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 612 F. Supp. 904,
923, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court must exclude, in limine, exhibits and damage theories
based on speculation and guesswork; in limine consideration of expert testimony is also
deemed appropriate), aff'd, 801 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 1295
(1987); Fowler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 92 F.R.D. 1, 3-4 (N.D. Miss. 1980)
(granting defendant tire manufacturer's motion to exclude documents related to tire de-
signs other than design of tire actually involved in accident that injured plaintiff).
615. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also
supra notes 483-96 and accompanying text.
616. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317 (1986). For a good discussion of these cases, see generally Childress, A New Era for
Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987); Wal-
lance, Summary Judgment Ascending, 14 Litigation 6 (Winter 1988).
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derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,617 for a plaintiff to survive a motion for
summary judgment, "there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoid-
ably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict ....61
Anderson was a libel case, but its interpretation of summary judgment
applies to scientific as well as other testimony. Relying on Agent Orange,
Anderson, and other recent Supreme Court cases, the Western District of
Michigan recently granted partial summary judgment in a case involving
claims that the defendant's conduct had increased the risk that the plain-
tiffs would contract cancer.619 The court held that the plaintiffs' expert
testimony on the issue of causation was insufficient.620
Even if courts take full advantage of available procedures, the commit-
ment of judicial resources required for the rational and consistent control
of scientific evidence should not be minimized. Ultimately, however, im-
provements in fairness and efficiency would result. Over the long run,
decisions based on a principled review of the validity of disputed reason-
ing would reduce the number of cases in which issues related to a specific
kind of testimony would have to be addressed.
CONCLUSION
Rational and consistent judicial control of scientific evidence requires
an analytical framework based on a distinction between the scientific va-
lidity of the reasoning that connects facts to conclusions, and the reliabil-
ity of the conclusions themselves in view of legal requirements. Within
such a framework, a uniform and consistent standard can be applied to
all kinds of science in all kinds of cases. To put this proposal into prac-
tice, the Federal Rules of Evidence should be clarified by establishing an
explicit requirement for scientifically valid reasoning, and a separate re-
quirement for legally sufficient reliability. This change would resolve the
longstanding debate about the Frye general acceptance test, and it also
would greatly improve the judicial evaluation of medical testimony, to
which Frye traditionally has not been applied.
In recent years the need for a change in the rules governing scientific
evidence has become especially acute. The emergence of toxic tort litiga-
tion has brought disputes about the reasoning of experts to the fore. In
toxic tort cases the conclusions reached by experts very often are quite
clear (even if not clearly sufficient), as are the facts upon which the ex-
perts rely. The real issue is whether scientifically valid reasoning con-
nects facts to conclusions. Historically, cases involving traditional
medical testimony or forensic science have turned on other issues. In-
617. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
618. Id. at 252.
619. See Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
620. See id. at 1524-25.
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stead of reasoning and its validity, courts usually have focused on factors
such as the probability of error or the degree of certainty expressed by a
witness. This approach has led to aberrations even in the more tradi-
tional cases, but in toxic tort cases it has sometimes resulted in decisions
that defy reality.
When confronted with disputed and questionable expert scientific tes-
timony, courts need not and should not passively admit opinions that do
not derive from accepted scientific practices, and lawyers need not and
should not leave unscientific testimony unchallenged. With a rudimen-
tary understanding of how science depends on a commitment to objectiv-
ity and on a process of criticism and review, both judges and lawyers are
more than capable of distinguishing valid from invalid reasoning. In-
deed, cases that have arisen in contexts that do not involve medical or
forensic science clearly demonstrate that the judicial system can effec-
tively evaluate scientific evidence if the effort is made.
The question of scientifically valid reasoning ultimately comes down to
a question of acceptance, and the law can apply this test just as well as
science applies it. Courts should not reopen questions that science has
resolved, nor should they presume the existence of knowledge that sci-
ence cannot provide.62 A legal standard that looks to scientific accept-
ance as the best evidence of valid reasoning would produce decisions
consistent both with science and with each other, and would avoid most
of the problems that scientific evidence has so long posed for the law.
621. See Marshall, supra note 587, at 1491. In this article, Marshall discusses the inap-
propriateness of resolving scientific issues in the courtroom. He quotes Ellen Silbergeld,
staff scientist with the Environmental Defense Fund, who has expressed fears that experts
who advocate unsound theories will frighten away good scientists: "'I hate to see a novel
area of science being worked out in the courts. If it discourages good people from getting
involved, it would be unfortunate.'" Id

